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Résumé
Dans l'optique du troisième Objectif de Développement Durable ("Santé et Bien-
Etre pour tous"), il est nécessaire d'augmenter les ressources consacrées à la santé
dans les pays à faible revenus, mais aussi de s'assurer que ces ressources sont al-
louées de façon optimale. Pour cela, les mesures d'ecience sont un outil d'analyse
adapté pour évaluer la performance des systèmes au niveau macroéconomique ou
des établissement de santé au niveau microéconomique, an d'obtenir "plus de santé
pour son argent" (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, 2010). Au travers de ses qua-
tre chapitres, cette thèse s'inscrit dans la littérature empirique de l'évaluation de
l'ecience des systèmes de santé.
Le premier chapitre est une revue méthodologique des mesures non-paramétriques
d'ecience, utilisées dans les trois chapitres empiriques qui suivent. Le second
chapitre estime l'ecience d'un échantillon de 120 pays à revenu faible ou intermé-
diaire de 1997 à 2014. On considère que les systèmes de santé produisent des résul-
tats en termes de santé (de la survie maternelle et infantile) grâce à des dépenses
de santé. Les résultats montrent que, pour un état de santé identique, les pays de
l'échantillon pourraient dépenser 20% de ressources en moins en moyenne, et que
l'inecience augmente avec le niveau de développement. Les deux derniers chapitres
sont des études de cas. Le troisième porte sur un échantillon d'hôpitaux municipaux
à Weifang, dans la province chinoise du Shandong. Il met en lumière, grâce à des
données d'enquête, le potentiel d'amélioration en termes de performance, et le rôle
de certains facteurs sur l'inecience des hôpitaux: la demande de soins, et la part de
subventions dans leur revenu. Le quatrième chapitre traite de l'ecience des étab-
lissements de soins de santé primaires à Oulan-Bator, en Mongolie. Avec les mêmes
ressources, ils pourraient produire 30% de soins supplémentaires en moyenne. Le
bassin de desserte est positivement associé au niveau d'ecience, mais la faible ré-
munération du personnel, ainsi qu'un équilibre sous-optimal entre personnel médical
et non-médical semblent freiner l'ecience des établissements de santé.
Mots-clefs: Financement de la santé ; Ecience ; Soin de santé primaire; Analyse
en frontière partielle; Réforme pharmaceutique chinoise.

Summary
In the perspective of the third Sustainable Development Goal ("Good Health and
Well-being"), it is necessary to increase nancial resources for health in low income
countries, but also to ensure that those resources are optimally allocated. To this
purpose, eciency measures appear as a useful tool to assess the performance of
healh systems at the macroeconomic level, or of health facilities as the microeco-
nomic level to get "more health for the money" (WHO,2010). Through its four
chapters, this thesis provides some empirical evidence to the assessment of the e-
ciency of health system.
The rst chapter is a methodological review of nonparametric eciency measures,
used in the three empirical studies that follow. The second chapter assesses the
eciency of a sample of 120 low and middle income countries over the 1997/2014
period. Production function is dened as health expenditures producing health
outcomes (maternal and juvenile survival). It concludes that, for the same health
outcomes, countries could spend more than 20% for the same health outcomes, and
that ineciency increases with the level of development of coutries.
The last two chapters are case studies. The third one focuses on Township Health
Centers in Weifang, Shandong province, China, relying on survey data. It highlights
the potential for performance improvement and the role of demand side determinants
and of the share of subsidies in incomes to explain eciency scores. The fourth chap-
ter deals with the eciency of primary healthcare facilities in Ulan-Bator, Mongolia.
It concludes that eciency could be spurred by about 30%. Demand side factors are
positively associated to eciency, but low levels of sta remuneration, as well as a
suboptimal balance between medical and non medical sta seem to hinder activity
and eciency of health facilities.
Keywords: Health nancing ; Eciency ; Primary healthcare; Robust frontier
analysis; Chinese pharmaceutical reform.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A health system: multiple components to articulate
towards dened objectives
1.1.1 A health system: an interaction of multiple and various ac-
tors. . .
The denitions of what a health system encompasses are multiple and have been
progressively enriched. The rst and strictest denition considers as synonyms the
health system and the healthcare system. In this perspective, it includes all the
activities and people whose primary purpose are to promote, restore and/or main-
tain health (Reinhardt and Cheng, 2000). The concerned activities have dierent
natures: personal medical health services are health care delivered individually;
non-personal health services are delivered collectively (smoking or alcohol consump-
tion prevention programs against for example); intersectoral actions are not directly
health services but aim at improving health: sanitation infrastructures, legislation
around the road trac fro instance.
Even with this narrow denition of a health system, it involves several actors: health
care providers at their widest sense (public and/or private medical sta of course,
working in public and/or private entities, but also family or neighborhood care-
givers), political authorities (Ministry of Health or equivalent), and nancing insti-
tutions (private insurance companies or social security funds). Figure 1.1 sums up
the dierent actions included in the health system.
1.1.2 ...At the service of a common objective
For a long time, the health system was considered to have one main objective: im-
provement of the health status of the population it serves. It was thus considered
in the light of this primary goal. The Alma-Ata declaration in 1978 is a good exam-
ple of this conception: it gives to developing countries the objective of a universal
access to health by 2000, at a reasonable cost for users and societies, but with no
detail about the nancing model to implement to make such healthcare systems
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Figure 1.1: Boundaries of the health system
Source : WHO (2007)
sustainable. They were mostly nanced by general government expenditures, and
then jeopardized when those latter collapsed in the 1980's due to the debt crisis. As
a consequence, quality of healthcare provided in those countries deteriorated.
In 1987, the Bamako initiative introduced the idea of user and communitarian par-
ticipation, in order to ease health cost recovering for providers, and to improve the
quality of provided care. Ridde (2004) highlights the fact that equity was neglected
in the implementation of this reform. Cost of healthcare increased for households,
and so did inequalities in access to health care and health indicators, both within
developing countries, and between developing and developed countries: Figure 1.2
highlights the inequalities in life expectancy at birth. Figure 1.3 shows that in the
poorest countries, households have to pay themselves for health services through
out-of-pocket payments, which represent about a half of total health expenditures1.
This proportion is much lower in upper middle income countries and high income
countries.
In this context, it was necessary to rethink the health system concept, and to dene
what it encompasses. This was done by Frenk and Murray (1999) and Reinhardt and
Cheng (2000). The main change was the denition of the mission of a health system,
which was enlarged. Three objectives are described as intrinsically valuable, i.e.
they are at least partially independent from the others (it is partially possible to
increase their attainment without changing one of the other objectives), and it is
always desirable to improve their attainment (WHO). Other objectives are dened
as instrumental, they serve the realization of the intrinsic objectives.
1Out-of-pockets are dened as payments borne by patients and the moment of the health service
delivery. They are opposed to prepayments, realized through taxes or insurance premiums
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of life ex-
pectancy at birth by World Bank income
group in 2000
Figure 1.3: Distribution of the share of
out-of-pocket payments in total health
expenditures by World Bank income
group in 2000
1.1.3 The enriching of health systems objectives
First, the ultime objective, improvement of health is decomposed into two parts:
the rst is an improvement in average, and the second a reduction of health in-
equalities (importance of the distribution). It was already implicit in the Alma-Ata
declaration (through the notion of universal access to healthcare), but is now an
explicit goal.
A second valuable objective of health systems is the responsiveness to the population
needs and expectations. Again, it is decomposed between the average improvement
and the reduction of inequalities.
Finally, health systems aim at a fair nancing of the provided services to protect
people against the risk of illness. The importance of the reduction inequalities in
terms of health status and satisfaction of expectations, associated to the idea of a fair
nancing, suggests that equity has become a priority in the health system objectives.
To reach those objectives, the dierent actors of the health system fulll four main
functions: delivery of personal and non-personal health services, investment in
health resources (human resources and capital, infrastructure and equipment), -
nancing of the service delivery by raising and allocating resources, and oversight (or
stewardship) of the dierent actors and resources involved in the system to meet
its objectives. One actor may be involved in one or several of those functions. For
instance, health facilities may be only responsible for delivering health services, or
they can be responsible for service delivery and human resources creation through
training. Public authorities, by organizing the relations between the dierent actors,
are involved in the four functions. The logical chains from functions to objectives
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are depicted in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Articulation of the health system functions and goals
Source : WHO (2007)
When such functions and objectives are dened, then it is possible to assess the
performance of a global health system and of its dierent actors, according to the
missions they are each supposed to fulll.
The rst step of health system assessment is attainment: respectively to its objec-
tives and functions, how does it perform? Kruk and Freedman (2008) provides a
literature review of indicators used by studies assessing health systems and actors of
the health system in the realization of the eectiveness and equity objectives. The
evaluation of those realizations is to be evaluated in light of the outcomes indicators
(e.g. health status information for eectiveness), or of output indicators (produc-
tion of health services for eectiveness). The choice between the two depends upon
the focus level of the study. For instance, considering health facilities, the improve-
ment of health does depend upon their activity and performance, but not entirely.
Therefore, it is more accurate to assess only their outputs.
1.1.4 Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development
Goalth
WHO (2010) gives a framework for health reforms and recommendations: the Uni-
versal Health Coverage. It is dened as the goal that "people have access to ser-
vices and do not suer nancial hardship paying for them" by the Member States
of the World Health Organization in 2005, and encompasses all of the ve previ-
ous objectives. In 2015, Universal Health Coverage is included in the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). It is the cornerstone of SDG 3 ("Good Health and
Well-Being"), and is directly involved in SDG 1 ("No poverty"), 2 ("End hunger,
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achieve food security and improved nutrition") 10 ("Reduce inequalities within and
among countries"). As such, its importance has been reinforced as a priority in the
policy agenda.
1.2 How to improve health status and equity ?
1.2.1 The necessity to increase health expenditures
In order to improve the attainment of the ve intrinsic objectives, a rst instrumental
objective is to increase the quantity of resources dedicated to health. This is even
more crucial in developing countries, where the level of health expenditures per
capita is extremely low, especially compared to high income countries (see Figure
1.5). In 2014, four countries still spent less than 50 annual dollars per capita in
health: The Central African Republic, The Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Eritrea and Madagascar, and 19 countries spent less than 100 annual dollars per
capita in health (NHA).
All the groups Low and Lower-middle income
Figure 1.5: Evolution of the average annual total health expenditures per capita by
World Bank income groups, 2010 PPP dollars
More specically, an objective is to increase public health expenditures as a lever for
action. Private expenditures rely almost exclusively on out-of-pockets payments in
developing countries. Moving towards equity in health nancing implies the decrease
in out-of-pocket payments. Indeed, they represent a nancial burden for individu-
als and can impoverish them if they have to face catastrophic health expenditures
(Wagsta and Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003) 2. Consequently, in the objective of
2Catastrophic health expenditures are dened as a share of a household budget dedicated to
healthcare that exceeds a certain threshold, and makes the household fall into poverty. The measure
is calculated as the share of the available income allocated to healthcare (the threshold is commonly
xed around 10%, or by the share of the ability to pay dedicated to healthcare. In this case, the
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fair nancing of the health system, public health expenditures are the priority.
Figure 1.6: Percentage of government health expenditures in total health expendi-
tures in 2014
Several levers for action are available to public authorities to increase public re-
sources and dedicate them to health (WHO 2010):
• To give a higher priority to the health sector in the allocation of public re-
sources. The declaration of Abuja in 2001 gave the objective of 15% of public
expenditures allocated to health. This objective is far from being reached.
Since 2005, the trend is even declining (see Figure 1.7). In 2001, only two
African low income countries satised the criteria (Madagascar and Tanza-
nia). In 2011, there were only six (Ethiopia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Swaziland and Uganda).
• To increase health expenditures through scal space (Heller, 2005; Mathonnat,
2010; Tandon and Cashin, 2010). Fiscal is dened as the budgetary potential
to gather additional resources for a given purpose (here, health expenditures)
without harming the nancial sustainability of the government. This can come
from (i) favorable economic conditions (economic growth) that create wealth
and provide taxes, (ii) from a reallocation of government resources, (iii) from
an increase in collected resources. In developing countries, where the informal
sector is important, improving the low tax compliance may be a way to raise
new resources, allocated to health, without decreasing other expenditures.
Using the scal system is also advocated by WHO (2010) to seek for the
Universal Health Coverage goal.
ability to pay is the available income minus the subsistence expenditures, it is associated to non-food
expenditures. In this case, the threshold of 40% is commonly used. See Wagsta and Doorslaer
(2003) and Xu et al. (2003)
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Figure 1.7: Evolution of the proportion of government health expenditures in gov-
ernment expenditures
Source : WHO (2007)
1.2.2 The amount of expenditures is not sucient: the need for a
greater eciency of health systems
Nevertheless, the increase in health expenditures does not mechanically improve the
health status, because health systems have been proved to use their resources inef-
ciently, leading to major wasted outlays. In this perspective, an improvement in
the eciency of health systems can be a major path to gains in health and equity,
for the same quantity of inputs.
The interest of eciency measures can be seen in two close but dierent ways.
First, it is a tool to compare performance of health systems or their components,
relatively to their resources and the constraints they face. Indeed, as pointed in
WHO (2010), comparing outcomes is not sucient to assess performance. For a
same health status, a country using fewer resources than another should be ranked
higher. Eciency measures take into account the quantity of resources injected,
and, to some extent, the constraints they face3. In this matter, they are a useful
tool to compare the performances of health systems.
Second, eciency is an instrumental goal of the health system, which aims at im-
proving the attainment of the intrinsic objectives. An ecient system, i.e. a system
which allocates its resources optimally produces the maximal level of health services
expectable given those resources. This is favorable to global health status and to
equity. If healthcare is too expensive, some people will not seek health care for
nancial reasons, therefore both health and equity deteriorate. If healthcare is of
3The presentation of those models is the core of Chapter 2
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
poor quality, people will not seek it either, or they will go to more expensive facili-
ties. Again, both health and equity deteriorate.
It is thus crucial to move from the macro-economic diagnosis of the identication of
the sources of this eciency. This issue is developed by the WHO in its 2010 Health
Report, focused on the development of the Universal Health Coverage. Reaching
this Universal Health Coverage requires optimal use of current resources.
Aiming at getting More Health for the money, WHO (2010) identies ten major
sources of ineciency:
1. underuse of generics and excessive prices for medicines,
2. use of substandard and counterfeit medicines,
3. inappropriate and ineective use of medicines,
4. overuse of healthcare equipment and procedures,
5. inappropriate sta mix, unmotivated workers,
6. inappropriate hospital admissions and length of stay,
7. inappropriate hospital size,
8. medical errors and suboptimal quality of care,
9. health system leakages (waste, corruption, fraud),
10. inecient mix, inappropriate level of strategy.
From this statement, empirical work has to be developed through case studies to
determine which sectors in which countries are aected by one or several of these
source of ineciency, in order to identify reforms to solve this issue. Eciency and
performance improvement of the health workforces are the rst objectives given by
WHO (2016), which underlines the accuracy of this issue.
To address those aws of resources, a relevant organization of the relationship be-
tween the dierent healthcare providers is desirable. Several of those relationships
are agency relations, and induce some agency costs from moral hazard and infor-
maion asymmetry Those costs are sources of ineciency of the health system4. Liu
4Agency costs appear between two economic actors when the rst one (the "principal") hires
the second one (the "agent") to produce a good or service on its behalf. The well-being of the
principal positively depends upon the eort of the agent, which partly determines the output, and
negatively depends on the wage he pays to its agent . On the contrary, the well-being of the agent
depends positively on its revenue and negatively from his eort. The agency costs comes from the
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and Mills (2007) analyze all the 11 health actors interactions that can be associated
to agency relations. In this context, the stewardship function of health authori-
ties is essential. It has to take into consideration every agency relation in order to
anticipate strategic behaviors and to avoid them while dening provider payment
mechanisms.
This thesis provides empirical evidences about two examples of the importance of
dealing with information asymmetry and moral hazard to spur the eciency of
health institutions. The rst study is of the Chinese pharmaceutical supply chain
until 2009, widely reformed in 2009 (see section 4.1.2.1). The second study is on
the contract binding primary healthcare facilities in Ulan-Bator, Mongolia to their
missions, which are private entities contracted by the health authorities to provide
health care but the ministry has little control over the eort of the medical sta
(see Section 5.2.2). Another chapter deals with the performance of global health
systems.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis consists in a methodological chapter and three empirical studies. Those
three empirical works are part of the literature that use eciency measures to as-
sess the performance of health systems or facilities, and analyze those performances
through dierent scopes.
Chapter 2 is a methodological review of the nonparametric eciency models, used
in the empirical Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Nonparametric eciency models are part
of frontier models, coming from the rm theory. It is focused on the production
function of any good or service considered as the transformation of a quantity of
inputs into a quantity of outputs. In this context, the production frontier is best
possible performance, i.e. the maximal output for the quantity of inputs, or the
minimal input quantity for the level of outputs. It is reached when inputs and out-
puts are allocated optimally. Eciency measures are the estimation of the distance
of an observation to its frontier, to its best possible performance. It relies on the
estimation of the production frontier, and then on the computation of the distance
from a point to this frontier.
Two majors kinds of models are implemented: Stochastic Frontier Models (SFA)
and nonparametric deterministic models. The rst category develops an economet-
divergence of interests, and from the fact that the principal does not observe the eort of the agent.
This latter benets from an information asymmetry. To maximize its well-being, the principal has
to nd payment mechanisms that make the agent reveal its eort. See Jensen and Meckling (1976)
for the rst denition of the agency relation.
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ric estimation for the frontier, while the second category solves a linear program
to compare the dierent observations in a sample. In this thesis, nonparametric
models were chosen, the empirical reasons for each study's method are explained in
Chapters 3, 4 and 55. Therefore, nonparametric methods are presented, with the
main stakes that drive their evolution. Some aws have been coped with, and some
issues remained at least partially unsolved, mainly the introduction of environmen-
tal variables.
Chapter 3 is a macroeconomic study on the eciency of a sample of 120 low
and middle income countries according to the World Bank. Relying on three year
averages from 1997 to 2014, it aims at assessing the global performance of those
countries, and to estimate the waste in resources. In order to take into account the
economic capacities of the each country, the Gross Domestic Product is introduced
in the model. The study concludes to an increasing technical eciency over the
period, driven by an improvement of the health status of many countries.
Chapter 4 is a case study, relying on survey data consisting of a sample of 30
Township Health Centers (THCs) situated in the rural prefecture of Weifang, Shan-
dong province, China. During the study period (2006/12), a major pharmaceutical
reform was lead, which aimed at improving the performance of pharmaceutical sys-
tem. As result of two decades of unhappy combinations of health reforms, in the
2000 decade the Chinese health system was extremely costly, with low levels of
health outcomes. It particularly suered from overprescription and overpricing of
medicines, poor medicine quality and excessive use of high-technology medical, in-
duced by perverse incentives of healthcare providers. The reimbursement of a part
of health expenditures through the 2003 New Cooperative Medical Scheme, an in-
surance system, accelerated the rise of costs. Through the implementation of a
National Essential Medicine List (NEML) in 2009, and the rebuilding of the phar-
maceutical supply chain, the government aimed at improving the eciency of the
system. This Chapter encompasses directly or indirectly each of the ten sources of
ineciency presented in section 1.2.2.
The study uses a two-stage procedure. The rst stage is the assessment of the
eciency level of the 30 THCs (primary healthcare facilities) of the sample through
a nonparametric frontier analysis. Contrary to what was expected, no eciency
increase is noticed across the period. In average, sampled THCs could produce 30%
more with the same level of inputs.
5The advantages and drawbacks of each of the two methods are presented in Chapter 2. Broadly,
if the health production is unknown, it is more relevant to use nonparametric frontier estimators.
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The second stage is the estimation of the determinants of those eciency scores.
Adequation between demand and supply is essential to explain performance, as the
most ecient THCs are those in which there are the most people per bed. The
share of subsidies in the THC income is negatively associated to THC performance,
highlighting a problem of incentives for healthcare providers.
Chapter 5 is another case study, using survey data from primary health care fa-
cilities of Ulan-Bator, Mongolia (so-called Family Health Centers (FHCs)), from
2011 to 2012. Mongolia is a former Soviet republic, with a tradition of free basic
healthcare. The liberalization of the system led to the health sector being depen-
dent on macroeconomic conditions through the amount of available resources. In
the 1990's, the State kept on nancing the health system, but macroeconomic di-
culties emerged in the 2000's, with a relative decrease in public health expenditures,
oset by private expenditures. In the context where raising new resources is dif-
cult, eciency gains are a major path to ensure universal health coverage to the
population. This Chapter mainly encompasses sources 5, 8 and 10 of ineciency in
the frame of section 1.2.2.
The study uses a two-stage procedure, to rst assess the eciency scores through a
nonparametric frontier approach and explain the scores in a second stage. Eciency
is quite low in the sample, and decreases over the study period. Demand, through
the catchment area of each FHC, is positively correlated to eciency, as well as to
supply side variable concerning the composition and remuneration of the sta. The
conclusion is that it is necessary to nd some accurate incentives mechanisms for the
sta, and to understand the knowledge and perceptions of the population relative
to FHCs to spur activity of primary healthcare facilities.
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Chapter 2
Nonparametric eciency analyses
and environmental variables: the
available tools
2.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the nineties, eciency has become a crucial stake in Health
Economics, both in academic and institutional works (WB, 1996, 1997; Hollingsworth,
2008; Giurida and Gravelle, 2001). The concept has been applied both at the mi-
croeconomic (the facility: health center, hospital for instance) and macroeconomic
level (looking at national health systems). In a context of nancial constraint, im-
provement of health care systems eciency levels is a major path to reach universal
access to healthcare, and two of the three rst Sustainable Developement Goals:
"no poverty" (considering the risk of impoverishment linked to health expenditures)
and "good health and well-being".
The emergence of this literature was fed by the development of new methodological
tools that enlarge the possibilities of statistical analysis. In this perspective, this
chapter proposes a methodological review of eciency analyses. The rst section
focuses on the assessment of eciency by nonparametric methods. The second
one focuses on the introduction of external and environmental variables into those
eciency models.
The concept of technical eciency Eciency, in a general meaning, deals with
the managerial strategy of a rm, a so-called Decision Making Unit (DMU hereafter)
concerning the transformation of a certain quantity of resources (or inputs) into a
certain quantity of outputs through the production process. DMUs may be many
kinds of organization: rms, but also, in this thesis, health facilities. They can also
be dened at a regional or national level: a health, or education system, a scal
entity for instance.
The economic eciency, that reects the global managerial performance of DMU
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includes two components:
• technical eciency. It focuses on the production function, i.e. on the transfor-
mation of a quantity of inputs into a certain quantity of outputs. In an input
orientation, an ecient DMU uses the smallest amount of inputs to produce a
certain level of output. In a output orientation, it produces the greatest amout
of output given their level of inputs. The prices are not taken into account,
only quantities.
• allocative eciency. It enlarges the concept of technical eciency eciency
by taking into consideration the ratio of the prices. In an input orientation,
it looks at the optimal combination of inputs (i.e. the combination that mini-
mizes production costs) to produce a given level of output, considering the set
of input prices. In an output orientation, it looks at the optimal combination
of outputs (i.e. the combination that maximizes the income) for a given level
of inputs, considering the set of output prices.
In the empirical analyses of this thesis, it was not possible to have complete and
detailed information concerning the prices of each resource and each medical output.
Therefore, the focus was on the quantity of delivered health services and resources,
aiming at maximizing health facilities activity. The case studies will only estimate
technical eciency, thus this chapter only deals with technical eciency.
Parametric and nonparametric analyses Empirical models proposed in the
literature are divided in two main types: parametric and nonparametric. The most
common parametric model is the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), introduced by
the pioneering works of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).
Parametric models are econometric approaches. They rely on a hypothesis about
the functional form between the quantity of inputs and the quantity of outputs.
For instance, let the production function of a rm be composed of two inputs, labor
L and capital K and of one output Y. f is the functional form of the relation between
a set of inputs (L,K) and a quantity of output Y, i.e. that satises Y = f(L,K).
Assuming that f is a Cobb-Douglas function the production function is written as
follows:
Y = f(L,K) = kLαKβ; k > 0; 0 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
The empirical model explains the quantity of output by the quantity of inputs and
a residual. If the chosen functional form is a Cobb-Douglas function, the model is
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the following one:
lnYi = α+ β1lnLi + β2lnKi + εi
In the case of a SFA model, the residual has a particular property. It is built so that
εi = vi−ui with cov(vi, ui) = 0. vi is a stochastic component that captures random
events which are not under the control of the DMU: "climatic conditions((Aigner
et al., 1977)), random equipement failure (Greene, 1993), errors in identifying or
measuring explanatory variables (...) or just pure chance." (Jacobs et al., 2006). It
is normally distributed. ui is a non-negative term that represents the distance of
the individual i to the production frontier (the maximum output given the quantity
of inputs), the maximum feasible. Several distributions are possible (half-normal,
truncated normal...). Parametric models therefore rely on the empirical knowledge
of the form of the production function. In some elds of application, production
functions are well known. In some others, including health economics, the literature
does provide any theoretical or empirical knowledge about the functional form of
the production function.
The choices of the functional form of the production function and of the distribution
of the ineciency term are not neutral and can impact the results. In this way, it
represents a weakness of parametric models.
For those reasons, the case studies of this thesis use only nonparametric models.
This chapter aims at presenting the main methodological stakes of nonparametric
eciency models in their empirical implementation. The rst part of this chapter
deals with the dierent models developed by the literature. The second part tackles
the introduction of environmental variables in nonparametric models, a crucial part
of eciency assessment.
2.2 Nonparametric eciency models: a rst assessment
2.2.1 The reference models
Nonparametric models were rst developed by Farrell (1957), through the intro-
duction of the concept of technical eciency. They were not empirically used until
Charnes et al. (1978), introduced Data Envelopement Analysis (DEA) only in the
case of constant returns to scale. Banker et al. (1984) extended the model to the
variable returns to scale case. The main objective is to study the behavior of DMUs
inside a sample and to benchmark them through a scoring process. those meth-
ods are only data-driven since there is no assumption on the functional form of
the production function (nonparametric characteristic). The whole gap between
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the production frontier (the best possible performance) and a particular DMU is
attributed to ineciency, i.e. to managerial factors. It implies that nonparamet-
ric models described in this chapter are deterministic (contrary to the Stochastic
Frontier Analysis).
2.2.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
The Data Envelopment Analysisb (DEA thereafter) is the most used nonparametric
model in the empirical literature. It consists in resolving a linear optimization
program to get the eciency score for each DMU. The rst version (Charnes et al.,
1978) only considered constant returns to scale. The next sections rely on Daraio
and Simar (2007) and Simar and Wilson (2008) for the presentation of the formalized
models.
Let us consider a set of inputs X and a set of outputs Y . The production frontier
is dened as follows :
Ψ̂DEA = {(x, y) ∈ <p+q+ |y ≤
n∑
i=1
γiyi;x ≥
n∑
i=1
γixi}
There two possible computations of eciency scores, according to the chosen ori-
entation: the input orientation aims at minimizing the inputs for a xed level of
output, while the output orientation aims at maximizing the outputs for a xed
level of inputs. The two model are detailed below.
The input orientation The input eciency score θDEA of a DMU producing at
(x0, y0) will be obtained by resolving the following program:
θ̂DEA(x0, y0) = min{θ|y0 ≤
n∑
i=1
γiYi; θx0 ≤
n∑
i=0
γiXi; θ > 0}
θ̂DEA(x0, y0) represents the radial distance between (x0,y0) and the input target,
the input level that the DMU should use, for the same level of output, to be on the
production frontier. The interpretation is the following: a DMU exhibiting a score
of 0.8 could decrease of 20% its input quantities, while reaching the same level of
output.
The output orientation The output eciency score θDEA of a DMU producing
at (x0, y0) will be obtained by resolving the following program:
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θ̂DEA(x0, y0) = max{λ|λy0 ≤
n∑
i=1
γiYi;x0 ≥
n∑
i=1
γiXi;λ > 0}
θ̂DEA(x0, y0) represents the radial distance between (x0,y0) and the output target,
the output level that the DMU should reach, for the same level of input, to be on the
production frontier. The interpretation is the following: a DMU exhibiting a score
of 1.2 could increase of 20% its quantity of output, with the same level of input.
Conditions were later added by Banker et al. (1984) to introduce variable, non
increasing or non decreasing returns to scale. They are the following ones:
• for variable returns to scale,
∑n
i=1 γi = 1; γi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
• for non increasing returns to scale,
∑n
i=1 γi ≤ 1; γi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
• for non decreasing returns to scale,
∑n
i=1 γi ≥ 1; γi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n
Those conditions allow to decompose ineciency between technical ineciency and
scale ineciency, i.e. the fact of not operating at an optimal scale of production
2.2.1.2 Free Disposal Hull
The DEA relies on the convexity assumption of the data hull, of the envelop. On the
contrary, the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) only relies on the free disposability assump-
tion of inputs and outputs. If a DMU operates at (x, y), then another operating at
(x′, y′) with (x′ ≥ x) and (y′ ≤ y) will also be part of the production set. In other
words, it is always possible to produce less with more inputs, to waste resources.
The expression of the production frontier becomes the following one (with the sample
χ =: {(Xi, Yi), i = 1, ..., n)}):
Ψ̂FDH = {(x, y) ∈ <p+q+ |y ≤ Yi;x ≥ Xi, (Xi, Yi) ∈ χ}
In this case, there is no possibility to assume any nature of the returns to scale, as
the production frontier takes the form of stairs linking every DMU that uses the
smallest quantity of inputs, among those which produces at least the same quantity
of output in the input orientation (that produces the greatest quantity of outputs
among those which use at most the same quantity of inputs). The frontier is the
closest possible to the observed points of the sample.
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of DEA and FDH frontiers, in the case
of a production function with only one input and one output. The major trend is
the same with both of the two techniques, but with some dierences. A point, for
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instance, is ecient under the FDH estimator, but not with the DEA estimator.
This dierence is due to the drawing of the production frontier. The DEA makes a
linear combination of DMUs, raising the frontier in comparison to the FDH case.
The choice between DEA and FDH depends on the convexity assumption about the
production set. On the one hand if the true set is convex, both DEA and FDH are
consistent, but FDH has a slower rate of convergence. On the other hand if the true
set is not convex, the DEA estimator is not consistent (Daraio and Simar, 2007).
Empirically, most studies assume a convex set and use a DEA model (Hollingsworth,
2008).
Figure 2.1: DEA and FDH frontiers
2.2.2 Limits of nonparametric models and the robust models
From their data-driven dimension, nonparametric methods suer from several weak-
nesses.
2.2.2.1 The weaknesses of nonparametric deterministic measures
The sensitivity to the denition of the production function Jacobs et al.
(2006) underlines the importance of the chosen inputs and outputs on the eciency
scores. A way to avoid this potential bias is to test for alternative expressions of
the production function, and to see to which extent the scores are aected by thos
changes.
The curse of dimensionality Deterministic nonparametric estimators have very
slow rates of convergence, especially in compared the stochastic parametric estima-
tors. They require much more observations to obtain relevant estimates of the e-
ciency score, particularly when the number of inputs or outputs increases (Simar and
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Wilson, 2008). To tackle this issue, additional models were proposed to bootstrap
both DEA and FDH eciency scores (Simar and Wilson, 1998). Partial frontier
models, developed in section 2.2.2.2, also exhibit some interesting properties in this
matter.
The sensitivity to outliers and extreme values As the production frontier
is dened by the best performers in the sample, the production hull is necessarily
sensitive to the presence of outliers. Outliers are observations that may be subject to
a measurement error, or that do not respond to the same production function as the
others. They exhibit much better performances than the others. Thus, they cannot
be analyzed with the same Data Generating Process, otherwise, in a deterministic
model, they would biased all the scores. It would distord the production frontier,
and the scores of all their peers would be underestimated.
Several techniques have been developed by the literature to detect those outlying
values. Those techniques can either be graphical (with the limit that graphical
analysis can only include two dimensions)) or of a jackknife approach (Wilson, 1993,
1995). Zhu (1996) and Zhu (2001) proposes a super-eciency approaches, for DEA
estimates. Finally, after the introduction of partial frontier models by Cazals et al.
(2002), Simar (2003) uses the dierent parameters of the model to detect outliers.
The diculty of the detection of outlying DMUs comes from the fact that they
exhibit multiple dimensions, making the issue more complex.
The introduction of environmental variables The last and major drawback
of deterministic nonparametric models is the diculty to introduce environmental
variables in the eciency analysis. In parametric models, those variables are in the
regression, so their role in DMUs performances can be easily identied.
On the contrary, in nonparametric models, the introduction of environmental vari-
ables is still a open issue, especially in empirical terms. Section 2.3 discusses the
issue into more details.
2.2.2.2 Robust frontier models
Starting from Cazals et al. (2002), several nonparametric models were proposed in
the literature, named "robust" or "partial" frontier analysis. Their main charac-
teristic is that the data hull does not envelop all the DMUs of the samples; some
of them are left outside the hull. In this way, they cannot distord the frontier,
hence the robustness of the frontier and of the scores. They show better statistical
properties than the DEA or FDH estimators.
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Those models can be read in the light of the probabilistic reformulation of tradi-
tional nonparametric models proposed by Cazals et al. (2002) and extended to the
multivariate case by Daraio and Simar (2005). The following section presents the
probabilistic expression of nonparametric eciency models, and then more precisely
the two main families of robust frontier analyses: order-m and order-α.
Probabilistic expression of nonparametric eciency models Cazals et al.
(2002) proposes a new formulation of the eciency set of DMUs, and of eciency
scores, using of a probability function. Here, following Daraio and Simar (2007) and
Simar and Wilson (2008), the multivariate case of Daraio and Simar (2005) will be
developed. It relies on the following probability function:
HXY (x, y) = Prob(X ≤ x, Y ≥ y)
It can be interpreted as the probability, for a DMU operating at (x, y), to be domi-
nated by another, i.e. the probability that another DMU produces at least as much
output with at most the same quantity of input.
HXY (x, y) can be decomposed as follows:
HXY (x, y) = Prob(X ≤ x|Y ≥ y)Prob(Y ≥ y) = FX|Y (x|y)SY (y)
HXY (x, y) = Prob(Y ≥ y|X ≤ x)Prob(X ≤ x) = SY |X(y|x)FX(x)
where SY (y) and SY |X(y|x) are survivor and conditional survivor functions of Y,
and FX(x) and FX|Y (x|y) are distribution and conditional distribution functions of
X. Eciency scores can be computed from those expression, in both of two possible
orientations.
In the input orientation, with SY (y) ≥ 0
θ̃(x, y) = inf{θ|FX|Y (θx|y) > 0} = inf{θ|HXY (θx, y) > 0}
In the output orientation, with FY (y) ≥ 0
λ̃(x, y) = sup{λ|SY |X(λy|x) > 0} = sup{λ|HXY (x, λy) > 0}
Simar and Wilson (2008) explicits the meaning of the eciency score: in a input
(output) orientation θ̃(x, y) (λ̃(x, y)) is the proportion in which a DMU operating at
(x, y) can decrease (increase) the quantity of inputs (outputs), output level (input
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level) xed, to reach a null probability of being dominated. This expression gives
an estimation of the scores identical to the one of the FDH estimator. Indeed, in
the input orientation the frontier is the minimum of the support of the conditional
distribution function FX|Y (x|y), i.e. the minimal quantity of inputs used by DMUs
producing at least y output. This denition is strict and makes the estimator sen-
sitive to the presence of any extreme value. The point of partiel frontier estimators
is to soften this condition, to get a robust frontier.
Order-m frontiers The order-m model is introduced by Cazals et al. (2002). Let
us consider m independent and identically distributed random variables among the
distribution of X, and producing at least the same quantity of output.
The production frontier will be dened as the expected minimal achievable quantity
of input among those m observations.
The full frontier production φ(y) can be written as:
φ(y) = θ(x, y)x = inf{|FX|Y (x|y) > 0}
With the order-m model, the new frontier is the expected lower boundary of the
minimum of m random variables X1, ..., Xm from the distribution function of X and
satisfying Y ≥ y. The denition of the frontier becomes:
φm(y) = E(min(X
1, ..., Xm)|Y ≥ y) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− FX|Y (x|y))mdx
with
lim
m→∞
φm(y) = φ(y)
This relation is still valid for the empirical expression of the estimator, φm(y), built
with m i.i.d. random variables given by the empirical distribution function of X
given that Y ≥ y, F̂X|Y (x|y))m.
For one level of output y, and m i.i.d. random variables Xi, i = 1, ...,m from the
conditional n-variate distribution function FX(·|y), the production set is:
Ψm(y) = {(x′, y′) ∈ RN+M+ |x′ ≥ Xi, y′ ≥ y, i = 1, ...,m}
The denition comes back to the free disposal hull, for m rms producing at least
y. The eciency input score for the given y and the production set Ψm(y) is then
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dened by:
θ̃m(x, y) = inf{θ|(θx, y) ∈ Ψm(y)}
This score is obtain, for a certain set of m values of Xi, the corresponding input
score θ̃m(x, y) is computed as such:
θ̃m(x, y) = min
i=1,...,m
{ max
j=1,...,p
(
Xji
xj
)}
From a computational point of view, the nal scores are obtained following the
following four-step procedure (Daraio and Simar, 2007):
1. For a xed value of y, a sample of m DMUs is drawn from the sample, among
those which satisfy Yi ≥ y.
2. Compute θ̃dm(x, y).
3. Repeat 1 and 2 D times, with a large value of D. 1
4. Compute the nal score as the average of all the preliminary ones.
Order-α frontiers Order-α frontiers are introduced by Aragon et al. (2005) and
extended to the multivariate case by Daouia and Simar (2007). Aragon et al. (2005)
proposes a nonparametric estimator of the ecient frontier, allowing for some DMUs
to be above the frontier ("partial frontier"). But, contrary to the order-m model, it
is the proportion α of DMUs remaining above the frontier that will be xed (and
not the number m of DMUs in the production set). In other words, in a input
orientation a DMU operating at (x, y) is compared to the input level not exceeded
by (1− α) ∗ 100% of DMUs producing at least y of output.
Supposing that SY (y) > 0 and for 0 > α ≤ 1, the eciency frontier is:
φα(x, y) = inf{x|FX|Y (x|y) > 1− α}
So the input eciency score of the DMU operating at (x, y) will be:
θα(x, y) = inf{θ|FX|Y (θx|y) > 1− α}
One advantage of the order-α method is the economic interpretation of the eciency
score. A DMU exhibiting a score of 0.8, with α = 90% can reduce by 20 % its
quantity of inputs to use the same quantity as 90% of the rms producing a least
1Daraio and Simar (2007) proposes D=200 as a reasonable value.
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the same level of output. This means that the closer α gets to 1, the closer the
order-α estimator gets to the FDH estimator, to a full frontier model.
The estimator of the score is the following:
θ̂α,n(x, y) = inf{θ|F̂X|Y,n(θx|y) > 1− α}
Graphically, the frontiers computed by the dierent nonparametric estimators are
depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Non parametric estimates of production frontier, for a production func-
tion of two inputs
Notes: Tauchman, 2012.
Super-ecient DMUs and detection of outliers A crucial point of partial
frontier analyses is that they allow for DMUs to be above the production frontier,
which means that eciency scores can be higher than 1, for so-called super-ecient
units. This property can be used to detect potential outliers. Simar (2003) proposes
a method using the order-m analyses, to discriminate super-ecient and outliers.
First, not all DMUs with scores higher than 1 are potential outliers. A threshold
τ must be dened, and a DMU will be considered as potential outlier if its score is
higher than 1 + τ . Then, the method relies on several elements:
• the "leave-one-out score", i.e. the score of a certain DMU when this same
DMU is kept out of the reference set, and this for several values of m, and
in both input and output orientation. DMUs whose score remains very high
even when m increase are probably outliers. Then, the proportion of DMUs
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exhibiting a "leave-one-out score" higher than 1 + τ is expressed depending
upon m, for every value of τ .
• the number of peers for each DMU, i.e. the number of DMU producing at
least the same quantity of output in a input orientation
If a DMU exhibits a leave-one-out score higher than 1 + τ for several values of
τ and both in input and output, then it is likely to be an outlier. Looking at the
proportion of high scores acoording to m, any disruption in the curv certainly shows
the presence of outliers in the sample.
Which value for m ? Which value for α ? Conversly to the DEA and the
FDH estimators, the partial frontier models require to choose some value for the
"trimming" parameters, m and α. As α has an easy economic interpretation, the
value of α depends upon how "severe" or absolute the frontier is expected to be.
It depends on the proportion of DMUs left above the production frontier. On
the contrary, the m parameter does not have any direct economic meaning, so the
choice of its value may seem more arbitrary. Daraio and Simar (2007) and Simar
and Wilson (2008) propose to rely on the proportion of DMUs above the frontier
(with a score higher than 1) to choose an value of m. This proportion decreases
as m increases. It is possible to select the smallest m value that gives the target
proportion of super-ecient DMUs. In the absence of a precise target value, the
selected value of m can be a threshold value from which the proportion does not
change. Simar and Wilson (2008) underline that most of the time, the value of m
does not aect much the proportion.
Order-m or order-α ? Order-m and order-α models give two close but dierent
answers to the same issue. They both have been proved to be bias-robust (Daouia
and Ruiz-Gazen, 2006). Then, which one of the two should be preferred? This
trade-o is tackled by Daouia and Gijbels (2011), with no absolute answer. Order-
m frontiers are less robust to extreme values than order-α while estimating the full
frontier (when α → 1 or m → ∞). If the order-α breaks down, then it becomes
more sensitive to outliers than the order-m frontier. Also, the order-m estimator
exhibits better statistical proporties. To compare the two analyses run with both
of the two methods, they propose to chose a value α = (
1
2
)
1
m for a chosen m value.
In the empirical works of this thesis, both of the two methods have been tested and
compared. They yield very similar results.
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Empirical implementations For those various advantages, robust frontier meth-
ods have been implemented in the literature, but not to a very large extent. The
following papers can be quoted: Xia et al. (2014) on the energy regulation in China,
Roudaut and Vanhems (2012) on ivoirian rms, and Pilyavsky and Staat (2008) on
community hospitals in Ukraine.
The assessment of eciency in the empirical literature mainly relies on "reference"
models. As pointed out by Hollingsworth (2008), the DEA method has been used
in 80% of the eciency analyses in the health sector between 1978 and mid-2006.
Varabyova and Schreyögg (2013) sum up several of its advantages. Health care is the
second sector in terms of number of DEA applications, behind the banking sector,
up to 2013 (Liu et al., 2013).
2.3 The introduction of environmental variables in e-
ciency analyses: rst attempts
Eciency analyses assess performances of DMUs, supposing that the whole distance
between a DMU and its projection on the production frontier is managerial inef-
ciency. But many exogenous factors can impact a performance, from climate to
economic circumstances. Taking those factors into account is crucial in terms of pol-
icy implications. Introducing some additional variables in a nonparametric eciency
analysis is a major stake in the literature. Contrary to SFA models, where they can
be added to the model, environmental or managerial variable do not t easily into
deterministic models. This section aims at summarizing the main possibilities, and
their empirical feasability.
2.3.1 One-stage models
The rst introduction of environmental variables is proposed by Banker and Morey
(1986b). It proposes to distinguish, in a classic DEA model, the inputs and out-
puts under the control of the manager (discretionary) from the others. The formal
model is close to the DEA, with the dierence that non-discretionary inputs cannot
be minimized, or outputs maximized. This method requires to know the eect of
the environmental variable : a variable supposed having a positive impact on e-
ciency will be introduced as an input. If a DMU exhibits a great quantity of this
variable, then it will be more likely to reach a good performance. So, if it exhibits
similar discretionary inputs and outputs to another DMU, but a greater value of
non-discretionary input, it will get a lower eciency score. In the case where the en-
vironmental variable is not continuous, Banker and Morey (1986a) propose a similar
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method to deal with categorical environmental variable.
This kind of method has some limits. First, as shown in Coelli et al. (2005), it
requires to know, ex ante the eect of the environmental variable on eciency, which
is not always the case. An alternative method is to introduce the environmental
variable under the form of a neutral one. In this case, a DMU is only compared
with DMUs exhibiting the same characteristics. This allows not to make hypothesis
on the impact of the environmental variable, but it reduces to a great extent the
number of peers to which a DMU can be compared.
Second, one-stage models suggest a relation of substituability between discretionary
and non-discretionary variables, that might not be obvious empirically. They also
assume at least the free disposability of external variables, and, in the case of DEA
model, the convexity of their relation with the output.
Finally, the number of environmental variables to be introduced in the model is very
limited. First, the number of inputs and outputs in a production function has to be
low. Second, it is hard to read if there are several variables.
2.3.2 Two-stage models
Two-stage models are the most used methods in the empirical literature to explain
eciency scores. They mostly consist in a traditional DEA model to get eciency
scores. Then, in a second stage, those scores are the dependent variables of an
econometric regression, where environmental variables are explicative factors. Dif-
ferent estimators are used at this stage. Most of the literature uses Tobit model to
estimate the impact of environmental factors, due to the distribution of eciency
scores: comprised between 0 and 1, and with a large proportion of 1. But some pa-
pers stand for linear models (Ho, 2007), claiming that Tobit is a mis-specication,
and does not give direct eects of the potential determinants. They considered that
eciency scores are not censored in an economic meaning, and thus that the Tobit
model is not appropriate (McDonald, 2009).
Two-stage models are also criticized in a more general way for several reasons (Simar
and Wilson, 2013):
• the estimated eciency scores are biased estimators of the true one;
• the estimated eciency scores are serially correlated;
• as the quantity of inputs an outputs are correlated to the environmental vari-
ables, the residual of the second stage is correlated to the explicative variables
They propose a single and a double bootstrap procedures to cope with those limits
(Simar and Wilson, 2007) and improve the statistical properties of the second-stage.
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Another answer is given by Ramalho et al. (2010), with McDonald (2009). McDon-
ald (2009) distinguishes two ways of considering eciency scores in the literature.
• The rst one, the so-called conventionalist one, looks at the estimated scores
as estimates of the true scores. It is advocated by Simar and Wilson (2013),
for instance.
• The second school, the instrumentalist one, considers scores as "simply de-
scriptive measures of the relative performance of the units in the sample". In
this case, many of the issues linked to the second stage disappear.
Ramalho et al. (2010) belong to this second group, and propose an estimator based
on the fraction regression model, rst proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
Their estimator is used in the empirical analyses of this thesis.
2.3.3 Three-stage model
One of the drawback of two-part models is that eciency score are rough, they
are not purged from the eect of environmental variables. It is possible to know
the impact of each variable, but the score does not directly reect the manage-
rial performance of the DMU. Yet, this information is crucial in terms of policy
recommandation, or benchmarking of rms.
In this perspective, Fried et al. (2002) proposes a three-stage procedure that allows
to get some purged scores that reect the managerial performances of DMUs. Three
potential determinants of DMUs are considered:
• the managerial performance (the eciency);
• the environmental components that impacts the global performance;
• the good or bad luck, or omitted variables
The objective is to disantangle the three eects. The procedure is the following one:
1. A "classic" DEAmodel is run, without any environmental component. "Rough"
scores are computed, as well as total slacks (radial and non-radial). Input
slacks are considered whether the input orientation is used, output slacks oth-
erwise.
2. Total slacks are regressed on environmental variables using a SFA estimator.
This allows to distinguish the eect of environmental variables from the man-
agerial ineciency and the statistical noise in the performance of DMUs.
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From the results of the second stage, adjusted inputs or outputs (according
to the chosen orientation) are computed. The adjustment puts every DMUs
in the best possible situation in terms of environment and of luck, using the
coecients of Stage 2.
3. A new DEA model is run, using the adjusted inputs or outputs. The new
scores are then purged of the impact of environment and luck and only reect
the managerial performance.
Denitive scores are always higher than the rough scores, as DMUs go from their
actual situation to the best environment and luck. In their empirical application,
the mean score rises from 0.52 to 0.905 from Stage 1 to Stage 3, and the number
of ecient DMUs went from 86 to 222 out of 395. This means that luck and
environment explains a very large part of DMUs' ineciency. It also shares the
limits of parametric approaches, as the second stage requires assumptions about the
functional form of the "ineciency" term.
Considered in a "conventionalist" way, this method suers from the same aws as
the typical two-stage approaches, about the estimated nature of the scores that
need to be taken into account in each possible second stage, and the correlation
issue between regressors and the residual term of the second stage.
The last but crucial limit of two and three stage-models is the assumption of separa-
bility they make between the inputs and outputs on one part, and the environmental
variables on the other part (Simar and Wilson, 2011). In other words, environmental
variables do not aect the production frontier itself (the best possible performance),
it only aects the distance from one DMU to its projection on the frontier, i.e. its
score. This is the strongest weakness of those methods in theoretical terms, because
this assumption seems quite unrealistic. It is explicitely made in the model of Simar
and Wilson (2007), but it is implicit for the relevance of two-stage approaches.
If this assumption is not satised, then Simar and Wilson (2011) advocate for the
use of contional eciency models, extended from Daraio and Simar (2005).
2.3.4 Conditional models
Conditional order-m Conditional eciency models are part of the order-m ef-
ciency models, proposed by Cazals et al. (2002) and extended to the multivariate
case by Daraio and Simar (2005). The only required assumption is the free dispos-
ability assumption (see section 2.2.2.2).
For one level of output y, Z the vector of environmental variables and m i.i.d.
random variablesXi, i = 1, ...,m from the conditional n-variate distribution function
FX|Y,Z(x|y, z), the production set is:
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Ψ̃zm(y) = {(x′, y′) ∈ RN+M+ |x′ ≥ Xi, y′ ≥ y, i = 1, ...,m}
The production set then depends on the value of z since Z = z is xed. The eciency
input score for the given y and production set Ψzm(y) is then dened by:
θm(x, y|z) = inf{θ|FX|Y (θx|y, z) > 0}
with FX|Y = Prob(X ≤ x|Y ≥ y, Z = z). These score is obtained, for a certain set
of m values of Xi, the corresponding input score θ̃m(x, y) is computed as such:
θ̃m(x, y|z) = min
{i|yi≥y,|zi−z|≤h}
( max
j=1,...,N
(
xji
xj
))
where h is a bandwith that has to be chosen carefully to "optimize" in a certain
sense the estimation of the density of Z" (Daouia and Simar, 2007). The four-step
procedure (Daraio and Simar, 2007) used to compute the denitive scores is the
same as in the classic order-m model.
Conditional order-α It is also possible to include environmental variables in an
order-α model. The conditional input eciency measure for Z=z is dened, for a
given value of y, by:
θα(x, y|z) = inf{θ|FX|Y (θx|y, z) > 1− α}
The interpretation is the same as in the simple order-α model: θα(x, y|z) is the
proportionate input reduction that a DMU operating at (x, y) should implement to
reach the input ecient frontier of α ∗ 100%, conditionally to z.
Those conditional methods are more robust and require less hypothesis on the rela-
tionship between environmental variables and components of the production func-
tion. They have been recently used in several papers including Minviel and Witte
(2017); Guerrini et al. (2016); Matousek and Tzeremes (2016). To the best of our
knowledge, it has not been used in health literature.
As they take the environmental variables into account in the estimation of the
production frontier itself, conditional models require large dataset, to get a sucient
variability in the several dimensions of the model (inputs, outputs, environmental
variables). The larger the number of variables in the model, the larger the dataset
needs to be, which can be an empirical diculty.
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2.4 Conclusions
The literature about non-parametric eciency assessment enlarged during the last
decades, providing some new statistical tools for empirical analysis. Those tools
aim at adressing some unsolved issues in the reference models, DEA and FDH: their
sensitivity to the dataset, and the introduction of environmental variables mainly.
In this thesis, three empirical works are realized, using the most accurate estimator
possible according to each case.
Chapter 3 considers national health system of a sample of 120 developing countries
as DMUs and assess the eciency of their health expenditures in the production
of "good health", proxied by maternal and juvenile survival. To take into account
the available resources, and the level of development of the dierent, the GDP per
capita is introduced as a non-discretionary input. To control for the presence of
potential outliers, and because of the size of the sample, robust frontier methods
are implemented.
Chapter 4 estimates the eciency of a sample of 30 Township Health Centers (THC)
in Weifang, China, and studies its determinants. A two-stage method is then
adopted, because of the number of potential determinants of eciency. Robust
frontier methods are used in the rst stage again, to deal with outliers and size of
the sample.
Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the eciency of Family Health Centers (FHC), the
rst level health facilities in Ulan-Bator, Mongolia. The objective is to understand
the determinants of eciency so a two-stage method is adopted, with robust frontier
estimator in the rst stage.
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Chapter 3
The eciency of health systems in
middle and developing countries
1
3.1 Introduction
As said in the introduction of this thesis, the nal objective of a health system is to
improve the health condition of a population. To this purpose, nancial resources
are injected in the system, by various agents (households, governments, international
institutions, private companies) and under dierent forms (funding of social security
funds or private insurance prepayments, spendings in health infrastructures and sta
for instance).
This chapter assesses the global health system of a sample of 120 middle and low
income countries (according to the World Bank classication) in order to evaluate
the performance of those countries in terms of healh expenditures. In order words,
which are the countries that use most eciently the resources they inject in their
health system? Or, for a certain health status, which are the countries that spend
the least resources? In a context of nancial constraint, especially in developing
countries, this issue is crucial.
Nevertheless, this assessment needs to take into account the propoer characteristics
of each country, because they are likely to aect the performance of their health
system. Those characteristics are various. They include the level of economic human
and developement (wealth, level of education), or demographic aspects for instance.
In this study, GDP per capita is included in the production function, to control for
the level of development in the eciency assessment.
The production function is made of private and public health expenditures as inputs,
GDP per capita as non-discretionary input, and juvenile (under-ve) and maternal
1This chapter is based on a reseach project on health scal space, asked by the WHO and the
FDA (Mathonnat J, Petitfour L. et Y. Tapsoba, Espace budgétaire et dépenses publiques pour la
santé - Mesures, évolutions et déterminants, december 2016, 107 p). It uses and complements
the section about eciency measure of health expenditures, developing the methodological aspects
presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. I remained solely responsible of this analysis presented here.
38
Chapter 3. The eciency of health systems in middle and developing
countries
mortality as outputs. Six production functions are estimated: one for each three-
year subperiod from 1997 to 2014, on a sample of 120 low and middle income
countries.
The results highlight some large disparities in health systems performances, but with
an increasing trend: the average technical eciency went from 0.632 in 1997/99 to
0.770 in 2012/14. Another result is the higher technical eciency level of low income
countries (mostly sub-saharian countries) compared to the rest of the sample, due
to their very low level of health expenditures.
Section 3.2 presents the production function of our model, Section 3.3 the data used
for the analysis. Section 3.4 details the empirical analysis, and Section 3.5 gives the
results of the study, and Section 3.6 concludes it.
3.2 The production function
3.2.1 Inputs
The literature around the eciency of health systems often includes sevral kinds of
inputs: the number of physicians and inpatient beds per 1000 inhabitants (Retzla-
Roberts et al., 2004; Ravangard et al., 2014). Yet, physicians and inpatients beds
are directy nanced by health expenditures. Therefore, there is no relation of sub-
stituability between those variable, which is a problem in the perspective of a non-
paramatric eciency analysis. They were thus excluded as inputs from this analysis,
to keep only the two types of health expenditures.
Here, the inputs of the production function were chosen to be an exhaustive expres-
sion of the resources injected in the health systems. Two inputs were introduced:
public health expenditures, and private health expenditures. They are the widest
expression possible of the resources injected in the health care system.
Public health expenditures include government (central and local) spendings, exter-
nal resources and Social Security Funds nancing (source: WHO).
Private health expenditures include out-of pocket payments, charitable donations,
private insurance spendings and direct service payments by private donations (source:
WHO).
It was chosen to consider both private and public health expenditures even though,
in this eciency analysis, the Decision Making Units are governments, i.e. public
entities. This reason is justied by three main reasons. First, households spend a
signicant part of their health expenditures in public facilities. Second, in many
countries, the sta of the public facilities has some private activities. Third, public
3.2. The production function 39
funds nance to some extent (according to the countries) private health facilities.
For those reasons, it is not sucient to consider only public, and not private health
expenditures to assess the performances of health systems, as the links are tigh
between the two of them. Moreover, private health expenditures can represent a
very large part of total health expenditures in developing countries. Introducing
them as separate inputs in the eciency analysis gives a more precise represention
of the production function of the rm.
3.2.2 Outputs
The output of a health system is the health status itself, so the chosen variables are
indicators of the health status of the population. Three indicators are commonly
used in the literature: life expectancy at birth, maternal mortality, and under ve
mortality.
Life expectancy was used by Alexander et al. (2003); Ravangard et al. (2014); Cheng
and Zervopoulos (2014). It is a good proxy of the global health status and condition,
but it does not react very quickly to a policy change, for two kinds of reasons.
• The rst reason is that life expectancy is a very global and long run indicator,
so it takes time for a precise health policy to have a important impact on it.
In this study, the dierent subperiods last only three years, which is certainly
too short to see any change. Therefore, if there is a big increase of health
expenditures in t, it will not be seen in the life expectancy before t+1. In t, a
decrease will be observed.
• This slow reaction of life expectancy is also due to the it is estimated nature. It
is computed with health indicators related to a past health production process.
The life expectancy at birth in t depends upon health policies implemented in
t-1, so the reaction to a policy will not be immediate
As one of the objectives of the study was to compare the peformances across sub-
periods, this lagged reaction of life expectancy is a major concern, so it was not
included in the production function.
The other indicators that are often used are mortality indicators: mainly maternal
mortality (Cheng and Zervopoulos, 2014; Dukhan, 2010) and infantile or juvenile
mortality (Cheng and Zervopoulos, 2014; Dukhan, 2010; Retzla-Roberts et al.,
2004). They have the advantage of being very reactive to a push in health inputs,
so both of them were selected as outputs of the model.
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An issue emerged from this choice. Mortality ratios have to be minimized, which
is not compatible with the characteristics of an output in an eency model. They
have to be transformed to become proper outputs. The main two solution are the
inversion of the variable, and, when it is a ratio, its complementary expression. For
instance, a maternal mortality rate of x deaths per 100 000 births, becomes a survival
rate of (100 000 - x ) surviving women per 100 000 births. This last expression is
preferred for two reasons. First, it has an "concrete" interpretation, it represents a
real quantity, which more relevant to introduce in a production function. Second,
the distorsion of the quantity is more important with a inverted variable.
Let's consider the case of a mortality rate, with four dierent countries. Countries
A and B exhibit very low mortality rates, with a dierence of 1 between the two.
Countries C and D both exhibit high mortality rates, but also with a dierence of
1 between the two. The dierence will remain 1 with a transformation in a survival
rate. On the contrary, with an inversion, the dierence between A and B will become
greater than between C and D. In economic terms, this is quite counter-intuitive,
because it means that an decrease in mortality for countries with poor health condi-
tions will be considered as less valuable than for countries with better health status.
Thus, the two outputs of the health production function of this study are the ma-
ternal and the juvenile (under ve) survival rate.
3.2.3 Environmental variables
Health systems face very dierent constraints and situations, that needs to be taken
into account in the assessment of their performances. Indeed, there are various de-
terminants to the health status, and multiple channels through which policies can
improve (or not) health condition. Dupas and Miguel (2017) underline the role of
environmental and infrastructural variables on health. For instance, sanitation in-
frastructures have a signicant on morbidity, and their magnitude mainly depends
upon the economic conditions. Several other variables can be considered as deter-
minants of health system performances2.
3.2.3.1 Education
Education is a key element of the eectiveness of health policies, through the chan-
nels of health behaviors, and also of the qualication of the health care providers.
2This section only deals with the choice of the variables. Methodological concerns are dealt
with in section 3.4.1.1
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• Education allows a better access to information, and thus, to knowledge about
"healthy behaviors". Thomas et al. (1991) rely on Brazilian DHS data. They
highlight the role of the mother education on child height in Brazil and identify
that the access to information (through the radio, the media) is the main
transmission channel (and not the income). They also nd a substitution eect
between the education of the mother and the availability of health services.
On the contrary, the education of the mother and the availability of sanitation
infrastructure are found to be complementary in their eect on the child height.
• Education makes people more adaptable in their behaviors, it improves their
ability to learn. Rosenzweig (2004) concludes that investments in health re-
sources have to be implemented jointly with opportunities to learn so that
they induce actual changes in health behaviors
It is introduced as an input of the health system production function in several pa-
pers. For instance, Retzla-Roberts et al. (2004) introduces the school expectancy.
3.2.3.2 Demography
Some demographic variables might constraint the performances of health care sys-
tems, through one main channel: the unit cost. Reaching the same objective in
terms of health status does not require the same means in a big city and in a rural
area. Two variables can be considered in this perspective: the density of population
and the urbanization rate. Two main factors can be highlighted, whose impacts are
contrary:
• The accessibility of health care facilities. In remote areas, maintaining health
facilities is more expensive than in the cities. In cities, the catchement area is
often larger (in number of patients) and allows some economies of scale, and
lower unit cost for the same health services. To this dierence of unit cost
must be added the transportation costs borne by households, much higher in
rural areas. In this case, it takes more resources to reach a certain health
objective.
• The structure of the health care pyramid. In rural areas, health care facilities
are mainly primary facilities. Patients are referred to higher level facilities if
needed, for severe pathologies. On the contrary, in rural areas, thanks to the
geographical proximity, people can easily bypass the healthcare pyramid and
directly go to second or third level facilities, where unit costs are higher. As
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a consequence, the healthcare system is more expensive in cities., and tech-
nological resources, are concentrated in the cities. The unit cost is therefore
higher in densely populated areas.
A main preoccupation with those two variables is that there is no certainty about
the way they aect the heath production function. This means that it is not possible
to introduce it directly in the production function. An input necessarily has to be
minimized, and an output to be maximized.
3.2.3.3 Economic conditions
The last environmental input introduced in eciency analyses is the economic con-
traint faced by a governement, often approximated by the GDP per capita. Indeed,
in the short run the GDP per capita is not under the control of the government.
Yet, it directly aects the health system performances through dierent channels:
• It constraints both public (through the amount of collected taxes, and available
public resources) and private (through the eect on the purchasing power)
health expenditures.
• It aects indireclty health status through the other environmental variables,
especially education and infrastructures.
For instance, Retzla-Roberts et al. (2004) introduces the school expectancy, the
gini coecient and the tobacco use as inputs of the health production function.
3.3 The data
3.3.1 The source of the data and the selection of the sample
A large part of the literature around eciency analyses on health systems focus on
developed countries (Afonso and Aubyn, 2005, 2006; Bhat, 2005). Some papers use
samples composed of both developing and developed countries (Grosskopf et al.,
2006; Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; Kirigia et al., 2007). Here, the focus is placed
on low and middle income countries, which also suers from waste of resources in
their health systems, and face harder nancial contraints, and challenges in terms
of health status than developed coutries.
The data comes from the World Health Organization. All the observations from 1997
to 2014 were considered. The initial sample included all the countries classied by
the World Bank as Low Income, Lowere Middle Income or Upper Middle Income
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(135 countries). Then, some countries were excluded, because the information was
not available for every variable and every period.
Three year averages were computed from 1997 to 2014: 1997/99, 2000/02, 2003/05,
2006/08, 2009/11 and 2012/14. Indeed, there may be some conjonctural variations
in health expenditures, not necessarily linked to the global performance of the health
system (mostly, variations in external resources allocated to health that are above
the control of governements). Moreover, for some isolated years data was missing.
With three year averages, conjonctural variations are smoothed compared to annual
data.
Finally, the denitive sample is constituted of 120 countries to be perfectly balanced.
The initial list and nal one are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.8. The sample
in constituted of 26 low income countries (mostly sub-saharian countries, except
for Cambodia and Nepal), 48 lower middle income countries, and 46 upper middle
income countries.
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Table 3.1: Countries of the sample
Country WB income
group
Country WB income
group
Albania Upper middle Egypt. Arab Rep. Lower middle
Algeria Upper middle El Salvador Lower middle
Angola Upper middle Eritrea Low
Armenia Lower middle Ethiopia Low
Azerbaijan Upper middle Fiji Upper middle
Bangladesh Lower middle Gabon Upper middle
Belarus Upper middle Gambia. The Low
Belize Upper middle Georgia Lower middle
Benin Low Ghana Lower middle
Bhutan Lower middle Grenada Upper middle
Bolivia Lower middle Guatemala Lower middle
Bosnia and Herzegovina Upper middle Guinea Low
Botswana Upper middle Guinea-Bissau Low
Brazil Upper middle Guyana Lower middle
Bulgaria Upper middle Haiti Low
Burkina Faso Low Honduras Lower middle
Burundi Low India Lower middle
Cabo Verde Lower middle Indonesia Lower middle
Cambodia Low Iran. Islamic Rep. Upper middle
Cameroon Lower middle Jamaica Upper middle
Central African Repub-
lic
Low Jordan Upper middle
Chad Low Kazakhstan Upper middle
China Upper middle Kenya Lower middle
Colombia Upper middle Kiribati Lower middle
Comoros Low Kyrgyz Republic Lower middle
Congo. Dem. Rep. Low Lao PDR Lower middle
Congo. Rep. Lower middle Lebanon Upper middle
Costa Rica Upper middle Lesotho Lower middle
Cote d'Ivoire Lower middle Liberia Low
Cuba Upper middle Libya Upper middle
Djibouti Lower middle Macedonia. FYR Upper middle
Dominican Republic Upper middle Madagascar Low
Ecuador Upper middle Malawi Low
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Table 3.2: Countries of the nal sample, 2
Country WB income
group
Country WB income
group
Malaysia Upper middle Sao Tome and
Principe
Lower middle
Maldives Upper middle Senegal Lower middle
Mali Low Sierra Leone Low
Mauritania Lower middle Solomon Islands Lower middle
Mauritius Upper middle South Africa Upper middle
Mexico Upper middle Sri Lanka Lower middle
Micronesia. Fed.
Sts.
Lower middle St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Upper middle
Moldova Lower middle Sudan Lower middle
Mongolia Upper middle Suriname Upper middle
Montenegro Upper middle Swaziland Lower middle
Morocco Lower middle Syrian Arab Repub-
lic
Lower middle
Mozambique Low Tajikistan Lower middle
Myanmar Lower middle Tanzania Low
Namibia Upper middle Thailand Upper middle
Nepal Low Togo Low
Nicaragua Lower middle Tonga Upper middle
Niger Low Tunisia Upper middle
Nigeria Lower middle Turkey Upper middle
Pakistan Lower middle Turkmenistan Upper middle
Panama Upper middle Uganda Low
Papua New Guinea Lower middle Ukraine Lower middle
Paraguay Upper middle Uzbekistan Lower middle
Peru Upper middle Vanuatu Lower middle
Philippines Lower middle Viet Nam Lower middle
Romania Lower middle Yemen. Rep. Lower middle
Rwanda Low Zambia Lower middle
Samoa Lower middle
3.3.2 Health status
3.3.2.1 Main evolutions
The evolution of maternal and under ve mortality in the sample are depicted in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2. They both decreased constantly from 1997/99 to 2012/14, but
their distribution remained the same across the subperiods.
The mortality decreased by 35% in average and 31% in median from 1997/99 to
2012/14 (see Table 3.10). In 1997/99, in average 375.9 women over 100 000 died
giving birth, in 2012/14 it was 243.8 (198.7 and 136.3 in median).
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The distribution of the variable over the sample remained the same across the subpe-
riods: the concentration is the strongest among the 50% lowest maternal mortality
rates, and the inter-quartile ratio is stable around 8. Half of the sample is under 200
deaths per 100 000 births, see Table 3.9). The remaining quarter are much more
disparate, especially for the highest one, up to a maximal outlying value3.
Under ve mortality also decreased in average and median across the period (see
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.10), to a larger extent than maternal mortality (45% in
average and median). In average, 83.3 children over 1000 died before their fth
birthday in 1997/99 (32 in median), in 2012/14 this gure fell to 45.9 (33.9 in
median).
Contrary to the distribution of maternal mortality, the distribution of under ve
mortality is concentrated around the median value for every subperiod (i.e. between
the 25th and the 75th percentile). As a piece of evidence, the inter-quartile ratio is
comprised between 3 and 4 according to subperiods, which is smaller than the same
ratio for maternal mortality (ratios computed from Table 3.9).
Figure 3.1: Distribution of maternal mor-
tality per 100 000 births
Figure 3.2: Distribution of under-ve
mortality per 1000 births
The analysis of the evolution of juvenile and maternal mortalities highlights the
strong improvement of health conditions in low income countries (Figure 3.3a and
3.3b). It led to a tightening of the gap between this group and the middle income
countries of the sample. Maternal mortality fell from 924 to 565 in the rst group,
from 327 to 216 in lower-middle income countries, and from 40 to 22 in upper-middle
countries.
3Sierra Leone exhibits extremely high maternal mortality rates for each subperiods, thus it was
not included in Figure 3.1 to keep it clear. It decreased constantly across the study period, from
2813 to 1460 deaths per 1000 births, which is still much higher than the rest of the sample. In
terms of under ve mortality, Sierra Leone is part of the highest values of the sample, but it does
not apart from the other countries.
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a. Maternal mortality (per 100 000
births)
b. Under 5 mortality per 1000 births
Figure 3.3: Evolution of mortality variables per WB income groups (in average)
3.3.2.2 Strong correlation between the two indicators
There is a strong positive correlation between maternal and under-ve mortality,
for each subperiod (see Figure 3.4). Most of the sample is concentrated in the left-
bottom part of the gures (low maternal mortality, low under-ve mortality). No
country exhibits a low maternal mortality and a high under-ve mortality, or the
inverse situation, conrming the strong correlation between the two indicators.
A group of countries can be identied with a poorer health status, it is situated in the
right-upper part of the gures (high maternal mortality, high under-ve mortality):
Chad, Central African Republic, Angola. Those countries are all situated in sub-
saharian Africa, and for most of they suered from conicts during the period.
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a. 1997/99 b. 2000/02
c. 2003/05 d. 2006/08
e. 2009/11 f. 2012/14
Figure 3.4: Maternal and under ve mortality, per period (deaths per 1000 births
for maternal mortality, deaths per 100 000 births for under ve mortality)
3.3.3 Health expenditures
3.3.3.1 Main evolutions
Total health expenditures doubled from 1997 to 2014 (see Figure 3.5). They sored
from 196 to 481 annual 2010 PPP dollars per capita (Table 3.9). This increase
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is mainly due to public expenditures. They represent the greater part of health
expenditures in the majority of the sample (around 60%), and experienced a stronger
increase than private expenditures between the rst and the last subperiod (increase
of 181 % against 106 in average, and 218 against 137% in median, see Table 3.10).
In average, governements of the sample spend 292 annual 2010 PPP dollars per
capita in health sector in 2012/2014, while private agents spend 190 annual 2010
PPP dollars per capita.
The two indicators exhibit almost the same distribution for the three rst subperi-
ods: more than a half of the subsample spends less than 200 (100 until 2005) dollars
per year in health, for private and public expenditures. From 2006 to 2014, public
health exenditures sore in some countries (the 75th percentile went from 162.5 in
1997/99 to 331.2 in 2006/08, to 451.0 in 2012/14, see Table 3.9 in Annex). The
dispersion increased for public health expenditures4.
a. Distribution by period b. Composition by period
Figure 3.5: Evolution of health expenditures, annual 2010 PPP $
It is also interesting to decompose these evolutions according to the World Bank in-
come classication. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of health expenditures separately
for the three groups. Public expenditures were almost multiplied by 3 in upper mid-
dle income countries, from 200 to 600 annual PPP dollars. In lower-middle income
countries, it went from 60 to 152 dollars in average, and in low income countries it
went from 14 to 35 dollars. This increase seems marginal in absolute terms, particu-
larly compared to the other groups, but in relative terms public health expenditures
more than doubled across the period.
The same trend is observed for private health expenditures, there some important
dierences between the three groups. They rose from 28 to 57 annual PPP dollars
4Five values of the public health expenditures are extremely high and were removed from Figure
3.5. They correspond to the following observations: Cuba 200/08, 2009/11, 2012/14 ; Maldives
2012/14; Panama 2012/14.
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for low income countries, from 61 to 138 in lower-middle income countries, and from
160 to 335 for upper-middle countries in average. Within the study period, the gap
widened between the countries of the sample.
Though the gap widened between the dierent groups, even in low income countries
health expenditures sore in relative terms. Figure 3.7 highlights their evolution for
low income countries only, underlining the increasing trend.
a. Public health expenditures b. Private health expenditures
Figure 3.6: Evolution of health expenditures per capita per WB income group, 2010
PPP dollars
Figure 3.7: Evolution of health expenditures in low income countries
3.3.3.2 Composition of health expenditures
Private expenditures are mostly composed of out-of pocket payments in the sample
(the median in over 80%). There in no real evolution of this trend across subperiods
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(Figure 3.8a), and no real dierence according to the level of development (Figure
3.8b).
a. By period b. By WB group
Figure 3.8: Distribution of the proportion of out-of-pocket expenditures in private
health expenditures
Public expenditures are partly composed of Social Security nancing. Their propor-
tion in Public health expenditures increased over the period from 16.6% in 1997/99
to 21.5% in 2012/14 in the sample (see Figure 3.9a). Contrary to the proportion of
out-of-pocket expenditures, their importance in strongly linked to the level of devel-
opment of the country. Figure 3.9b highlights the dierence of distribution of the
proportion of Social Security nancing in public health expenditures. It is higher
for lower-middle, and much higher for upper-middle income countries than for low
income countries (in average, respectively 3, 13 and 33 % for low, lower-middle and
upper-middle income countries).
Public expenditures are also made of external resources for health (including Ocial
Development Assistance). Their share is stable across the period, but is strongly
related to the level of development. The median is 25% for low income countries
(with values going to more than 60%), while it is less than 10% for middle income
countries. For upper-middle countries especially, the 75th percentile is smaller than
5%.
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a. By period b. By WB group
Figure 3.9: Distribution of the share of Social Security Funds health expenditures
in public health expenditures
a. By period b. By WB group
Figure 3.10: Distribution of the share of external resources for health in total health
expenditures
3.3.3.3 Complementarity or substituability between private and public
health expenditures ?
There is a clear common trend between private and public expenditures, that can be
seen graphically for each period in Figure 3.11. The Pearson correlation coecients
are signicant at the 95th percentile, and positive for every period (Table 3.3). The
correlation is stronger for the rst subperiods than for the last.
Some countries spend exceptionally high amounts of money on health:
• Lebanon exhibits very high private health expenditures, around 600 $ per
capita for each subperiod. This value is much higher than any other country
of the sample until 2000/02. Public expenditures are stable across the period,
around 400 $ per capita, which is in the highest values of the sample for the
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rst three subperiods.
• The Cuban government spends a lot of money on health. From 2000, it repre-
sents the largest public health expenditures in the sample. The gap with the
second country widened across the subperiods.
• Other countries increased their private health expenditures in a very large
extent compared to the rest of the sample: Azerbaijan, Brazil, Iran, Mexico,
South Africa.
Table 3.3: Pearson rank correlation between private and public health expenditures
Subperiod 97/99 00/02 03/05 06/08 09/11 12/14
Pearson corr. 0.648 0.6088 0.5371 0.4926 0.4758 0.5144
The proportion of private health expenditures ranges between 0.4 and 0.5, with
a declining trend between subperiods (0.51 in 1997/99, 0.46 in 2012/14). Half of
the sample exhibits a proportion of private health expenditures roughly comprised
between 0.4 and 0.6 (see Figure 3.12a) for every subperiods. Very low values are
to be noticed, while very high values are decreasing across the period the minimal
value remains stable, while the maximal values declines).
Looking at the composition of health expenditures according to World Bank income
classication, low income countries health expenditures are mostly borne by pri-
vate agents (three quarter of the group exhibit a proportion of private expenditures
greater than 50%, see Figure 3.12b). On the contrary, the median proportion of
private health expenditures among total health expenditures is 0.4 for upper-middle
income countries. This conrms the idea that the poorest countries, households
have to face themselves the nancial risks of illness (Dupas, 2011).
Public and private health expenditures are rather complementary in the nancing
of the health system, from their strong correlation. This correlation is possibly due
to the economic conditions of each country, hence the necessity to take those latter
into account in the performance assessment.
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a. 1997/99 b. 2000/02
c. 2003/05 d. 2006/08
e. 2009/11 f. 2012/14
Figure 3.11: Health Expenditures, 2010 PPP $
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a. By subperiod b. By WB income group
Figure 3.12: Distribution of the proportion of private health expenditures in total
health expenditures
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3.3.4 GDP per capita
The average GDP per capita increased from 1997/99 to 2012/14 in the sample from
4627.4 to 7244.6 annual PPP dollars (increase of 57%). The variation rate is even
greater for the median (73%) that rose from 3218.0 to 5568.1 annual PPP dollars.
The distribution of the variable is given in Figure 3.135.
Half the sample is concentrated between 0 and 5000 for every subperiod. But the
disparity is very large for the upper half of the sample: the gap between the minimum
and the 25th percentile is always smaller than the one between the median and the
75th, and this for the six subperiods. Moreover, the gap between the 75th and
the maximum is always bigger than the one between the minimum and the 75th
percentile.
Figure 3.13: Distribution of the GDP per capita across subperiods, annual 2010
PPP $
3.4 Measurement of eciency
3.4.1 The empirical model
3.4.1.1 How to take the environmental variable into account ?
Environmental variables are always introduced as inputs in the literature about
health systems eciency, implicitely assuming that they are part of the production
function.
The objective of this study is to compute eciency scores that take into account
the impact of the GDP per capita. A rst solution is to estimate several production
5A few values are very high, they correspond to the following observations: Lybia for all periods
but 2012/14, Kazakhstan in 2012/14, Malaysia in 2009/11 and 2012/14.
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frontiers, so that countries would only be compared to similar peers. The problem
is that the GDP per capita is a continuous variable, so the choice of a threshold is
completely arbitrary, and that id would impossible to compare the scores obtained
in the two subsamples. This solution was rejected.
The most common in the literature is to introduce the environmental variable in the
production process itself, by considering them as inputs. Nevertheless, it is neces-
sary to be careful with the implications of this technique. Indeed, in a production
function, inputs have to be minimized, and outputs have to be maximized. But
environmental variable are not, by denition, under the control of Decision Making
Units. So according to the orientation of the model, some issues have to be delt
with.
For example, in an output orientation, the idea is to maximize the quantity of
outputs with a given level of inputs. In this case, there is no computation problem.
The quantity of output produced by country A will be compared to the quantity of
output produced by countries spending at least the same amount of money as A in
health, and exhibiting at least the same GDP per capita. This makes sense.
But, in the case of an input orientation, the idea is to minimize the quantity of
inputs used by DMUs producing at most the same quantity of output. Thus, if
two countries exhibit similar levels of output, similar public and private health
expenditures, but one has a smaller GDP per capita, its score will be higher than
the other one. Yet, the GDP per capita is here considered as exogenous data, so it
cannot be minimized. It is introduced as a non-discretionary input.
3.4.1.2 The parameters and assumptions
The choice of the estimator As the functional form of the health production
function is unknown, nonparametric estimator was chosen. Because of the size of
the sample, and of the potential presence of outliers, partial frontier estimators were
used to compute eciency scores.
The choice of the orientation An input orientation was chosen in order to
compare countries with similar health status and economic capacities, and to assess
their performance in terms of health expenditures. The score reects the waste in
health resources.
The number of estimated production frontiers In almost 20 years, the en-
vironment and the health production functions changed a lot. Thus, it is not rea-
sonable to consider all the observations relatively to the same production frontier.
On the contray, there is no reason to think that the health production function
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changed drastically within three years. One production frontier per subperiod was
thus estimated.
The choice of the m parameter In partial frontier model, the value of the
m, seen as a "trimming parameter", is crucial. Simar and Wilson (2013) gives a
method to choose the optimal value : "The nal value of m can be chosen in terms
of the desired level of robustness", i.e., of proportion of DMUs above the production
frontier. The upper limit is the number of observations.
Here, all possible values from 10 to 110 were tested, with a range of 10. As expected,
the proportion of DMUs above the frontier (with a score higher than one) decreases
as m increases, and so does the mean eciency in the sample (see Figure 3.14), for
the last subperiod). From m=40, there are less than 10% of super-ecient DMUs
in the sample, and from m=50, this proportion is very low and the mean eciency
does not vary (see Figure 3.14). The value of 40 was chosen for the rest of the nal
analysis , as from m equal to 40 the scores remained identical whatever the chosen
value of m.
Figure 3.14: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs and mean eciency according to
the value of m
The choice of the alpha parameter Running the order-alpha analysis, the value
of the parameter has to be chosen. The higher the alpha, the closer the method is
to the Free Disposal Hull. In this study, the proportion of super-ecient DMUs is
very low, and even equal to 0 from α = 5% (see Table 3.4 6).
6 see Section 3.4.3 for the description of the dierent models
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Value of alpha 87 89 91 93 95 97 99
Model 1 0.067 0.042 0.017 0.017 0 0 0
Model 2 0.042 0.025 0 0 0 0 0
Model 3 0.05 0.042 0.025 0.008 0 0 0
Model 4 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.4: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs according to the model and the value
of alpha
3.4.2 Detection of outliers
Partial frontier analyses give some robustness to the estimation regarding the pres-
ence of outliers. Indeed, outliers will exhibit a score higher than 1 so that they are
easily detectable and do not distord the production frontier (and bias the scores of
the other DMUs).
A rst graphical analysis gives an idea of potentially atypical DMUs regarding the
relation between the quantity of inputs and outputs. The limit of this analysis is
that it can only handle two dimensions at a time. However, it gives an idea of the
sample homogeneity. The objective is to detect the potential super-ecient DMUs,
that will distord the production frontier because they do not respond to the same
production function.
The only atypical countries that can be highlighted in Figure 3.15 are not potential
outliers in the eciency analysis. Indeed, they seem to be partucularly inecient
(high level of input, ou low level of output) so they are not likely to distord the
production frontier. Moreover, the robust frontier analyses, both with the order-m
and order-alpha estimators give very few, or no super-ecient DMUs (countries
with a score higher than 1, see Figure 3.14 and Table 3.4). The trends are exactly
the same for the six subperiods, leading to the conclusion that the study does not
suer from the presence of any outlier.
3.4.3 Robustness of the model
As stated in Chapter 2, as they are data-driven, non-parametric eciency models
are sensitive to the denition of the production function (see paragraph 2.2.2.1). To
test the validity of the eciency scores, several alternative scores, computed wih
alternative inputs or outputs, were compared to the initial one7. All the tested
7An additional alternate model was tested, including the prevalence of HIV in the population
as an output, following Dukhan (2010). The reason to introduce it in that for countries heavily
aected, the costs may be a nancial burden that other countries don not have to face. It can
increase their level of health expenditures and explain a low performance, therefore they are to
be compared to countries facing the same situation. In our sample, nine countries suer from
higher HIV prevalence then the other countries (prevalence higher than 10%): Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and The Gambia). The introduction
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a. Maternal survival rate/Private
expenditures
b. Maternal survival rate/Public
expenditures
c. Under-ve survival rate/Private
expenditures
d. Under-ve survival rate/Public
expenditures
e. Inverted GDP per capita/Private
expenditures
f. Inverted GDP per capita/Public
expenditures
Figure 3.15: Graphical detection of outliers
models are summed up in Table 3.5.
of HIV prevalence in the production function did not aect their score by more than 0.02. The
correlation coecient of scores obtained with model 1 was 0.94, and the Spearman rank correlation
was 0.89. The results remained the same.
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Moreover, there are two candidate methods, order-m and order-alpha frontier anal-
ysis. The scores were thus computed, and compared with both of the two methods.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Inputs
Public health expenditures
√ √ √
Private health expenditures
√ √ √
Total health expenditures
√
GDP per capita
√ √ √ √
Outputs
Maternal survival
√ √ √
Juvenile survival
√ √ √
Table 3.5: Tested models for the production function
In this perspective, eciency scores were computed for four production functions,
with order-m and order-alpha estimations. They were compared both through a
Pearson correlation matrix (Table 3.11), and through a matrix of Spearman rank
correlation (Table 3.12). Correlations are here given for the last subperiod only, but
lead to the same conclusions for the other ones.
The analysis of the Pearson correlations conrms the validity of our results, as the
coecients are very high. Indeed, between scores computed with various production
functions but a same method, they range between 0.657 and 0.893 for order-m
estimations, and 0.651 and 0.895 for order-alpha estimations. The lowest correlation
is obtained between Models 2 and 3, when only juvenile and maternal mortality are
successively taken into account. This suggests that the relevance of including both of
the two indicators in the production function. The correlation is the highest between
Models 1 and 4, when the inputs are modied (public and private separately, of total
health expenditures).
In terms of rank correlations, the same conclusion can be drawn. When the method
is xed and only the production function changes, the Spearman rank correlation
ranges from 0.658 to 0.870 for order-m scores, and 0.674 to 0.903 for order-alpha
scores. Similarly to the Pearson coecients, the correlation is the weakest between
Models were only juvenile and maternal mortality are introduced as outputs. The
highest correlation is also found between Models 1 and 4.
It is also to be noticed that the scores estimated with the same production function
but with a dierent method are always highly correlated. The Pearson correlation
coecient are all 0.999, and the Spearman rank correlations ranges between 0.982
(Model 1) and 0.998 (Model 2). Therefore, the choice of one method over the other
does not impact the scores at all.
Order-m scores were used for the rest of the analysis, considering the better statis-
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tical properties of this estimator (see paragraph 2.2.2.2).
3.5 Eciency scores
3.5.1 Evolution of eciency between 1997 and 2014
Technical eciency increased progressively across the subperiods (Table 3.6), from
0.632 to 0.770 in average. This increase is mainly explained by the evolution of
the lowest scores of the sample. In 1997/99 and 2000/02, the 25th percentile were
0.316 and 0.388, which is extremely low. It means that a quarter of the sample (30
countries) could, for the same level of maternal and juvenile mortality, and for the
same GDP per capita, decrease their health expenditures by 60% at least. On the
opposite side of the distribution, 40 countries are on the production frontier (Table
3.7). There is no country in the sample that uses less nancial resources for the
same level of maternal and juvenile mortality and for the same GDP per capita.
The disparity in terms of performances is very strong in the sample.
The gap tightened in the last subperiods: the median increased to 0.987 in 2012/14.
Almost half of the 120 countries are on the production frontier in the last subperiod.
The 25th percentile soared to 0.518, meaning that there is a smaller number of very
inecient countries. The average eciency score is went to 0.770, indicating that in
average, in 2012/14, middle and low income countries wasted almost a third of their
health expenditures, considered their health status and their economic situations.
period mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
1997/99 0.632 120 0.133 1 0.316 0.582 1 0.321
2000/02 0.683 120 0.116 1 0.388 0.694 1 0.301
2003/05 0.725 120 0.119 1 0.472 0.815 1 0.291
2006/08 0.744 120 0.124 1 0.488 0.927 1 0.288
2009/11 0.753 120 0.160 1 0.485 0.946 1 0.286
2012/14 0.770 120 0.169 1 0.518 0.987 1 0.274
Table 3.6: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores
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Table 3.7: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores, inecient countries
only
period mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
1997/99 0.447 80 0.133 0.976 0.281 0.401 0.582 0.228
2000/02 0.499 76 0.116 0.994 0.342 0.456 0.675 0.224
2003/05 0.528 70 0.119 0.992 0.376 0.499 0.690 0.227
2006/08 0.521 64 0.124 0.997 0.348 0.490 0.667 0.218
2009/11 0.551 66 0.160 0.999 0.365 0.512 0.754 0.241
2012/14 0.555 62 0.169 0.999 0.361 0.526 0.732 0.221
Figure 3.16: Evolution of the distribution of eciency scores
3.5.2 Dierent country proles
It is important to check whether there are some signicant dierences of perfor-
mances between the three World Bank income groups. Tables 3.15 give some in-
formation about this issue. There does not seem to be any dierence on the rst
subperiods, but in the last ones the gap has widened (0.898 for low income countries,
0.769 for lower-middle incomes and 0.698 for upper-middle incomes). This might be
related to the unequal increase in health expenditures, that makes some countries
very inecient compared to other ones.
The dierence of mean between low income countries and the rest of the sample is
statiscally signicant at a 95th level of condence, and for every subperiod but the
rst one. The dierence between upper-middle income countries and the rest of the
sample is signicant for the last three subperiods, at a 95th level of condence also.
Those results are not very surprising, given the very important gaps in terms of
health expenditures, compared to the dierences in mortality.
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3.5.3 Potential limits to the model
Several explanations can be given to this fact. The rst one is that the dierence of
performance decreased among the countries of the sample across the study period.
But there is also a risk of lack of comparability between the dierent countries.
Indeed, in an input orientation, countries are compared to other countries exhibiting
at least the same output, i.e., in this analysis, at most the same juvenile and maternal
mortalities, and the same GDP per capita. Yet, according to the distibution of the
two mortality variables, there are few countries exhibiting very low mortality rates,
so there are few peers to compare them.
Another limit of the model may rely in those mortality variables. Indeed, after a
certain threshold of economic development, there are not many dierences between
countries with very dierent level of developement in terms of maternal and juve-
nile mortality. Countries experience an Inequalities in health status may be better
expressed by the prevalence of cardiovascular disease or diabetes for example. It is
very likely that mortality variables are not sucient to capture health inequalities
for countries that reached a certain level of development and well-being!;
3.6 Conclusion
As a conclusion, from 1997 to 2014 the gap in terms of health system performances
tightened in average, between the least and the most ecient countries. But this
global evolution hides various evolutions according to countries level of development.
Low income countries lowered their mortality ratios to an important extent, while
their health expenditures remained very low in absolute terms. Their eciency
scores therefore sore across the period. On the contrary, the mortality ratios of
upper-middle income countries very slightly decreased as they already were low for
most of them, while their health expenditures, both private and public, skyrocketed.
The evolution of their eciency scores is thus less impressive.
From those conclusions, several points can be drawn. First, there is a need for a
better denition of a health production function to get relevant eciency assessment.
The rst assumption of any eciency assessment is that the denition function
includes all the resources and the productions of all the Decisions Making Units.
Health systems certainly aim at producing some "health", or avoiding the production
of bad health. But the measurement of this health is very complicated, as shown
in section 3.2.2. But, more important, the transformation of health resources into
"health" is subjected to many external elements that entirely under the control of
governments, or public authorities. Many studies tried to deal with this issue, here
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we include the GDP per capita in the production function as a proxy of the level of
developement.
But the relation between the external variables and the performances are rarely well
known, so the assessment of the performance does have some limits.
A response to this issue is the focus not on the production of "health", which is
the ultimate objective of a health system, but on the delivery of health services, as
an intermediate output. In this case, the Decision Making Unit is not a country
anymore, but a health facility, whose production function is easier to establish.
This kind of analysis is the core of Chapters 4 and 5, focusing on survey data
from Towhship Health Centers in Weifang, China and on Family Health Centers in
Ulan-Bator, Mongolia.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.8: Countries of the initial sample but excluded in the nal one
Country WB income group
American Samoa Upper middle
Dominica Upper middle
Korea. Dem. Rep. Low
Kosovo Lower middle
Marshall Islands Upper middle
Palau Upper middle
Somalia Low
South Sudan Low
St. Lucia Upper middle
Tuvalu Upper middle
West Bank and Gaza Lower middle
Iraq Upper middle
Afghanistan Low
Timor-Leste Lower middle
Zimbabwe Low
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Table 3.13: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores, low income countries
only
period mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
1997/99 0.621 26 0.222 1 0.333 0.582 1 0.293
2000/02 0.793 26 0.116 1 0.656 0.947 1 0.273
2003/05 0.887 26 0.124 1 0.884 1.000 1 0.224
2006/08 0.894 26 0.336 1 0.935 1.000 1 0.205
2009/11 0.891 26 0.285 1 0.821 1.000 1 0.200
2012/14 0.898 26 0.361 1 0.845 1.000 1 0.194
Table 3.14: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores, lower middle income
countries only
period mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
1997/99 0.645 48 0.133 1 0.275 0.766 1 0.346
2000/02 0.671 48 0.187 1 0.377 0.646 1 0.296
2003/05 0.688 48 0.119 1 0.454 0.624 1 0.279
2006/08 0.730 48 0.124 1 0.498 0.749 1 0.271
2009/11 0.753 48 0.201 1 0.521 0.900 1 0.272
2012/14 0.769 48 0.169 1 0.507 0.848 1 0.260
Table 3.15: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores, upper middle income
countries only
period mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
1997/99 0.624 46.000 0.134 1 0.348 0.482 1 0.316
2000/02 0.633 46.000 0.138 1 0.366 0.587 1 0.310
2003/05 0.671 46.000 0.149 1 0.432 0.711 1 0.308
2006/08 0.675 46.000 0.181 1 0.369 0.706 1 0.318
2009/11 0.674 46.000 0.160 1 0.355 0.753 1 0.317
2012/14 0.698 46.000 0.196 1 0.351 0.744 1 0.304

Chapter 4
Activity and eciency of
Township Health Centers in
Weifang, China
1
This chapter focuses on the eciency of a sample of 30 Township Health Centers
in Weifang, China, relying on survey data from 2006 to 2012. During this period,
China implemented a large pharmaceutical reform, which is the main institutionel
frame of this case study. Section 4.1 presents the major evolutions of the Chinese
health system since the comunist era. Section 4.2 is a literature review around health
care facilities eciency, and their determinants. Section 4.3 details the content of
the collected database, and gives information about the activity of the THC of the
sample. Section 4.4 deals with the rst stage of the eciency analysis, i.e. the
computation of the scores, and Section 4.5 presents the second stage, the estimation
of the determinants of eciency.
1This chapter comes from a research program on the eects of the essential drug policy on a sam-
ple of Township Health Centers of the prefecture of Weifang, Shandong province, under the joint
supervision of Pr. J. Mathonnat (CERDI) and Pr. A. Ma, Head of Weifang Medical University.
It beneted from funds from the National Research Agency through the program "Investissement
d'Avenir" (ANR-10-LABEX-14-10-01) by the CERDI and from nancial support from the FERDI
(Fondation pour les Études et les Recherches sur le Développement International), as well as from
the Bureau of Social Aairs of the French Embassy in Beijing. This program was conducted in
collaboration with a team from the Health Bureau of Weifang and from searchers of the Weifang
Medical University, and Pr. N. Chen, Deputy Director General, Department Policies and Legis-
lation, National Health and Family Planning Commission in Beijing. A rst version of this study
was at the core of a research report in French and Chinese, whom I am a co-author (Audibert M,
Huangfu X., Mathonnat J, Petitfour L., Politique Nationale de Médicaments Essentiels et activ-
ités, nancement et ecience d'un échantillon d'hôpitaux municipaux de la préfecture de Weifang,
FERDI, decomber 2015, 85 p). I was involved in its presentation and discussion with the Health
Bureau from Weifang and with the National Health and Family Planning Commission in Beijing.
The study also lead to a Working Paper of the FERDI (Petitfour L, Huangfu X, Audibert M, Math-
onnat J., Eciency of township hospitals in China in the context of the drug policy reform: Progress
should not get bogged in midstream - A case study from a survey in Weifang prefecture, Working
Papers Serie, 2017). An article, for which I am the corresponding author has been resubmitted to
International Journal of Health Economics and Management. I remained solely responsible of this
analysis presented here.
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4.1 Background
Section 4.1 provides information about the historical context of the Chinese Health
sytem, from the comunist era to the 2009 pharmaceutical reform.
4.1.1 The dislocation of the communautary health system
4.1.1.1 The Chinese health system under the communist regim (1960-
1978)
The Chinese Health system exhibits numerous specicities, partly inherited from
the communist era. Indeed, primary health care was a corner stone of the Maoist
health system. In urban areas, households were covered by the Free Medical Service
program nanced by governments- if civil servants, and by the Labor Medical Ser-
vice program nanced by employers -if industrial employees. This last system was
rst proposed to state-owned enterprises workers, and then enlarged to collective-
owned enterprises workers. In both of the two systems, households benetted from
free primary health services (Dong, 2009).
In rural areas, the health insurance took the form of the Cooperative Medical Scheme
(CMS), and was integrated, at the commune level (the working unit), to the col-
lective agricultural system. It relied on its pyramidal structure, as a so-called three
tier structure (Liu and Hsiao, 1995). The rst tier was the Village Health Station
(VHS) at the brigade level, composed of barefoot doctors, members of the commune
who had received a short training to provide preventive and basic curative health-
care (Bloom and Xingyuan, 1997). Barefoot doctors worked part-time as health
providers, part-time as peasants, and they were paid for their two activities by the
commune. If needed, they referred the patients to the Commune Health Center
(second tier) where they would be healed by physical assistants. Then, for serious
illnesses, patients were referred to the County Hospital (third tier), staed with
fully qualied physicians (Zhu et al., 1989). Commune Health Centers also had the
responsibility of managing and training the barefoot doctors of their area.
This pyramidal system ensured the accessibility of health facilities (basic and so-
phisticated), and a control of health costs at the same time. Unit costs were higher
at the County Hospital, so it xas more expensive for the CMS nances. As barefoot
doctors were part of the commune, they did not have interest to refer unnecessarily
their patients to County Hospitals. Thus only the most serious cases were referred.
There were three main sources of nancing of the CMS: individual premiums, com-
mune welfare funds (agricultural incomes were collectivized and a part was dedicated
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to the CMS nancing), and subsidies from upper governments. Communes could
choose the organization of their CMS (provider payment, package benet). In most
of them it provided peasants with free basic healthcare, preventive services and other
services, and reimbursement of drugs at the brigade level or in the reference system
(Zhu et al., 1989).
The CMS system was politically and nancially supported by the government, es-
pecially during the Cultural Revolution, so the percentage of communes with CMS
rose in the 1960 decade from 32% in 1960 to 46 in 1962, and 80 in 1968. At the
end of the system, in 1976, 90% of Chinese rural communes had a CMS. In terms of
health status, it means that 90% of the Chinese rural population had access to im-
munization and basic healthcare, which was the cornerstone of a global improvement
of Chinese health status.
This improvement appears in the evolution of life expectancy at birth (gure 4.1).
In 1960, a Chinese expected to live 43 years at his birth, almost the same as an
Indian citizen for instance, while the Indian GDP per capita is 50% higher than
the Chinese one (192 international $ in China against 307 in India). In 1970, the
Chinese life expectancy soared to 58 years, and reached 65 years in 1978, while the
Indian life expectancy was only 53 years. The infant mortality also fell over this
period. In 1949 it was estimated to be 200 per thousand live births, in 1982 it
was 20.3 (Young, 1988). This improvement was realized despite of the degradation
of the economic conditions during the Cultural Revolution. The GDP per capita
remained very low in the 1960 decade and even decreased in the rst part of the
decade (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1: Evolution of life expectancy
at birth in China and India
Figure 4.2: Evolution of GDP per capita
in China and India
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4.1.1.2 The liberalisation of the Chinese Health system (1980's)
The reforms and their direct impacts After the death of Mao in 1978, the
important reforms of the system enhanced the end of the CMS, due to a combina-
tion of nancial, political and management problems (Xueshan et al., 1995).
First, the system of communes as working units was replaced by the household
production responsibility system. In the communes (now called townships), each
household was attributed a piece of land to cultivate, and sold the production to
the government. The nancial losses or benets were individually assumed, so the
CMS lost its major nancing source, the commune welfare funds. This also means
that barefoot doctors could not be compensated anymore for the time they work
as health workers. They became full-time peasants (as agriculture became more
income-generating) or full time doctors (through an upgrade of their skills) (Liu
et al., 1995).
Second, political reasons also to the collapse of the CMS as they were associated to
the Cultural Revolution era, which was completely rejected after Mao's death. The
new regimen did not stand for the CMS system despite the improvements it allowed
in access to health care and the Chinese rural health status. As a result, in 1986
only 4.8% of the villages had a CMS (while 87.8% still had a Village Health Stations).
The collapse of the CMS had some negative consequences on the access to health-
care in rural areas. As welfare funds disappeared, health institutions shifted to a
fee-for-services system, with large out-of-pockets payments (Xueshan et al., 1995).
Therefore the nancial burden went from collective to individual.
The management model of rural health facilities also changed. The CMS system
relied on the three-tier structure, a compelling referral system that aimed at limiting
health expenses while ensuring an almost universal access to healthcare (see Section
4.1.1.1). But in the 1980 decade the referral pyramid was broken, as a large part
of VHS and Township Health Centers (THCs, former Commune Health Centers)
were sold (VHS to former barefoot doctors that upgraded their qualications for
example) or submitted to contract with private providers. In 1990, less than a half
of VHSs were owned by the village (Xueshan et al., 1995).
As a result, they became independent institutions, with great nancial autonomy.
For the VHS, it means that their nancial outcomes depended greatly upon the eco-
nomic conditions of the areas as they rely mostly on fee-for-services payments. In
poor areas, many VHSs disappeared for nancial reasons. In richer areas, barefoot
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doctors continue working in the stations, but with fewer control from township or
county authority in the health costs and follow-up of patients. In most villages,
preventive activities were neglected because they were not protable. On the con-
trary, they focused on curative services and drug selling, on which they could take
a margin. In some areas rich enough to raise some funds for this purpose, a substi-
tute to CMS was created. It generally implemented some incentives mechanisms to
increase preventive follow-up (with a capitation amount dedicated to prevention for
instance, or a reimbursement of antenatal visits) and prevent over prescription using
co-payments(Young, 1988). This widened the gap between rich and poor areas. In
their survey in 1989, Henderson et al. (1995) nd a health insurance coverage of
almost 50% in the most developed province of their sample, Jiangsu, and of 11.7%
in the least developed, Guizhou.
As for THCs, as they were newly nancially independent, they had to substitute
former subsidies with new sources of revenue, i.e. activity incomes. They had
to compete for patients with the County Hospitals (Liu et al., 1994), since there
were no nancial incentives for patients to visit them anymore. As households
preferred to pay more but for better services, they directly went to County Hospitals,
where the sta was more qualied and the medical equipment more sophisticated.
The improvement of economic conditions, thanks to the rise of the mean GDP per
capita, fed this new demand for high quality medical care, and the global ination
of healthcare expenses. The pressure of the demand in County Hospitals and urban
facilities became really strong, whereas attracting patients was dicult for many
THCs.
The nature of THC activities also changes as they had to spur their incomes. The
price of the preventive and basic curative services was xed by the government, to
keep access to basic healthcare aordable for households. But the consequence was
that they were not protable for THCs, which shifted their activity towards more
sophisticated acts, on which they could earn money (Liu et al., 2000) As they were
also authorized a 15% mark-up on drug sale, they also started overprescribing drugs
of patients.
Therefore, the gap widened between rich areas where THCs could aord to invest in
equipment and propose some high quality services, and those in poorer areas which
suered from the lack of revenue. They could not invest, or even maintain their
existing equipment, so the quality of their care deteriorated (Bloom and Xingyuan,
1997). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of THCs in China decreased from 55413
to 47749 (-14%). The decrease is more important for collectively owned THCs (-
17%) than for state-owned THCs (-8%) (Xueshan et al., 1995). The case study
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of Tang, 1997 in the county of Donglan (Southwestern China), illustrates all those
diculties, and how THCs failed to accomplish the missions they were attributed
by the Ministry of Health (MoH), especially in preventive and training activities.
Wider consequences on Chinese health system One major evolution of the
Chinese health system is the cost escalation of health expenditures in the 1980 and
1990 decade that made health insurance organizations implode. ? divide the factors
into four categories: increase in the number of covered people; ination factor (. . . );
the ageing of the covered population; residual factors. Ination includes the price
of the inputs, and of the fee itself. Disentangling the eects of each of those factors
on the cost increase, they nd that from 1985 to 1989, 74 % of the increase of social
health insurance costs are due to ination and residual factors.
Those residuals factors are the increase of demand, use of new technology and
drugs, and improvement in general quality of services. They can be considered
from the supply and the demand side of health care. On the supply side, recently
autonomous health facilities replaced governments subsidies with activity incomes
and drug selling benets, and tended to overprescribe expensive drugs and services
(such as injections or high-tech exams). They transferred the nancial load from
the public authorities to health insurance for insured households, or to uninsured
households.
On the demand side, patients asked for better quality of service, which implied an
increase of expenses in inputs from the health facility. Moreover, the phenomenon
of induced demand, regarding the (excessive) prescription of high-tech services, also
caused some more expenses, that may have been unnecessary. Patients expected
their doctor to give them antibiotic injection for instance, and would have had the
impression of low quality care otherwise (Liu et al., 2000).
Increasing risk of impoverishment due to health expenses Chinese house-
holds progressively had to take in charge the nancial burden of health costs esca-
lation through out-of-pockets payments.
In the 1980's, the inequalities were very important between the rural and the urban
areas. In the latter, most people benetted from work-based insurance, so that
they did not bear alone the costs of their health cares. On the contrary, in rural
areas access to health care could be much more complicated when local facilities had
closed or provided a poor quality of services, with few preventive activities. They
could go to the VHC or County Hospital, but had to pay themselves for the services
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and the drugs, which was a potential source of impoverishment. In 1986, in rural
areas the infant mortality rate was 27.3 per thousand live births, while 14.3 in urban
areas (Young, 1988).
Nevertheless, the gap between urban and rural tightened in the 1990 decade, as
a consequence of economic reforms in urban areas that jeopardized the insurance
coverage of many Chinese employees. Du (2009) links the insurance coverage to the
open door policy (progressive opening to international competition in the 1980 and
1990 decades), to the reforms of state-owned enterprises and the agricultural reform
of the 1980 decade. Faced with competition and the sharp decrease of subsidies (Hu
et al., 1999), many state-owned enterprises exhibited huge nancial losses, and had
to cut in their workforce and lower their funding of fringe benets (for example,
diminish the coverage or the benet package).
Du (2009) highlights varieties in the health insurance coverage rate: in 1991 it is
11% in rural group, and 65% in urban ones. However, a strong decrease in the
urban health coverage (44% in 2000) suggests that the situation regarding health
expenses was dicult for both urban and rural groups at the end of the 1990 decade.
Inequalities are mainly linked to working status: only 8% of insured unemployed
households, and 6% for employees of foreign and/or private companies. This last
gure can be explained by an overestimation due to the fact that some people lose
their job and insurance but are still administratively registered as employees.
The gures of Du (2009) include full and partial coverage of health expenses, while
Hu et al. (1999) makes the distinction between the two. From survey data on
enterprise and individual workers in 1992, they found that more than a half of their
sample benetted from a partial coverage only. No signicant dierence is found
between the workers with no coverage at all and those with partial coverage on the
incidence of out-of-pocket expenditures, even though a signicant dierence between
no coverage and a partial coverage is found on the mean amount of payments. Of
course, this study doesn't include unemployed people, who mostly have no health
insurance at all.
Because of those multiple factors, out-of-pockets payments became the rst source
of health expenditures in China. They represented 20% of total health spending in
1978, and progressively soared to 60% in 2009).
4.1.2 Health reforms in the 2000's
4.1.2.1 The NRCMS and its limits
The implementation of the NRCMS At the end of the 1990 decade, while
the GDP per capita had been multiplied by more than four since 1980, health
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expenses were still a nancial burden for many households. In the case of a serious
illness or accident, the expenditures could be catastrophic and lead the household
into poverty. Facing a growing discontent, the government launched a large health
insurance scheme, the Basic Social Medical Insurance (BSMI) system. It includes a
scheme for urban employees introduced in 1998, another for urban unemployed and
a last for rural residents, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme, implemented
in 2003 (Dong, 2009). Though inspired by the CMS (it is managed at the county
level, with counties managing their benet package), it diers from it in several
ways; for instance, it is voluntary-based, and not mandatory. It is also the rst time
that central and local governments take part in the nancing of the rural health care
(Dong, 2009; You and Kobayashi, 2009), through premiums paid to NCMS pools
in Western and central China. Its implementation was spectacular. From 2003 to
2010, the enrollment rate rose from less than 10% up to more than 90% (WB, 2010;
Yip et al., 2012). The copayments were higher in high level facilities, in order to
rebuild the pyramidal reference system. An increase of THCs activity was expected,
due to new patients: households that couldn't aord health care before the reform,
and households that directly went to County Hospitals when sick. It was actually
observed (Wagsta and Yu, 2007; Pélissier et al., 2012). Milcent and Wu (2015)
also nd a positive impact of the NRCMS on the subjective health status, using a
longitudinal household survey, that includes two channels: an "insurance eect" of
the coverage (between insured and uninsured households, in counties where NRCMS
is available), and a "general equilibrium eect" aecting every resident of a NRCMS
county. But the NRCMS did not have its intended impact on the impoverishment
due to health reasons. Yang and Wu (2015) emphasizes the increase of outpatient
cost per case between 2004 (pre-enrollment in their study area) and 2009.
Limits of NRCMS in reducing impoverishment The NRCMS was not suf-
cient, in the way it was implemented, to reduce substantially the impoverishment
induced by health expenses. There are several reasons to this unexpected result.
First, when insured, people increased their health expenditures, including out-of
pockets payments (Wagsta and Yu, 2007). Those who didn't seek health care at
all now did, and those who already sought for care increased their expenses to get
better quality of care (Lindelow, 2005). This is a positive sign in terms of universal
access to health care but also needs to be addressed by a relevant incentive policy
to control for health unit costs.
Second, the NRCMS was focused on avoiding catastrophic expenditures and pre-
venting households from falling or sinking deeper into poverty because of health
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shocks. Therefore, inpatient cares (hospitalizations, medical acts and drugs) are the
most reimbursed, while outpatients expenditures are mainly left to out-of-pockets
payments. Yet, at the beginning of 21rst century, most of Chinese provinces had
achieved their epidemiological transition. The ageing of the population, and the
change of lifestyles due to urbanization and the improvement of economic condi-
tions (tobacco use, access to cheap rich food, lack of physical activity) for most of
the population induced major changes in the main causes of mortality and mor-
bidity that changed a lot within the last decades. Yang et al. (2008) found that
while communicable diseases and maternal and perinatal conditions accounted for
almost 30% of deaths in China in 1973, the gure decreased to less than 10% in
2005. On the contrary, cerebo-cardiovascular disease and cancers explained about
25% of deaths in 1973 and more than 50% in 2005. Chronic diseases (hypertension,
diabetes) soared in the Chinese population, but their diagnosis and treatment are
highly imperfect (Wang et al., 2005; Lei et al., 2012).
Sun et al. (2009), through a household survey in Ningxia and Shandong found that
the enrollment in the NRCMS was not protective enough against catastrophic ex-
penses linked to chronic diseases. In each of the two provinces, around 15% of
NCMS members spent more than 40% of their annual non-food expenditures in
treatment for chronic diseases. This irrelevance of the benet package regarding the
epidemiological prole of NCMS members is also shown by Yip and Hsiao, 2009.
They compare the performance, in terms of impoverishment, of a typical benet
package of the NRCMS (high copayments on outpatient care and drugs, high de-
ductibles and ceilings for inpatient care) with another they imagined, focused on
primary and outpatient care (no deductible for drugs, coverage of primary care)
with a similar premium. This last system proved to be more eective to reduce
impoverishment due to medical reasons, because very high expenses are rare, while
daily expenditures are a nancial burden for households.
Third, the NRCMS did not tackle the nancing scheme of health providers that
spurred overpricing and overprescribing for many years. Since their liberalization,
health facilities sought for activity incomes and drug sales benet to reach a positive
nancial balance at the end of the year. If there was a nancial surplus, it allowed
to give some bonuses to health practitioners. Those phenomena put together cre-
ated incentives for health practitioners to overprescribe high-technology tests and
expensive drugs rather than cheaper ones, in order to increase the THC income,
through user fees. Drug benets became the main source of hospitals nancing (Yip
et al., 2010). Until 2009, health facilities were allowed to take a 15% mark-up on
the drug purchasing price, and used to actually take an average margin between
30% and 40% (Wang Dongsheng, vice-director of the Social Development Division
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of National Development and Reform Commission in 2006).
Drug overpricing was also spurred by the national drug supply chain and its exces-
sive number of wholesalers, intermediaries between the drug producers and health
facilities, and by the absence of bidding (Yu et al., 2010). Since the liberaliza-
tion, the Chinese pharmaceutical market was made of manufactures (up to 5000
in 2008), mostly small producers of generic drugs (Sun et al., 2008). They sold
their production to a `third-tier' who made the contact to another wholesaler, or
to health facilities. Every actor of the supply chain taking a benet, this structure
participated in the very high prices of drugs in China (compared to the international
prices). Moreover, the regulatory focus had been put on the price rather than the
quality of drugs, so that many producers deliver poor quality drugs to contract their
costs.
Those various mechanisms that lead to the generalization of overpricing and over-
prescribing are analyzed through a system dynamics model by Li et al. (2014b), by
decomposing every actor of the Chinese pharmaceutical chain and their interests.
They lead to a global inecient system, very expensive for poor services. The au-
thors stand for a cuto of the benet chain of drug suppliers between prots and
prescribing behaviors. Empirical works, relying on audit studies (Currie et al., 2011,
2014), conclude that supply side factors (i.e. perverse nancial incentives of health
providers) are the main reason for antibiotic overprescription (far ahead the demand
side factors, i.e. patient expectations)
4.1.2.2 The Health Care Reform Plan
The main objectives of the reform In 2009 a global plan concerning the health
system is announced, with the strong idea that it should be government-led. It aims
at universal access to basic health care, and equity in this matter. Huge nancial
resources are injected in the system at this purpose, related to several major aspects
(Yip and Hsiao, 2009; Yip et al., 2012).
A rst objective is to reform public hospitals. Second, the plan advocates primary
health care and prevention, placed at the cornerstone of the new system. With new
resources for infrastructure and sta, the goal is to reinstate the referral pyramid,
with VHS and VHCs at gateways to the healthcare structure. This also means
new responsibilities for these Primary Healthcare Facilities (PHF) in terms of vac-
cinations, antenatal care, follow-up of young and elder people, and of patients with
chronic diseases. Diagnosis of those pathologies is also part of their missions.
Important resources are also dedicated to the health insurance institutions. New
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targets are xed in terms of per capita subsidy to both rural and urban insurance
schemes. This aims at ensuring universal coverage, and allowing NCMS County
Bureaus to widen their benet package, particularly towards outpatient care.
Finally, the 2009 plan is the starting point to the National Essential Drug Policy
(NEDP).
To cope with the excessive price of drugs and disconnect hospitals income from drug
sales, the Chinese government implements the NEDP. The objective is to improve
the drug supply system and ensure both equity in the access to basic care medicines
and safety of drug utilization. A National Essential Medicine List (NEML) is re-
leased at the same time, updated in 2012. It includes three medicinal categories:
chemical and biological drugs (317 drugs), traditional Chinese patent medicines (203
drugs) and traditional Chinese cut crude herbs (NHFPC, 2013). To meet regional
specic needs, local governments are allowed to establish an additional list of essen-
tial drugs. In Shandong province, where this study area is located, the additional list
(2010 version) consists of 216 drugs. All PHF must now prescribe exclusively essen-
tial drugs. As for other healthcare facilities, the utilization of essential drugs should
be a priority, and the rate of essential drug utilization must reach the threshold
dened by health authorities (NHFPC, 2009).
Since October 2008, the government has also gradually implemented a zero-markup
policy for the sales of essential drugs (NDRC, 2008). The selling price in PHF is
adjusted to the purchasing price, including delivery costs, and health facilities are
not allowed to x a higher selling price anymore. Moreover, the governement cuts
the direct link between PHF and pharmaceutical supplyers, by the creation of a
public bidding system at the provincial level. This policy, between 2009 and 2010,
completely redened the structure of PHF nancial balance (Fang et al., 2013).
Indeed, the loss of drug benets is a huge hole in PHF revenue and could have
widely disturbed their daily activity.
Compensation schemes for the loss of drug sales income To compensate
losses due to the zero-markup policy, and ensure the stability of NEDP, dierent
modes of nancial compensation have been created (Yuan and Tang, 2012; Zhuo
and Zou, 2012). Each county can either choose one, or mix several modes of com-
pensation among the following.
Exclusive government compensation
The PHF with a nancial decit between incomes and expenditures will have their
decits nanced exclusively by county government. This compensation mode pro-
vides a guarantee for implementation of NEDP, but also a lot of nancial pressure
for local governments, which could impedes the nancial viability of the NEDP. If
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subsidies are allocated unconditionally, this could lead to a strong decrease of e-
ciency, as health care providers know that the government will nance them without
regards to their performances.
Incentive system
The nancial losses are not directly compensated, instead the PHF encourage their
medical sta to develop protable activities such as surgery, or color Doppler ultra-
sound for instance.
Multiple compensations
They mainly come from government subsidies but also from health insurance funds,
or other complementary compensations like the increase of the cost of some treat-
ments. For example, some health facilities increased the cost of tests and injections,
other health facilities created a general consultation fee, which includes the fee for
consultation and the fee for injection, or a fee for drug prescription.
The separation of revenue and expenditure system
Both the revenues and the expenditures of PHF are totally managed by the county
government. In other words, all the incomes of PHF are paid to the county govern-
ment, and their expenses are integrated into the government budget. The govern-
ment handles the wages and the cost of the zero-markup policy. This compensation
mode breaks the link between revenue and expenditure, so that prot-seeking be-
haviors could be avoided.
By lowering the unit price of healthcare for households and realigning the healthcare
providers incentives, this reform aims at increasing THCs level eciency through
an increase in the demand for healthcare.
4.2 Literature review and the potential eects of the
zero mark-up policy on township hospitals eciency
4.2.1 Expected eects of the reform
Eects on demand of healthcare Because of the high cost of care, the health-
care demand at the TH level is considered as relatively price elastic to the amount
of the residual cost borne by the households. The mandatory use of essential drugs,
as well as the policy of zero mark-up, should lead to a decrease in the unit cost of
care and a reduction in catastrophic costs, all things being equal. For these reasons,
an increase in healthcare demand is expected, and was found in various studies (Li
et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2013). This can result from a demand that was previously
not satised for nancial reasons (renunciation to care, self-medication) or from a
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transfer of demand from Village Health Stations, or county hospitals, to Township
Health Centers. An increase may not be observed if patients, considering the de-
crease in unit costs, seek more sophisticated care (in county hospitals) than they
would have otherwise. This eect was highlighted in the Gansu province following
the development of NCMS (Wagsta and Yu, 2007).
Considering that Township Hospitals are far from being saturated, an increase in
activity could lead to an increase in their eciency. Pélissier et al. (2012) nd a
decreasing bed occupancy ratio (BOR) from 2000 to 2004 (from 40% to 35%), then
increasing to 60% in 2008. In such a context, a surge of activity should not mean
new inputs, and an increase in eciency is expected as the physical and human
resources are newly utilized.
Yet, Audibert et al. (2013) demonstrates a positive and signicant impact of the
NRCMS on Township Hospital activity in Weifang, but a negative impact on its
eciency. It is therefore essential, in terms of public policy, to distinguish the two
analyses.
Eects on eciency In the precise context of the pharmaceutical reform, three
main scenarios can be considered:
• Demand for care increases, all other things being equal leading to eciency
progress.
• Demand for care increases, but its expected positive eect on eciency is
oset by an increase in inputs. To anticipate increased attendance at THCs,
the quantity of inputs (especially sta) rise, despite their low productivity.
If the demand does not increase suciently, the eect on the eciency is
potentially negative. This seems likely in Weifang, based on our discussion
with the local authorities.
• Demand remains unchanged, as does the level of personnel and equipment. A
decline or stagnation in eciency is expected for several reasons:
 Compensation for loss of income from drugs is partial (see paragraph
4.1.2.2). Demand remains unchanged because THCs develop coping
strategies that maintain high unit costs. For example they can increase
medical activities (such as lab tests and drug injections) prices beacause
they are not supervised by the reform. The unit cost of care borne by
households does not decrease, therefore the demand remains the same.
 Cost of care decreases. If there is partial compensation, and without
THCs coping strategies, objective and/or perceived quality of care are
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likely to decline. The negative eect on demand neutralizes or outweighs
the positive eect coming from the decrease in the cost of care borne by
households.
Nevertheless, the success of the reform relies upon several conditions in its imple-
mentation. First, there is a need for a comprehensive policy, that takes every aspect
of the issue into consideration. The removal of perverse nancial incentives is not
sucient. Drug providers have to be involved in the reform so that the drug quality
would not be altered, and that there would not be any shortage in drug supply.
The NEML also has to meet the needs of health care providers (Chen et al., 2014;
Xiao et al., 2013). Indeed, if the competition is too hard in the bidding process,
pharmaceutical rms may lower the quality of their drugs, so quality controls are
necessary. It is also essential to ensure a permanent supply of health facilities in
essential drugs. Otherwise, two scenarios are possible:
• health facilities activity is constrained because of the lack of medicines to
provide, so every possible positive eects on eciency is diminished;
• health providers prescribe drugs out of the essential medicine list, so patients
have to buy them at a higher price in private pharmacies. The nancial burden
of drug consumption remains heavy and is still a barrier to healthcare.
4.2.2 Literature on health facilities eciency
For decades, eciency studies using Data Envelopment Analysis focused on devel-
oped countries, mainly US and European countries, as summed up in Hollingsworth
(2008) and O'Neill et al. (2008). Pélissier (2012), studying the eciency of a sample
of 24 THCs in Weifang prefecture (Shandong, China), details three previous studies:
Liu and Mills (2005), Ng (2011) and Hu et al. (2012). Since then, several studies
have been published using eciency analysis of health eciency in China including
Yang and Zeng (2014), Li et al. (2014a), Cheng et al. (2015a), Cheng et al. (2016).
They provided some more information on the methodological and analytic point of
view.
Hu et al. (2012) and Audibert et al. (2013) focus on the impact of NRCMS on
health facilities, through a two-stage procedure (DEA + Tobit). The rst uses data
from 30 province hospitals across China, on the 2002/08 period, while the second
studies a sample of 24 THCs in the Weifang prefecture, Shandong province, on the
2000/08 period. Audibert et al. (2013) uses the NRCMS coverage rate to estimate
the eect of the reform, while Hu et al. (2012) uses both a dummy equal to 1 if
the province implements the reform in a given year, and the coverage rate in the
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province. The NRCMS reform is found to have a positive eect on eciency in
regional-level hospitals (Hu et al), but a negative one in THCs (Audibert et al.,
2013). This dierence can be explained by the dierence of nature of those two
kinds of health facilities: if reimbursed with no incentives to go to PHFs, patients
tend to go to high-level facilities to get better quality of care. The increase of activity
is therefore stronger in high-level facilities than in PHFs, while resources increased
at least in the same proportions in PHFs.
Li et al. (2014a) concludes to the same increasing trend in eciency as Hu et al.
(2012) in 12 third-grade public hospitals in Beijing from 2006 to 2009. They were
able, through the Malmquist method, to decompose the Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) increase into technological change (evolution of the production frontier) and
pure eciency change (evolution of the distance to the frontier). The rst element
drives the TFP increase, while pure eciency change is even decreasing for some
hospitals, suggesting that the gap has widened between hospitals that can provide
high-tech and quality care and others.
Cheng et al. (2015a), also use a two-stage procedure to estimate, decompose and
explain the eciency of 114 County Hospitals in the province of Henan from 2010
to 2012. They nd the same decomposition of TFP increase: a leading role of
technological change as Li et al. (2014a), and a low average increase of pure eciency
gain (decreasing for several hospitals). They introduced productivity indicators in
the second stage of the study (Average Length Of Stay (ALOS), Bed Occupancy
Ratio (BOR) for instance) that are found to have a signicant impact on eciency.
Hu et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2015a) use inpatients days to measure activity,
while the other quoted studies use the number of inpatients. The drawback of using
inpatient days is that if a hospital increases its average length of stay to maximize
its revenue, it will increase its level of eciency. Yet, it will cost more to the patient
and the insurance system for a same output. This is even more relevant given the
hypothesis of a homogenous case-mix: in average, the ALOS should be more or less
the same across facilities. In this study the number of admitted inpatients was thus
chosen.
Table 4.1 sums up the main characteristics of the eciency studies quoted in Section
4.2.2.
4.2.3 Potential determinants of eciency
The literature related to this issue highlights two main types of factors: internal
and external ones.
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Internal factors Internal variables deal with the way THCs are managed and
nanced. Here two managerial variables are tested: the wage and bonus expendi-
tures, per employee, and the proportion of licensed sta (i.e., proportion of doctors
among the medical sta).
The nancing structure of hospital income is also taken into account through its
composition, between subsidies and activity revenue. In the situation of soft budget
constraint (Kornai, 2009), by a mechanism of moral hazard, the dependence of
hospitals on public subsidies has a negative impact on their eciency. However, if
subsidies are allocated according to THCs performances, their eect can be positive
on eciency and attributed to an incentive mechanism.
A methodological concern is the potential endogeneity of the eect of subsidies on
technical eciency, through reverse causality. In theory (according to the policy
guidelines), the amount allocated to a THC is partly related to its performance,
so the causality would rather be from eciency to the amount of subsidy, with a
positive sign. It can also be considered that in a soft budget constraint situation, if
a THC is inecient it will more likely be bailed out at the end of the year to oset
its decit and reach a nancial balance. In this case, the amount of subsidies is still
reliant on THC performances, but with a negative sign.
To check for the endogeneity of subsidies, the determinants of subsidies in the study
are analyzed through a panel data model. The results highlight an absence of reverse
causality between subsidies and eciency scores. Neither the eciency score, nor its
lagged value signicantly explain the amount of received subsidies. The endogeneity
of subsidies is thus rejected. Indeed, the amount of the subsidies allocated to each
THC is largely driven by the population of the township (the size eect), by the
county GDP per capita (which has a positive eect on the nancial capacities of the
NCMS bureau), and other unobservable factors.
The importance of subsidies is captured through several variables: the proportion
of subsidies in THC total income (used as a proxy for THC dependence on public
nancing), and the proportion of subsidies in THC expenditures. Other proxies
are successively introduced to the model: amount of subsidies per capita in the
catchment area, per bed, and per medical sta.
External factors External determinants of eciency encompass all the aspects
of a hospital's environment including competition with other healthcare facilities
and the importance of potential demand in the catchment area. During a previous
period (2000-2008), those variables were found to be the most determinant factors of
TH eciency (Audibert et al., 2013). Here, according to the available data, several
variables were introduced:
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• the population covered by the NCMS in the township;
• the density of population;
• the net income per capita;
• the number of Village Health Stations under the responsibility of the THC.
This last variable can have two opposite eects: there can be a phenomenon
of competition (a negative eect), or stimulation by the referring of patients
(positive eect).
To check whether there was a shift in the determinants of eciency between the
beginning and the end of the period, the potential determinants were interacted
with dummies corresponding to sub-periods. Determinants were also introduced at
square to test non-linear relations.
4.3 Evolution of activity in Weifang prefecture Township
Health Centers
Section 4.3 focuses on the THCs of a case study in Weifang, Shandong province.
It presents the collected data and the main trends drifting the evolution of the
activity and productivity of the THCs of the sample, and of their corresponding
NCMS bureaus.
4.3.1 The database: survey and study area
This study relies on annual survey data from the rural part of the Weifang pre-
fecture, a relatively rich coastal province, over the 2006-2012 period. Therefore,
this study includes the implementation of the 2009 pharmaceutical reform. The
Weifang prefecture includes 12 administrative divisions: four urban districts in the
Weifang urban area (Weicheng, Kuiwen, Fangzi et Hanting), six rural county-level
cities (Qingzhou, Zhucheng, Shouguang, Anqiu, Gaomi and Changy) and two rural
counties (Changle and Linqu).2 Each county or county-level city is divided into
townships, and each township is associated one Township Health Center.
Because the urban healthcare issues are dierent (and so are the urban healthcare
facilities), we used only the eight rural entities to select the THCs of the sample. A
previous study had be conveyed on the same area in 24 THCs of the six county-level
2County-level cities are third-level administrative divisions. They are often composed of a city
and its rural surroudings. They were created in the 1980's to reunite the institutions the city itself
and of the former county. On the contrary, in a county, there is no major city. But both are
administratively classied as rural areas.
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County Population
Anqiu 97.42857
Changle 60.61857
Changyi 60.94857
Gaomi 86.64571
Linqu 86.51143
Qingzhou 90.87714
Shouguang 104.28
Zhucheng 107.5771
Table 4.2: Population inWeifang rural counties, thousands of people (2006/12 mean)
cities (Audibert et al., 2013). It was therefore decided to keep those 24 THCs to
have some information on a longer run for descriptive statistics. Six THCs were
added, in the counties, to have a complete vision of rural administrative divisions
in Weifang.
For Linqu and Changle, a list of all the THCs was dressed, with the GDP per capita
associated to each township. We ranked them and selected six THCs for the sample
through a systematic sampling method. A rst version of the questionnaires was
established in winter 2013, and discussed with local colleagues in a rst visit at
Weifang, to be sure of the availability of the data. Once the nal version had been
approved, "survey teams" were constituted, including Weifang Health Bureau sta
and colleagues from Weifang Medical University. The questionnaire was presented
to them, and the data was collected in the THCs at spring 2013. Sources of data
include books and registers from THCs and the statistical and nance oces of
townships and counties. Figure 4.3 gives the localization of each THC of the sample
in the Weifang prefecture. Data analysis was realized in France after the survey, and
the rst results were discussed with the Weifang Health Bureau and the Weifang
Medical University during another visit in Weifang in 2014, in order to prepare the
nal report of the study.
Every township in the sample is administratively classied as rural, therefore ex-
hibits a large majority of rural population (around 90% throughout the period, Table
4.4). The populations and densities covered by each hospital vary, creating large
dierences in terms of potential demand for healthcare. The average net income
per capita is homogenous among the 30 townships and almost doubled from 2006
to 2012 (5510 annual constant yuans in 2006, 10800 in 2012, Table 4.3).
The broad characteristics of the population remained stable across the period (Table
2). There is no major demographic evolution between 2006 and 2012. The stability
of demographic indicators associated with the precise missions of THCs which focus
on curative treatment of non-severe cases justies a homogeneous case-mix across
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Figure 4.3: Localization of THCs of the sample
the THCs of the sample, and across the period. The choice of collecting THCs
actitivity is linked to this case-mix issue. As it provides Primary Health Care, if the
catching areas have some identical characteristics, the case-mix is likely to be the
same across THCs. This is crucial for an aciency analysis.
4.3.2 Important evolution of activity
4.3.2.1 The physical and human resources, and their evolution across
the period
There were important investments in human and physical resources over the studied
period. As a result, the quantity of sta, and the size of hospitals, represented by
the number of available beds, increased in the sample. Regarding the number of
beds, two categories of THCs can be distinguished in Figure 4.4: a group whose size
did not change between 2006 and 2012 (on the diagonal axis), and another whose
size increased a lot (Jinggou, Dongchengjiedao, Xinzhai for instance).
The evolution and sta is much less homogenous than the one of the number of
beds (see Figures 4.5a and 4.5b). Several THCs saw their sta decreased over the
period (those under the diagonal line). This can be linked to several factors. First,
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it can be linked to a decrease of the manning sta, i.e. the quantity of employees
allocated and paid by the local governement, based the covered population and the
number of beds (both strongly correlated). Second, it can mean that THCs cannot
nd enough employees to ll complete manning sta (this problem was put forward
by the heads of THC we met during the qualitative survey). They face diculties
to attract qualied medical sta to medical areas.
Figures 4.5a and 4.6 together give some elements of answer. For example, in Cheng-
guanjiedao the decrease in manning sta mainly explains the decreasing sta (more-
over, this decrease seems to be mainly linked to non-medical sta). Indeed, the
global sta went from 150 to 110, following the decrease of manning sta (from
100 to 60 approximately). In Chaigou, on the contrary, the manning sta does not
explain the decrease of medical sta (the global sta decreased from 100 to 80, while
the manning sta remained at 110). The THC may have some diculties to hire
new sta.
If an increase in the actual sta is observed, it can also have several explanations.
The government may have increased the manning sta of a precise THC, or the
THC chose to hire some extra sta on its own budget, considering that the manning
sta is not sucient. In Tanfang for example, the manning sta soared in six years,
while the increase of the actual sta was much smoother. It is possible that the
THC substituted some manning sta to the extra sta he had to pay itself.
Figure 4.4: Evolution of the number of available beds between 2006 and 2012
As for equipment, six kinds of machines are considered:
• Two for medical imaging: radiology, echograph
• Four for functional explorations: computed tomography, electrocardiograph,
endoscope, anesthetic machine, ECG monitoring.
Some of them are almost equally disdributed in the THCs of the sample, others are
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a. Global sta b. Medical sta
Figure 4.5: Evolution of sta between 2006 and 2012
Figure 4.6: Evolution of the manning sta between 2006 and 2012
more discriminating. Several observations can be made:
• Endoscopes are the most rare equipment in the sample. In 2012, only four
THCs out of 30 owned an endoscope: Xinzhai (since 2007), Daotian (since
2008), Houzhen (since 2009) and Baichihe (since 2006).
• Few THCs were not already equiped with a radiograph and an echograph
in 2006 (5 for radiographs Jingzhi, Xinanjiedao, Zheshan, Dongchengjiedao,
Baichihe, 7 for echographs Zheshan, Damujia, Dongchenjiedao, Heguan, Tan-
fang, Wangfen and Baichihe). The latest THCs to get a radiograph was
Dongchengjiedao in 2012, and an echograph Damujia in 2011.
• On the contrary, the computed tomography machines (CT scans) are not that
generalized. Only 5 THCs are equiped with it in 2006 (Jingzhi, Liutong,
Xinzhai, Daotian and Houzhen), and 10 in 2012 only (Chaigou, Damujia,
Dongchengjiedao, Heguan and Baichihe in more).
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• Electrocardiograph, in 2006 was already common in the sample, as only Xi-
nanjiedao and Jinggou did not have one. The number of machines varies very
much, up to 6 in Kanjia (2012) and 8 in Daotian (2012). From 2007, the
median number is 2 CT scans per THC in the sample.
• Concerning anesthetic machine, their presence grew over the period, from 12
in 2006 to 18 in 2012 (out of 30). THCs always own one only, except Damujia
(2 since 2006) and Kanjia (4 since 2008), which are atypical in this respect.
• Lastly, ECG monitoring machines have been quite common in the sample
since 2006 (18 equiped THCs, 25 in 2012). Nevertheless, a few THCs can be
distinguished by the number of machines they own: 4 for Damujia, Kanjia
and Houzhen, 6 for Gaoliu and 10 for Xinzhai.
4.3.2.2 Increase of the activities of the THC of the sample
During the period under review, the level of activity increased. In average, the ac-
tivity of the hospitals grew drastically regarding outpatients, inpatients, lab tests,
medical examinations (radiology, etc.) (see Table 4.12). Yet, looking at the distri-
bution of the variables (Figure 4.7), the increase of activity is concentrated on the
highest half of the sample. This is conrmed by the stronger variation rate of the
mean than of the median, for both inpatient admissions and outpatients. The mean
number of daily inpatients went from 4.14 in 2006 to 9.34 in 2012 (+82%) while
the median went from 3.19 to 6.98 (+63%). The mean daily number of outpatients
went from 90 to 165 (+126%), while the median rose from 54 to 88 (+118%).
The evolutions of other THC activities are less spectacular, except for the number
of surgeries, which more than doubled in mean and median over the period.
A few hospitals exhibit particularly high level of curative activities: Jingzhi and
Kanjia for outpatients, Xinzhai and Kanjia for inpatients admissions.
The concept of Public Health, through the development of preventive activities
(vaccinations, follow-up of riskier populations, informations campaigns) is at the
core of the governement plan of 2009, especially in PHF like VHS. An increase in
those activities is thus expected, and conrmed by Table 4.12: the average number
of vaccinations rose by 43%, from 11 178 to 16 002, and the number of emergencies
more than doubled, going from 605 to 1331 in average.
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of activity between 2006 and 2012
4.3.2.3 Excessive increase of expensive tests and imaging ?
One of the consequences of the reform may be that THCs, as they cannot rely on
drug sale income anymore, will increase the number of high-tech and expensive tests
to increase their activity income. This behaviour has been observed in China since
the liberalization of the health system, but the 2009 reform might spread it even
more.
In the THCs of the sample several kinds of tests and imaging are provided:
• The rst kind of tests are the blood, urine and stool tests. The number of those
tests per inpatient admission ranges between 0 and 3 during the whole period,
with the exception of Liutong where it ranges between 5 and 10 according to
the years. THCs of the sample provide between 0 and 0.5 tests per outpatient
visit. Liutong is on the top of the distribution, and the maximum value is
0.89 in Daotian (2007). No increasing trend is to be noticed between 2006 and
2012.
• The second kind of medical exams are imaging examinations: echography
and radiology. Most of the sample provides less than 0.2 echography per
outpatient (Wangfen exhibiting high features across the whole period) and
less than 1.5 echographies per inpatient admission. The average number of
echographies decreases for inpatient (0.43 to 0.31), and remains stable for
outpatients (around 0.07). An inpatient receives less than 2 radiologies during
his hospitalisation (a THC, Dongxia, exhibits higher scores, around 3). The
average number of radiologies decreases for inpatient, from 0.9 to 0.64 over
the period (not for outpatient, stable at 0.1).
• The third kind of tests provided by THCs are function tests, i.e. ECG and
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endoscopies. In the study sample, only 4 THCs practiced endoscopies in 2012:
Xinzhai (since 2007), Daotian (since 2008), Houzhen (since 2009) and Baichihe
(from 2006). ECG are far more common in the sample, and their use is stable
for outpatients and inpatients over the study period. In average, an outpatient
receives 0.05 ECG, with three atypical THCs: Liushan, Xinzhai and Wangfen.
As for inpatient, an inpatient receives by average 0.4 ECG, and three THCs
exhibit much higher gures: Chaiggou and Xinzhai in 2006 and 2007.
From the observations on the sample, there doesn't seem to be a clear stategy from
THCs to rely on tests and exams to oset the drug sale loss. It is quite hard to
analyze, since several scenarios are possible. The phenomenon of overprescrption of
tests might be older than 2006, so there is no additionnal increase of tests linked to
the reform. Or in Weifang, THCs rely mostly on drug sales, and the subsidies came
to oset the loss so that the proportion of activity income remains stable.
4.3.3 Development of NCMS subsidies
4.3.3.1 NCMS enrollment and the benet package
Over the period, the Weifang prefecture reached an almost universal enrollment of
its rural population in the NCMS (see Figure 4.8). In 2010 every county exhibited
a coverage rate of 99 or 100%. Looking at coverage rate at the THC level, the same
evolution can be noticed. In the rst years of the period, one THC only, Liushan,
has a signicantly low coverage rate (less than 40%), but it grows to more than 80%
in 2012. Except Liushan, most THCs show high coverage rate, higher than 90% for
most of them (Figure 4.9).
Figure 4.8: Enrollment in the NCMS bureaus of the study area
To this increase in the number of insured households is associated a deepening of
the benet package throughout the period. The NCMS in Weifang is typical of
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Whole sample Without Liushan
Figure 4.9: Evolution of NCMS enrollment in the THCs of the sample
the priorities that have been given nationnally. In 2006, the reimbursment rate for
outpatient care is very low (between 0 in Shouguang and 30% in Anqiu, Figure
4.10a), but with no deductible. An important increase of the reimbursment rate is
observed between 2010 and 2011, illustrating the new focus on primary health care.
On the contrary, the reimbursment rate of inpatient care has been at least 40% in
every county in Weifang from 2006, with quite low deductibles, and the rate rised
regularly to reach 80 to 90% in 2012 (Figure 4.10b). The dierence between the
reimbursment rate in the primary and in the second level health care facilities is not
that important. 75 to 80% of expenses are reimbursed in every secondary health
care facilities of Weifang in 2012. The nancial incentives to respect the referral
pyramid rely on the deductibles (between 100 and 200 yuans in PHF in 2012, and
500 to 800 in second level health care facilities).
This certainly reects the fact that Weifang is a rich prefecture, relatively to China.
NCMS bureaus have the nancial means to propose a wide benet package, and
not to choose between protecting from health shocks and daily expenses as in many
central and western regions.
As a result of the universal NCMS coverage and of the deepening of the benet pack-
age, the expenditures of every NRCMS bureau in our sample soared, with a strong
acceleration starting in 2010 (Figure 4.11). Regarding the inpatient reimbursment,
the increase in NCMS expenditures is due to an increase of the reimbursed amount
per inpatient case rather than to an increase of the number of cases (see Figure
4.29b and 4.30b).
Regarding outpatient reimbursment, except for Shouguang, the amount of reim-
bursment remained quite stable, like the number of outpatients cases, except for
two atypical counties in this respect, Anqiu and Zhucheng (Figure 4.29a and 4.30a).
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a. Outpatients cares in PHF b. Inpatient cares in PHF
Figure 4.10: Evolution of reimbursment rates in Weifang
As expected, the mean reimbursment of an inpatient admission is lower in THCs
than in all types of facilities, because of the higher unit cost in CHs and the more
sophisticated cares provided there (surgeries for instance) (Figure 4.29c and 4.29d).
The second nancial aspect of the government investments in health is the amount
of health expenditures from the county governements, dedicated to the several levels
of health facilities. In addition to their spectacular increase, from 2010 the variety of
their destination has reected the new priority given to primary healthcare facilities
: THCs are at the core of the expenses, but some subsidies are now expressively
dedicated to VHSs (Figures 4.11 and 4.13).
Figure 4.11: Global expenditures of the
NCMS bureaus
Figure 4.12: County subsidies allocated
to THCs
Figure 4.13: Evolution of public health expenditures in Weifang
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4.3.3.2 The refunding of THCs nancing
As a result of the zero mark-up policy, the structure of THCs nancing has been
sharply reformed by the National Essential Drug Policy, and the THCs of this study
are no exception.
Figure 4.14 shows the comparison of main sources of income for all observed THCs
between 2006 and 2012. In 2006, over 80% of revenue is generated by hospital ac-
tivities, including activity, drug and preventive income. Drug income is the primary
source of income (about 50%). In contrast, income from activities, drug and pre-
vention reward hospitals with up to 55% of their revenue in 2012. Particularly, drug
income only represent 29% of THCs income. This huge decrease is due to the loss
of drug prescription mark-ups, oset by governmental subsidies, (about one third of
THC revenue). Those subsidies mainly come from the county level.
The increase in subsidies is much stronger than the drug income loss (Figure 4.15)
even considering activity increase.
4.3.3.3 Prescription of injections and antibiotics
An aspect of the survey deals with the pharmaceutical stake. For every THC of
the sample, the 15 drugs most sold by the THC pharmacy were listed, as well as
their main characteristics, in 2011 and 2012: western or traditional, antibiotic or
not, injected or not. This does not allow to produce any quantitative analysis about
overprescription, but gives descriptive information about the nature of the most
prescribed in Weifang THCs (see Table 4.14).
The mean number of antiobiotic drugs is 4.6 and 4.5 out of the 15 most sold drugs
in THCs in 2011 and 2012 (median at 5). The mean number of drugs that have to
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Figure 4.14: Evolution of the main source of THCS income 2006 and 2012
Figure 4.15: Evolution of subsidies and income from drug sales
be administered by injection is 10 out of 15 in 2011, and 9.7 in 2012 (the median
went from 10 to 11). This high proportion of injections is certainly explained by the
inpatient activity.
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4.3.4 Evolution of main productivity indicators
4.3.4.1 The Bed Occupancy Rate and the Average Length Of Stay
The Bed Occupancy Rate (BOR) and the Average Length of Stay (ALOS) were
collected in each THC, and they were also computed using the number of occupied
bed days per year, the number of inpatient admissions and the number of available
beds in the THC. For some THCs, we found important dierences between the two
gures, without any explanation. This issue concerns Xinzhai, Tianliu, Jinggou and
Shaoguang for the BOR, and mostly Damujia and Wutujiedao for the ALOS. To
compute them we used the following formulas:
BOR =
nb of occupied bed days ∗ 100
nb of available beds ∗ 365
ALOS =
nb of occupied bed days
nb of inpatient admissions
There a strong increasing trend of the BOR over the study period (Figure 4.16a),
from a mean of 54% in 2006 to 71% in 2012 (the median went from 53 to 66%).
This increase is not regular, it is concentrated on the beginning of the period (from
2006 to 2007 mainly). This gure is much higher than the national average quoted
by Eggleston et al. (2008): 60% globally, 40 for THCs. On the contrary, there is no
major change in the ALOS, which stays stable around 6 days (Figure 4.16b). This
value is a little smaller than the ALOS found by Yang and Zeng (2014) in Shenzhen,
around 7.
a. Bed Occupancy Rate b. Average Length of Stay
Figure 4.16: Evolution of global productivity
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4.3.4.2 Sta productivity
Productivity indicators allow to have a rst glance at trends concerning THCs activ-
ity and performances. Three indicators were computed: number of daily outpatients
per medical sta, number of daily inpatient admissions per medical sta, and num-
ber of annual inpatient bed days per medical sta. Sta productivity is very low
in the sample (2.2 daily outpatients per medical sta in 2012), even lower than the
gures given in Eggleston et al. (2008) ("5 outpatients per doctor and 1.5 inpatient
beddays per doctor for general hospitals in 2004", p.152). The dierence may be
partly due to the calculation, per medical sta or doctor only. Still, it remains
very low: 2.2 daily outpatients per medical sta in 2012 and only 0.14 inpatient
admissions (Figures 4.17 and 4.18). Yet, an increasing trend is observed from 2006
to 2012, especially concerning inpatient, and the annual number of bed days per
medical sta went from 150 to 300, doubling between 2006 and 2012.
Figure 4.17: Evolution of daily outpa-
tients and inpatient admissions
Figure 4.18: Evolution of daily outpa-
tient and annual inpatient bed days
4.4 Estimating eciency of Township Hospitals
This Section details the rst stage of this case study, i.e. the eciency assessment.
It presents the production function, the empirical methodology, and discusses the
eciency scores.
4.4.1 The choice of the production function
The denition of the production function, i.e. the choice of the inputs and outputs
is at the core of an eciency analysis, as it reects the relevance of the model
to describe the activity of a Decision Making Unit (DMU). The several variables
and parameters introduced in the following model were chosen with respect to the
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literature on eciency in health care sector, and to our discussions with locals
partners so that they could faithfully reect THCs activity. As for the literature,
several publication focus on the eciency of health facilities in China .3 Five articles
contain an exhaustive description of the methodology, detailed in Table 4.1. They
were used as starting points in the analysis.
4.4.1.1 Output of the production function : the Global Activity Index
The multi-output production function of a hospital has to be dealt with, regarding
the diversity of a health facility activity. The selected outputs have to exhaustively
represent the production of the DMUs. Usually, the literature only takes into ac-
count outpatient visits and inpatient days or admissions (see Table 4.1). Emergency
vists are often associated to outpatients. Those three variables were selected in our
study. The number of surgeries was also taken into account. This might be an ex-
haustive description of the activity of high-grade health facilities, since it is focused
on curative services. However, in the case of THCs, preventive activities are central
to production, especially in the context of the development of the Primary Health
Care in the reform. Cheng et al. (2016) add the number of Electronic Health Records
(EHR) under management and the number of chronic diseases patients under man-
agement to capture the preventive aspects of THCs production. In Weifang, in the
interviews THCs managers and doctors emphasized the workload that the primary
health care services represented. From our available data, the number of antenatal
visits, vaccinations were added to the model.
An issue was the relevance of including the number of total tests realized in the
THCs during the year. On the one hand, if we consider the quantity of activities in
the outputs, it might be justied to include them. It takes more time and resources
to practice an exam and examine its results than a "simple" consult. On the other
hand, considering the Chinese context there a risk of overprescription of tests and
imaging. Thus, including them in the outputs might lead to an articial increase
in the eciency score of THCs that prescribe too many exams for nancial reasons.
Yet, this kind of behaviour concerns only expensive and high tech exams. Thus,
blood, urine and stool tests were kept in the analysis and integrated in the "total
tests" variable. The other tests were excluded from the list of the outputs. To see if
the presence of the tests distorts the results, the same analysis was conducted with
and without them.
However, the number of inputs and outputs has to be limited, for the estimator
to converge quickly. Several "rules of thumbs" have been proposed to choose the
3In addition, several poster abstracts were published by The Lancet (Chen et al., 2016; Cheng
et al., 2015b), but the production functions were not detailed.
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optimal number of inputs and outputs, including the one of Boussoane et al. (1991):
the number of inputs multiplied by the number of outputs has to be smaller than
the number of DMUs.
To limit the number of outputs, a solution is to compute a synthetic indicator, taking
each one of the previously described variables into account. This choice was justied
by the high correlation between most of the variables. All the outputs variables are
signicantly and positively correlated (except for tests and antenatal visits), which
means that there is a strong common pattern among them (Table 4.13). The loss
of information induced by the construction of a synthetic index is thus limited.
To get a synthetic index, one main option is to compute a weighted mean, as done
in Audibert et al. (2013). The choice of the weights is then crucial. In Audib-
ert et al. (2013), the weights were xed by discussion with local actors. For this
study, such information was not available. Thus, a Principal Component Analysis
was conducted, to get the weights that would take into account the most common
variability possible.
Figure 4.19: Eigenvalues for the rst
components
Figure 4.20: Weights for the rst two
components
Figure 4.21: Relation between the rst
two axis
Figure 4.22: Evolution of the Global Ac-
tivity Index
The Principal Component analysis results in two axis with Eigenvalue higher than
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1 (Figure4.19), the rst one being more higher than the second. This rst axis
explains 44% of the total variability and is positively correlated to each one of the
variables introduced in the analysis. The positive signs of the weighting coecients
(Figure 4.20) suggest that this axis captures a global trend of the activity and is
consistent with the characteristics of an output (an increase of any variable will
increase the Global Activity Index). It is kept as the Global Activity Index and
is used as the output of our eciency model after being standardized so that the
minimal observation is 0 and the maximal is 100.
The second axis explains 13% of the global variabilty, with an Eigenvalue of 1.09. It
means that it can provide some information about a trend driving the data. Only
three activities are positively correlated with this second axis, the others being nega-
tively correlated (Figure 4.20). THCs that provide most antenatal visits, emergency
visits and vaccinations provide the less outpatients and inpatients, tests and surg-
eries. The axis gives information about complementary and substituable activities:
THCs which exhibit a large score in this axis are more focused than the others on
Primary Health Care (Tanfang or Dongxia, Figure 4.21).
Figure 4.22 gives the distribution of the Global Activity Index across years. A clear
increasing trend can be seen, but concentrated on the upper half of the sample The
sample mean rose by 70% over the period, and the median by 63% (Table 4.3).
Moreover, ther is no disruption in this increasing trend, it is regular across years.
Several alternative options were tested to judge the sensibility of the analysis and the
Index to the chosen variables. First, the same analysis was conducted replacing the
number of admitted inpatients by the number of occupied bed days during the year.
A Spearman ranking test conrms that the two series are not independent, with
a p-value of 0.00 and a Spearman'rho of 0.98. A unique dierence can be found
for Xinzhai, which has a better ranking with the number of admitted inpatients.
Otherwise the two variables give the same serie. An Index close to the one used
in Audibert et al. (2013) has also been tested. It is a weighted mean with weights
equal to 1 for each variables but inpatient admissions (3) and emergency visits (3).
The serie still has a strong ranking correlation with the one obtained with the PCA:
the Spearman's rho is 0.87, and the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis
of independance is 0.00. The PCA was also computed without including the total
number of tests, and the results are almost the same. The Spearman rho is 0.96
between the two series of results, and the independence hypothesis is rejected with
an error probability of 0.00.
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4.4.1.2 Inputs of the production function
The choice of the inputs was made based on the existing literature, and on discus-
sions with local actors. O'Neill et al. (2008) gives an almost exhaustive list of the
possible inputs to be include in an eciency analysis concerning health facilities.
Three inputs were identied in this study, reecting the human and physical capital
of the THCs of Weifang: the global sta of a THC for the human capital, the num-
ber of available beds and an equipment index for the physical capital. Many studies
consider only the medical sta(see Table 4.1), claiming that it was the only one to
be productive in terms of health care, or, if they have enough information and obser-
vations, separate the dierent kinds of sta: doctors and and nurses and nonmedical
sta . Here, given the number of DMUs (THCs), three inputs for human capital
is a too much. Therefore, the global sta was kept as the nonmedical sta (mostly
admnistrative and technical) is an essential resource for THCs activity. Alternative
possibilities were tested, including the separation of medical and nonmedical sta,
and the inclusion of the sole medical sta as input, with no major change in the
ranking of the THCs. The separation between medical and nonmedical sta was
not kept in the main results because three THCs in the sample declare employing
no nonmedical sta (Xiadan, Liushan, Tianliu). As nonparametric methods do not
accept the presence of nul values, it was not possible to get any score for those THCs
with specications that separate medical and nonmedical sta. Still, one alternative
model was considered, with the medical sta only instead of the whole sta.
The Equipement Index was computed using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
which included every kind of imaging and test machines found in a THC: radiology,
echograph, ECG, endoscopes, computed tomography, anesthetic machines and ECG
monitoring instrument. The rst axis of the analysis is kept as the Equipement
Index. It is positively correlated to every element of the analysis, and exhibits an
Eigenvalue of 3.91.
4.4.2 Measurement of eciency: the rst stage
4.4.2.1 The adopted methodology
As the number of potential determinants of eciency is rather important, it is hard
to use conditional models. A two-stage procedure was thus chosen (see Section
2.3.2).
In the rst stage, to deal with the presence of potential outliers and with the di-
mensionality issue (210 observations are available), robust frontier estimators were
implemented (see Section 2.2.2.2).
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Figure 4.23: Evolution of the Equipment Index for the THCs of the sample
4.4.2.2 The empirical model
The orientation From the literature, and the context of THCs in Weifang, an
output orientation was chosen. This orientation is the most common in the eciency
studies about Chinese health care facilities (see Table 4.1). Only Cheng et al. (2015a)
uses a input orientation, claiming the County Hospitals do not have the control over
the demand, and over their amount of activity, so that they can only minimize the
quantity of resources to provide those activities.
Here, it is rather the quantity of inputs that THCs cannot choose: the number of
available beds and sta (at least the manning sta) is xed by the County Health
Bureau, according to the catching area. Given those resources, THCs have to max-
imize their activity by providing good quality and aordable care to patients. In
this perspective, an output orientation was used in this study.
The number of estimated production frontier There is a trade-o in the
choice of the number of estimated production frontiers. If DMUs are evaluated
with the same production frontier over the whole period, it implies that there is
no technonlogical progress across the years. In the opposite case, if the production
frontier changes over years or periods, and a sole frontier is considered over the
period, then the estimated scores are biased because DMUs are not compared to
the relevant frontier.
Estimating several frontiers also allows to compute a Malmquist Index, i.e. to de-
compose the change in Total Factor Productivity between the scale eciency change,
the technological change (the evolution of the production frontier) and the pure ef-
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ciency change (the evolution of the distance of a DMU to the current production
frontier). In the review proposed in Table 4.1, only Audibert et al. (2013) do not
use annual production frontier, because the NRCMS reform was implemented grad-
ually, so there was a possibility of technological change over the study period. The
limit of using several frontiers relies in the dimensionality issue: it lowers the num-
ber of DMUs per frontier and can make the comparison between them dicult. If
the number of DMUs is low, it is crucial to have a very homogenous sample (as Li
et al. (2014a), with 12 hospitals only). The other drawback is at the second stage
of the analysis, while explaining the eciency scores. Indeed, it means that scores
(distances to production frontiers) related to dierent frontiers are to be explained
in the same regression.
In this study, only one production frontier was considered for several reasons. First,
it allows to raise the number of DMUs to 210. Second, from discussions with local
actors, it appeared that that had not been any technological change across the
period. Indeed, the core of THCs activity is basic health care that does not rely on
very recent technologies. Thus, it is credible to rely on the assumption that there
was no technological change between 2006 and 2012 in Weifang THCs. The fact
that no disruption in the evolution of activity is observed conrms this idea.
The returns to scale As the partial frontier methods come from the Free Disposal
Hull analysis, they do not require any assumption concerning the nature of the
returns to scale (unlike the Data Envelop Analysis). For the altenative estimations
and robustness checks, variable returns to scale were chosen to disantange the scale
ineciency from the technical ineciency.
The choice of the m parameter In partial frontier model, the value of the
m, seen as a "trimming parameter", is crucial. Simar and Wilson (2013) gives a
method to choose the optimal value : "The nal value of m can be chosen in terms
of the desired level of robustness", i.e., of proportion of DMUs above the production
frontier. The upper limit is the number of observations.
Here, all possible values from 10 to 200 were tested, with a range of 10, and with a
narrower range around the threshold in the proportion of super-ecient units. As
expected, the proportion of DMUs above the frontier (with a score higher than one)
decreases as m increases, and so does the mean eciency in the sample (Figure
4.24). From m=170, there are less than 10% of super-ecient DMUs in the sample,
and from m=180, this proportion is equal to 8. The value of 190 was chosen for
the rest of the nal analysis , as from m equal to 190 the scores remained identical
whatever the chosen value of m.
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Figure 4.24: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs and mean eciency according to
the value of m
The choice of the alpha parameter Running the order-alpha analysis, the value
of the parameter has to be chosen. This value gives the percentage of DMUs that
will remain below the frontier: the higher the alpha, the closer the method is to
the Free Disposal Hull. Contrary to the order-m method, the order-alpha method
leaves a great part of the sample as super-ecient units, even for large values of
alpha, and it is very sensitive to a slight change of the parameter when it is closing
1 (see Table 4.5). To get less than 10% of super-ecient THCs, only 1%, i.e. 2
DMUs of the sample, have to be left above the production frontier in its estimation,
which is very few.
For this reason, the order-m scores will be used in priority in the second stage, as
from 190 they do not vary with m. Nevertheless, it is necessary to check if the least
and most ecent THCs are the same with the two methods, to see if the conclusions
will remain the same whatever the estimations.
Value of alpha 95 97 98 99
Model 1 0.321 0.220 0.129 0.048
Model 5 0.3891 0.313 0.236 0.082
Model 7 0.316 0.215 0.129 0.048
Model 8 0.404 0.313 0.240 0.091
Table 4.5: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs according to the model and the value
of alpha
114
Chapter 4. Activity and eciency of Township Health Centers in
Weifang, China
4.4.2.3 Detection of outliers
As stated in the previous paragraphs, the partial frontier analyses give some robust-
ness to the estimation regarding the presence of outliers. Indeed, they will exhibit
a score higher than 1 so that they are easily detectable and do not distord the
production frontier (and bias the scores of the other DMUs).
A rst graphical analysis gives an idea of potentially atypical DMUs regarding the
relation between the quantity of inputs and outputs. The limit of this analysis is
that it can only handle two dimensions a time. However, it gives an idea of the
sample homogeneity. The objective is to detect the potential super-ecient DMUs,
that will distord the production frontier because they do not respond to the same
production function.
a. Number of available beds b. Equipment Index
c. Number of total sta of the THC d. Number of medical sta of the THC
Figure 4.25: Graphical detection of outliers
From Figure 4.25, several THCs seem specic. For instance, Xinzhai exhibits the
highest level of activity, by far, with the highest number of available beds and total
sta (Figures 4.25a and 4.25c). Wangfen, increased sharply its activity from 2011 to
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2012, for a stable level of inputs, so that it becomes atypical. Daotian increased its
quantity of available beds, and Jingzhi its equipment index (it seems over-equipied
for its activity, Figure 4.25b). To a smaller extent, Tanfang also provides a high
quantity of activity regarding its sta. On the contrary, Changguanjiedao provides
very few activities for its medical sta.
To check whether those observations are actually outliers (i.e. if they distort the
production frontier), their scores with the order-m method were analyzed, following
the method developed by Simar (2003). They use the order-m scores, with various
values of the m parameter, and dene outliers as DMUs whose score remains much
higher than 1 even when m increases. From Table 4.15, several THCs can be deleted
from the list of potential outliers: Chengguanjiedao, Jingzhi, Daotian and Tanfang,
because their scores decrease very quickly when m increases.
Finally, eciency scores were computed leaving successively each one of potential
outliers out of the analysis (leave-one-out strategy), in order to see if their presence
aect to a large extent the scores of the others DMUs. A dierence in the scores
was only found when the observation of Wangfen in 2012 was left out of the sample
(see Table 4.6). Indeed, both the Pearson correlation coecients and the Spearman
Rhos exhibit very high values (superior to 0.99). This means that the presence of
those DMUs does not aect neither the value nor ranking of the scores. The only
exception is Wangfen in 2012. When it is excluded from the sample, the Pearson
correlation is around 0.86, and the Spearman aroud 0.85 with all the other models.
This observation was thus dened as an outlier, and excluded for further analysis.
In the new eciency analysis, the scores of super-ecient DMUs range between 1
and 1.089 only. They are about 28 observations in this case, but their score being
close to 1, it is accepted that they are not ouliers.
4.4.2.4 Robustness of the production function
As stated in paragraph 4.4.2.1, as they are data-driven, non-parametric eciency
models are sensitive to the denition of the production function (Jacobs et al., 2006).
To test the validity of the eciency scores, several alternative scores, computed wih
alternative inputs or outputs, were compared to the initial ones. All the tested
models are summed up in Table 4.7. They mostly refer to the choices that were
made in paragraph 4.4.1.1.
Moreover, there are two candidate methods, order-m and order-alpha frontier anal-
ysis, both of them with many possibilities regarding the value of the trimming pa-
rameter. It is essential to verify whether methodological choices had consequences
on the scores, and on the ranking of the THCs.
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Table 4.6: Pearson and Spearman correlations with a left-one-out strategy
Pearson Whole Xinzhai Wangfen Jingzhi Chengguan. Tanfang Daotian
Whole 1
Xinzhai 1 1
Wangfen 0.870 0.867 1
Jingzhi 1 1 0.865 1
Chengguan. 1 1 0.869 0.999 1
Tanfang 1 1 0.868 0.999 1 1
Daotian 0.999 0.999 0.863 0.998 0.999 0.998 1
Spearman Whole Xinzhai Wangfen Jingzhi Chengguan. Tanfang Daotian
Whole 1
Xinzhai 1 1
Wangfen 0.852 0.852 1
Jingzhi 0.999 0.999 0.849 1
Chengguan. 1 0.999 0.853 0.999 1
Tanfang 0.999 0.998 0.853 0.998 0.999 1
Daotian 0.997 0.998 0.848 0.997 0.997 0.996 1
[h!]
In this perspective, eciency scores were computed for four production functions,
with order-m and order-alpha estimations. They were compared through a Pearson
correlation matrix (Table 4.16), and through a matrix of Spearman rank correlation
(Table 4.17). Tables are presented for alpha = 98%, but there is no big dierences
with other the chosen values. The minimal value for the Pearson correlation is
0.530, between Model 2 (inpatient days instead of admissions) in order-m and Model
5 (Inpatient + Outpatients and emergencies together) in order-alpha, so their is a
strong common trend between all those specications. More than a third of bilateral
correlations are higher than 0.8, so there is no big contradiction between the dierent
options. The lowest correlations (around 0.6) are often found while comparing
models with the Global Activity Index with models with the inpatient admissions
and the outpatients as outputs. This was to be expected, as these production
functions contain dierent information. As explained in paragraph 4.4.1.1, for the
output to exhaustively describe THCs activities, the Global Activity Index will be
chosen in the main analysis.
The analysis of the Spearman rank correlations leads to the same conclusion : the
minimal Spearman's rho (0.552) is obtained comparing Model 2 (Global Activity
Index, Global Sta) and 6 (Inpatients + Outpatients and emergencies, medical +
nonmedical sta) in order-m. This is the only value below 0.6. This means that,
whatever the eciency model or the production function, the most ecient THCs
are always the same, as well as the worst performers. This conrms the validity of
the rst stage of the analysis.
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It is also to be noticed that the scores estimated with the same production function
but with a dierent method are always highly correlated: the minimal Spearman's
Rho is 0.938 between the two models 1. Moreover, the Pearson correlation ranges
between 0.792 and 0.896. Therefore, the choice of one method over the other does
not impact the scores to a great extent.
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4.4.3 Eciency scores
4.4.3.1 Large potential for eciency improvement
The mean technical eciency remained quite stable over the period, around 0.75
from 2006 to 2012 (Tables 4.8 and 4.9). More than 20% are ecient (eciency score
equal to or higher than 1), other 20% exhibit a score between 0.9 and 1 (see Figure
4.26). The median eciency score is between 0.77 and 0.87, which is quite high.
This means that there is a large gap between ecient or almost ecient THCs, and
inecient DMUs which exhibit very weak scores, around 0.2 for the least ecient
each year (see Figure 4.26 and Table 4.8). Yet, the number of very inecient THCs
is very low. 6 THCs per year (less than 20% of the sample) are smaller than 0.5
(see Figure 4.26).
There is no clear evolotion across years, both in average and in distribution. Tech-
nical eciency remains stable from 2006 to 2012 in the sample.
Figure 4.26: Distribution of eciency scores across years
year mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
2006 0.734 30 0.071 1.056 0.510 0.816 0.980 0.268
2007 0.774 30 0.153 1.058 0.576 0.872 1.000 0.260
2008 0.745 30 0.154 1.089 0.606 0.783 0.952 0.243
2009 0.748 30 0.189 1.022 0.610 0.826 0.953 0.245
2010 0.752 30 0.166 1.061 0.553 0.797 0.976 0.245
2011 0.761 30 0.241 1.073 0.580 0.772 1.000 0.241
2012 0.769 28 0.257 1.052 0.590 0.816 0.990 0.228
Total 0.755 208 0.071 1.089 0.590 0.817 0.990 0.244
Table 4.8: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores
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Table 4.9: Mean descriptives statistics about eciency scores, inecient THCs only
year mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
2006 0.665 24 0.071 0.983 0.465 0.748 0.866 0.256
2007 0.619 18 0.153 0.989 0.481 0.627 0.834 0.228
2008 0.661 23 0.154 0.952 0.596 0.710 0.827 0.214
2009 0.683 24 0.189 0.990 0.533 0.715 0.862 0.230
2010 0.697 25 0.166 0.989 0.529 0.752 0.863 0.232
2011 0.668 22 0.241 0.989 0.496 0.686 0.831 0.214
2012 0.685 21 0.257 0.980 0.517 0.692 0.851 0.201
Total 0.670 157 0.071 0.990 0.501 0.696 0.850 0.223
4.4.3.2 No signicant dierence across counties
Most of decisions concerning THCs activity are made at the county level. Therefore
some dierences in the level of eciency can be attributed to the county bureau
(attribution of inputs for instance, or nancial decisions). Table 4.10 suggests that
2 of the 8 counties are particularly ecient, Shouguang and Zhucheng with average
eciency of 0.87 and 0.84. However, the number of THCs per county is very variable,
from 2 to 6, so it is not possible to directly read the means. Running statistical
mean tests, only Shouguang exhibits an average eciency signicantly higher than
the rest of the sample (Shouguang includes the townships of Daotian, Houzhen and
Tianliu)4.
Recalling that Changle and Linqu had a particular administrative status, this doesn't
impact at all their THCs in terms of activity or eciency.
Table 4.10: Eciency scores across counties
year mean N min max p25 median p75 sd
Anqiu 0.744 48 0.215 1.036 0.590 0.805 0.973 0.249
Changle 0.797 14 0.553 1.015 0.613 0.803 1.000 0.190
Changyi 0.703 14 0.479 1.006 0.596 0.647 0.815 0.173
Gaomi 0.730 28 0.444 1.056 0.523 0.710 0.933 0.209
Linqu 0.710 28 0.071 1.073 0.393 0.840 1.000 0.342
Qingzhou 0.727 41 0.285 1.052 0.493 0.832 0.980 0.255
Shouguang 0.872 21 0.486 1.089 0.731 0.983 1.010 0.186
Zhucheng 0.844 14 0.383 1.000 0.795 0.855 1.000 0.167
Total 0.755 208 0.071 1.089 0.590 0.817 0.990 0.244
4Statistical mean tests were realized through the ttest Stata command
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4.4.3.3 A link between eciency and the size of THCs ?
A crucial issue in terms of policy is the optimal size of THCs, both in terms of
available beds and sta. This is even more crucial in a context where the inputs
increase as quick as the activity, even though eciency was proven to be low at the
beginning of the period.
A rst graphical analysis, with Figure ?? does not allow to conclude in any way.
Most THCs have less than 100 beds, and there is no common trend in their eciency
scores. Nevertheles, for the "big" THCs (with more than 100 available beds), the
eciency score is always higher than 0.6. As for the quantity of sta, the same
analysis can be made. Nevertheless, some THCs employing more than 100 people
exhibit low eciency scores.
Statistical mean comparison tests conrm this idea: there is no statistical dierence
between small (less than 50) and medium (between 50 and 100) THCs, in terms of
eciency scores. On the contrary, eciency scores of big hospitals are signicantly
higher than the one of small and medium THCs. There might be an eect of
attraction coming from those well-equipied THCs, that could explain their higher
scores.
Figure 4.27: Eciency scores and the
number of available beds
Figure 4.28: Eciency scores and the to-
tal sta
4.5 Estimating the determinants of THs' eciency
4.5.1 Empirical strategy
The two-stage approach normally uses the Tobit model to deal with the bounded
nature of the DEA scores (Ng, 2011; Audibert et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2015a).
Nevertheless, due to skepticism regarding the censored nature of the boundary (Ra-
malho et al., 2010; Simar and Wilson, 2007), some alternative methods have been
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proposed (Simar and Wilson, 2007; Ramalho et al., 2010). Ramalho et al. (2010)
proposes an instrumentalist approach, considering that eciency scores are observed
managerial performances regarding a best-observed practice, and not an estimate
of the true eciency of a score5. He proposes the second stage used here, based on
fractional regression models (rst developed by Wooldridge (2002)). As some of our
THs exhibits order-m scores higher than 1, they have been normalized so that they
would be bound between 0 and 1.
This second-stage procedure requires several hypotheses. First we must choose
either a one-part or a two-part regression model, which would estimate dierent
partial eects for ecient and inecient rms. Here, as the proportion of ecient
rms is small (20%), we considered a one-part model. Then, the link function (the
distribution of the dependent variable conditionally to the environmental variable)
for the model must be chosen, according to the results obtained by the p-tests. As
robustness checks, regressions were tested with dierent link functions and with the
DEA scores instead of order-m scores.
4.5.2 Results
Results of the second step are presented in Table 4.11, for normalized scores. The
conclusions are robust to the use of DEA scores as dependent variable, and to other
choices of link functions (Tables 4.18 and 4.19 in the Annex).
Most of the variables introduced to capture the eect of the importance of sub-
sidies on eciency exhibit a negative sign, giving evidence of a substantial phe-
nomenon of soft budget constraint, especially when they are expressed in terms of
ratios (proportion of subsidies in THCs income or expenditures). Subsidies induce
perverse incentives, and no signicant change is noticed between the two sub-periods.
Thus, this situation did not change with the redenition of THCs nancing modal-
ities. One of the goals of the reform has not been reached in this respect. Also, the
net income per capita is never signicant in the analysis.
Two main reasons to the eect of subsidies on eciency can be proposed:
• the most inecient hospitals relied the most upon subsidies before the reform.
The subsidies were to oset nancial losses in the rst years (even for poor
performers), so those THCs received substantial subsidies in the rst years
after the reform, as a compensation.
• the other explanation is the soft budget constraint phenomenon; THCs with
poor performances expect to be bailed out at the end of the year, so they do
5True eciency is here opposed to the eciency observed in the sample
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not make any eort to maximize their activity. This negative eect of subsidies
is also found in coastal Township Hospitals (Hu et al., 2012), conrming the
perverse eects of inappropriate modalities of granting subsidies considering
the overall context of the reform.
Two other internal variables are signicantly associated with eciency level: the
sta expenditures, per medical sta (positive sign), and the mean number of
test per outpatient (negative sign).
• The rst one means that the economic incentives through remuneration can
spur activity. This result can be qualied by the fact that we are not able
to take the qualication and the experience of the sta into account. Still,
it seems plausible and not surprising, as wages of health practionioners were
proved to be very low (Qin et al., 2013), that higher wages (through bonus)
can be a way to spur activity. Of course, for this system to be ecient,
bonuses have to be connected to actual performances (and not to a THC
bonus, itself coming from drug sales). This argument would require to check
that the quality of care do not suer from the increase inactivity, but no data
is available on this matter.
• The number of tests per outpatient cases is signicantly and negatively linked
to the eciency score. This variable was introduced to capture any overuse
of imaging and testing in some THCs. Indeed, some inecient THCs seem to
rely on tests and imaging to increase their activity income.
Regarding the THCs environment on their performance, our results suggest that a
low ratio of inhabitants per bed hinders the eciency of THCs. This reects an
excess of inputs relatively to the current demand, as the THCs with the lower ratio
are the least ecient. This results can be seen from two sides. From the demand
size, the demand for health care is still not sucient for the infrastructure, so there is
a need to spur this demand through th development of the NRCMS benet package
for instance. From the supply side, there is a large potential in terms of productivity
gain, that can be reached through proper incentives. Indeed the sta productivity
is low
and to the increase in available beds in many THCs, though the BOR were not
that high. There is a need for input adjustment to the demand in the catchment
area. There is no signicant correlation between eciency and the covered popula-
tion. Thus, the negative relation between inhabitants per bed and eciency can be
explained by the the density of health facilities here.
4.6. Discussion 125
The number of VHS is also signicantly related to eciency scores, with a negative
sign, suggesting that the competition eect is stronger than the referral eect for
THCs in Weifang.
To sum up, the main results of the second stage are the following:
• the proportion of subsidies in the THCs income is negatively associated to
their eciency score.
• the amount of sta expenditures, per medical sta positively aects their
eciency
• the number of tests per outpatient is negativeley correlated to the eciency
scores
• the number of inhabitants per available bed aects positively the eciency of
the associated THC.
4.6 Discussion
Our results show that there is no improvement of THC eciency between 2006 and
2012, contrary to what was expected of the pharmaceutical reform. A similar trend
is found by Yang and Zeng (2014); Ng (2011), suggesting that health policy reform
in Weifang prefecture shares some common characteristics with other areas. This
feeds discussion about wider stakes of health policy reform in China.
First, as the core of the drug reform relies on reshaping TH nancing from drug
margins to subsidies, it is crucial that those subsidies should be allocated according
to a clear formula. This formula should include clear performance incentives, linking
subsidies to results, following a Result Based Financing (RBF) approach. THC
managers should know at the beginning of the period how much their THCs will
receive, rather than being easily bailed out at the end of the period.
Second, the optimal size of a Township Hospital is also a matter of concern. Our re-
sults suggest that the inputs of the THs are not fully utilized, since more inhabitants
per bed lead to better performance. Yet, over the 2006-12 period, the number of
available beds per TH grew drastically (from 44 to 77, on average, for the sample).
In a situation of nancial constraint, the priority should rather be the improvement
of healthcare quality and aordability for households. Moreover, as pointed out by
Yang and Zeng (2014), oversized hospitals may lead to quality concerns. In Weifang,
several THCs were merged in recent years. In this study most of the biggest THCs
are ecient ones, but the growing trend of the quantity of inputs lowered possible
eciency gains throughout the period.
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Third, as the demand side is still important in explaining THCs eciency, aord-
ability of healthcare has to be improved, mainly by deepening the benet packages
of the NRCMS. In Weifang , outpatient activities were reimbursed only up to 30%
in 2006, and many cases were not reimbursed at all. In 2012, user fees represent
at least half the total costs of outpatient care, and from discussions with local NR-
CMS and Health Bureau ocials, nancial barriers to healthcare remain for some
households.
Fourth, availability of essential drugs, periodic shortages have to be faced in several
areas in China, despite the reform, is also a concern in some THCs in Weifang. At
the national level, Li et al. (2013) point out that, because some ceiling prices have
been xed too low by the provincial government, manufacturers are reluctant to
produce them, increasing the risk of shortages. A decline of quality is also a concern
if cost is the crucial criteria to discriminate rms during the bidding process (Xiao
et al., 2013). The lack of availability of some essential drugs can be challenging for
THC daily activity and for healthcare costs. Indeed, since households have to get
drugs at higher prices from places other than public facilities.
Finally, this study leads to the issue of provider payment, that has to be tackeld
in Chinese Primary Healthcare Facilities. In the sample the fee-for-service method
is still used, though it has been shown, in China and elsewhere, to be linked with
higher costs than prospective payment methods (Yip et al., 2010). The introduction
of prospective payment is in discussion in Weifang and appears to be an essential way
to push the public healthcare system on the path of a better eciency, particularly
considering the multitasking nature of healthcare (Cheng et al., 2012; Eggleston,
2005; Robyn et al., 2014).
4.7 Conclusion
We use a two-stage partial frontier method to assess technical eciency of THCs in
Weifang, Shandong province, China. In a second stage, we use a fractional regression
model in a second stage to explain THCS eciency scores. Our results highlight
the role of public subsidies and demand-side factors in the technical eciency of
Primary Healthcare Facilities in the rural prefecture of Weifang.
The technical eciency remains constant over the period We identify a negative ef-
fect from the use of subsidies, showing that the soft budget constraint has not been
eciently tackled yet. Indeed, the subsidies allocation formula does not currently
spur eciency. More information must be collected regarding the real criteria of
subsidies allocation, as several elements suggest that, in practice, actual processes
may deviate from some of the criteria established in ocial texts. A greater under-
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standing of this is necessary to assess how well the global scheme of incentives (in
subsidies and elsewhere) is aligned, or not, with the health policy objectives.
At the same time, the eect of the covered population density per available bed,
and of THCs being oversized in counties, highlights that focusing on the managerial
aspects won't be sucient to improve THC eciency. Spurring activity needs out-
patient healthcare to become more aordable and the NRCMS to enlarge its benet
packages, increasing reimbursement of outpatient care. Another crucial aspect is
the perception of the quality of healthcare delivered in THC.
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4.8 Appendix
a. Outpatients b. Outpatients in THC
c. Inpatients d. Inpatients in THC
Figure 4.29: Evolution of mean reimbursed amount per case in Weifang, in yuans
a. Outpatient cases in THC b. Inpatient cases in THC
Figure 4.30: Evolution of the number of cases in Weifang
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Figure 4.31: Comparison of the rst axis scores
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Table 4.14: Nature of the 15 most sold drugs in the THCs of the sample
Injections Antibiotic
2011 2012 2011 2012
Guangong 6 13 0 2
Jingzhi 15 13 3 3
Jinzhongzi 8 6 2 1
Zheshan 5 1 1 7
Xinanjiedao 10 10 3 2
Wushan 8 9 4 3
Linwu 6 6 5 5
Qiaoguan 12 14 3 3
Wutujiedao 11 13 4 5
Liutong 10 8 2 0
Xiadan 13 11 7 4
Chaigou 11 13 4 5
Damujia 5 5 3 3
Jinggou 13 12 6 7
Kanjia 7 8 3 1
Chengguanjiedao 7 7 8 6
Dongchengjiedao 13 11 3 8
Liushan 13 12 7 4
Xinzhai 15 15 2 2
Dongxia 10 5 5 5
Gaoliu 11 9 5 5
Heguan 13 12 8 6
Shaozhuang 11 11 5 7
Tanfang 10 11 6 8
Wangfen 10 8 9 5
Daotian 5 5 5 5
Houzen 14 11 7 8
Tianlu 9 12 6 2
Baichihe 11 11 6 7
Mazhuang 9 9 6 6
Mean 10.0 9.7 4.6 4.5
Median 10 11 5 5
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Chapter 5
The eciency of Ulan-Bataar
Family Health Centers
1
This Chapter is a case study focused on Ulan-Bator primary healthcare facilities,
the Family Health Centers, from 2011 to 2014, relying on survey data. The sample
includes all the FHCs of Ulan-Bator. The study adopts a two-stage method, to
estimate eciency scores, and explain them by potential determinants. It concludes
that there is a potential space for improvement, and gives some policy recommen-
dations to spur activity ans performance.
5.1 Introduction
Universal access to primary health care is a major objective in most developing
countries. Including prevention and diagnosis of the commonest diseases, it plays
a crucial role in the ght against comunicable diseases, and in the improvement of
maternal and child health. Moreover, it was proved to be more cost-ecient than
more sophisticated care, as the unit costs are weak, and it allows to prevent more
large expenses in case of disease. Reaching an entire population, at a reasonable cost
requires an adequate health system, both in terms of organization and incentives.
This chapter is a case study. It focuses on the activity and eciency of primary
1This chapter comes from a research program on the eciency of Family Health Centers of
the city of Ulan-Bator, Mongolia, under the joint supervision of J. Mathonnat (CERDI) and Pr.
L. Munk-Erdene, Head of the Department of Health Policy and Management, School of Public
Health, Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences, Ulan-Bator. It beneted from funds
from the National Reasearch Agency through the program "Investissement d'Avenir" (ANR-10-
LABEX-14-10-01) to the CERDI and from nancial support from the FERDI (Fondation pour
les Études et les Recherches sur le Développement International). This program was conducted
in collaboration with a team of researchers from the Mongolian National University of Medical
Sciences. A preliminary version of the study is at the core of a research report whom I am co-
author (M. Audibert, J. Mathonnat, L. Petitfour, L. Munkh-Erdene, A. Tevendorj, L. Undram,
Improving Productivity and Eciency of Family Health Centers in Ulanbataar  A priority for
health policy in Mongolia, FERDI, september 2016, 59 p.). I was involved in its presentation and
dsicussion in Ulan-Bator with the Health Department of Ulan-Bator city (Family Health Centers
supervision). I remained solely responsible of this analysis presented here.
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health care facilities (the so-called Family Health Centers, FHCs hereafter) in Ulan-
Bator, capital of Mongolia. Mongolia is a former communist country, so since 1991
its health system has changed a lot, to meet the population needs while keeping the
system aordable for users. It beneted from a favorable economic context for two
decades, but now faces nancial constraints.
Relying on survey data from all FHCs in Ulan-Bator drom 2012 to 2014, this study
aims at estimating their eciency, and explaining it by environmental and man-
agerial factors through a two-stage procedure. Results show that there is a large
variability in FHCs performances, meaning that there is some potential for improve-
ment. In average, FHCs could increase their activity by 30% with the same level of
resources.
Section 5.2 presents the Mongolian context in terms of health system, and the
current stakes. Section 5.3 presents the survey data, and the main characteristics
of the Family Health Centers. Section 5.4 details the rst stage of the eciency
analysis, i.e. the calculation of the eciency scores. Finally, Section 5.5 presents
the second stage of the study, the identication of the determinants of eciency.
5.2 The Mongolian Health System: background and con-
text
The Section presents the specicities of the Mongolian health system, its pyramidal
structure and the precise role of FHCs, our focus level. It also provides wider
elements of context of the Mongolian economy.
5.2.1 The post-communist mutations
From its communist era (1941-1991), Mongolia inherited a state-managed health
system, nanced to a large extent by the USSR (up to 35% of Mongolian governe-
ment annual budget, (Manaseki, 1993). The health system became market-based,
and the focus was put on prevention and primary healthcare thanks to a free access
ensured by the Constitution of 1992 (WHO and MoH, 2012).
As a result, a noticable shift can be noticed in the composition of health expen-
ditures (Figure 5.1). Until 1999, government expenditures represented nearly 80%
of health expenditures. This proportion decreased to 50% approximately, and has
stayed around this proportion since 2002. Figure 5.2 gives a similar piece of infor-
mation: health expenditures are almost exclusively public until 2000, then private
expenditures constitute most on the increase of health expenditures from 2000 to
2005. Figure 5.3 highlights the fact that between 2000 and 2005, the proportion
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of health expenditures in GDP increased from 4 to 6 %, but only due to the in-
crease in private expenditures, since the proportion of general health expenditures
fell from 4 to 2%. Figure 5.4 underlines the explosion of total government expendi-
tures from 2005 to 2015, from which general governement health expenditures are
totally excluded. Indeed, their proportion fell from 11% in 2000 to 5% in 2014.
Since 2005, total and government health expenditures have followed the same evolu-
tion, suggesting that private expenditures have remained stable. In terms of amouts,
total expenditures tripled between 1995 and 2005 (from 100 to 300 Int $) and then
doubled from 2005 to 2015 (Figure 5.2)2.
Figure 5.1: Evolution of the percentage of public and private health expenditures
Figure 5.2: Evolution of health expendi-
tures per capita, Int $
Figure 5.3: Evolution of the percentage
of health expenditures in GDP
2Source of the data for Figures 5.1 to 5.5: World Health Organization Data Repository
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of general gov-
ernment health expenditures and general
government expenditures per cap., Int $
Figure 5.5: Evolution of the percentage of
general government health expenditures
in general govenment expenditures
5.2.2 A three-tier system
As in China, The Mongolian Health system is organized as two three-level pyramids,
following the administrative stratication of the country: one for rural areas, one
for urban areas.
Mongolia is divided into 21 provinces (so-called aimag), subdivided in soums (and
then in baghs in some areas). Apart from this organization, Ulan-Bator and big
cities are divided into districts, and subdivided into khoroos or subdistricts.
A detailed description of the role of each type of facility is provided by WHO and
MoH (2012).
Rural areas The healthcare system is composed of Bagh feldshers, Soum health
centres (between 15 and 30 beds) and Inter-Soum hospitals at the primary level. The
secondary level facility is the Aimag hospital (between 105 and 500 beds). At the
tertiary level, there are four regional diagnostic and treatment center for specialized
care.
Ulan-Bator and other big cities Primary level health care is provided at the
Family Health Center (FHC hereafter), private facilities contracted with the city.
Their missions are focused on basic and preventive care (monitoring, vaccinations,
diagnostics tests). They refer patients to the district hospitals and central hospitals,
i.e. secondary and tertiary level facilities, if needed.
FHCs are private entities, subjected to a three-peer contract with the disctrict
Health department (municipal authority) and the State Health Department).
Their performances are supposed to be assessed to ensure the terms of the contract.
The FHC earns some extra money if its performance is very good, and receive a
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warning that can lead to a break of the contract if the performance is very poor.
But, according to our discussions with Ulan-Bator City Health department, this
never or very rarely happens, the sanction is not really credible. This, associated to
a lack of supervision, raises the issue of the incentives for FHCs to spur activity.
5.2.3 The central place of Ulan-Bator
A major characteristic of Mongolia is the importance of its capital, relatively to
the rest of the country. Almost one half of the Mongolian population lives in Ulan-
Bator, and this pregnance of the capital became stronger over the last two decades,
due to a very fast urbanization, for several reasons.
First, hard living conditions in the rural areas (climatic conditions, lack of social
services) bring nomadic populations to the city. Natural disasters, like dzuds, (par-
ticularly cold and snowy winters, when livestock cannot nd any food) accelerate
this phenomenon. They can induce huge livestock and income losses, forcing no-
madic populations to come to the city, seeking for new economic opportunities.
Those nomadic populations mostly live in gers, so the urbanization of Ulan-Bator
since the 1990 decade has been quite unorganized, and not managed by the city.
New areas of ger housing appeared around the city, without sucient infrastructures
(sanitations, social services), leading to potential public health issues.
Moreover, many new households are not registered, therefore they are not reached
by the Family Health Centers. Those latter are supposed to monitor the health
of the households living in their khoroos. Risk of comunicable diseases are thus
higher, and those population do not have access to basic health care. To deal
with this major public health issue, several plans were implemented at the National
or municipal level, including the "Reaching Every District" approach, studied by
Lhamsuren et al. (2012). This program aims at reaching the most vulnerable in
urban areas, and oering them a package of health services. As a result, FHCs have
be found to be pro-poor unequal, contrary to the rest of urban health facilities (??).
Another major source of growing healh expenditures is the emergence of non-
communicable diseases, including cardiovascular diseases and diabetes. They have
become the leading cause of premature mortality (years of life lost). Diabetes, which
was quite rare in Mongolia two or three decades ago, hit about one in seven persons.
The diabetes rate increased by six and diabetes-related mortality by four between
2005 and 2014 (WHO, 2015). The government adopted preventive measures and put
in place nancial assistance schemes for some categories of patients. But the treat-
ment is expensive for households and is not entirely covered by the aid measures.
The government endorsed in 2014 the Second National Programme on Prevention
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and Control of Diseases caused by Unhealthy Lifestyles 2014-2021 which requires
signicant funding.
Despite the implementation of such programs, out-of-pocket health expenditures
rose in Mongolia from 12% in 1995 to 50% of total expenditures on healthin 2005.
They have stayed above 40% ever since, and are far above the average (30%) of the
upper-middle income countries (see Figure5.6). Global worldwide experience sug-
gests that universal health coverage is dicult to achieve if out-of-pocket payments
are greater than 30% of total health expenditure. They is a major risk of impover-
ishment for Mongolian households. With survey data from 2012, ? nd that 5.5%
of Mongolian households spend more than 10% of their expenditures in healthcare.
There is a need for better performance and equity of the global health system.
Figure 5.6: Evolution of the percentage of out-of-pocket payments in total health
expenditures
5.2.4 A dicult economic context
GDP growth collapsed from 12.4% in 2012 to less than 1% in 2016, with 3% expected
in 2017. External demand is weakening due to a continued dampening of the com-
modity market and slower growth in China, weakening Mongolian exports. Foreign
direct investments have decreased, slowing investment and domestic demand.
Real household income growth has become sluggish, braking consumption and mak-
ing households vulnerable to poverty. Socioeconomic factors have been shown to be
strong predictors of health services utilization (Gan-Yadam et al., 2013). Several
reports underlines that social safety nets should be strengthened and better tar-
geted to the poor (WB, 2012; WHO, 2010), not to put excessive pressure on public
nances.
Indeed, the scal situation has deteriorated over the past two years. The economy
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has faced sharp declines in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and coal exports. In
response to these shocks, the authorities resorted to expansionary policies to tide
the economy over until FDI and exports could recover. The scal expansion started
in 2012 when the government implemented universal transfers to the population and
the new Development Bank of Mongolia started to promote infrastructure develop-
ment.
When FDI inows tumbled and coal prices fell in 2013, the authorities maintained
expansionary scal policy in an eort to sustain growth as well as they boosted
infrastructure spending to realize the country's potential. The consolidated scal
decit (including spending of the DBM) oscillates between 9% and 10% of GDP
since 2012. Therefore the government had to take stabilization measures. But
the rst quarter of 2016 revealed a more delicate situation than expected, showing
the complexity of the situation. Revenue collections fell by 11% compared to the
rst quarter of 2015 (mainly due to falling mining revenues). Budget expenditures
increased by 24% over the same comparison period, mainly due to the sharp increase
in interest payments and social welfare transfers, an important program being the
Child Money Program.
High vigilance is also required regarding the growing public debt, because the debt
to GDP ratio is high (about 98 % in 2016 compared to 51% in 2012) because the
external government debt structure has rapidly changed towards non-concessional
conditions. The baseline scenario by the International Monetary Fund (2015) pro-
jections of the external debt sustainability of Mongolia suggests that debt service
could absorb 49% of Government revenue in 2017, 15% in 2020 and 26% in 2025.
There is therefore an extremely challenging environment for public nances and
for the public nancing of health expenditure because there is no scal space to
mobilize. Eciency of health expenditures is thus a key to keep improving access to
healthcare, particularly in a context of epidemiological transition with high costs.
5.3 The activity of Ulan-Bator Family Center Groups
This section presents the collected data, and the main information about Ulan-Bator
FHCs: their activity, their resources. It also provides some productivity follow-up
indicators.
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5.3.1 The database: survey and study area
5.3.1.1 The survey
The survey was conducted jointly with the Department of Health Policy and Man-
agement, School of Public Health, and the Mongolian National University of Medical
Sciences. A rst part of the data was collected in Spring 2015 (activities and de-
mographic data) from the FHCs registers and the Ulan-Bator city survey. It was
followed by a visit of the CERDI team in Ulan-Bator, to discuss with dierent local
actors of the health system, and work on the data. The second part (nancial data)
was collected in december 2015 from the accounting registers of FHCs.
5.3.1.2 Sample size and FHC catchment area
In Ulan-Bator, the urban area is divided into 8 districts and 145 sub-districts. The
FHCs are at the sub-district level (one by sub-district), and the sample includes
all of the 145 FHCs. Some of them have been divided in two FHCs, a main one,
and a satellite during the period. As the two of them are managed together, it has
been decided that only one Decision Making Unit would be considered, and that its
output would the sum of the main and the satellite FHC. It was the case for the
following pairs of sub-districts:
• 109  121
• 110  122
• 111  123
• 309  327
• 311  328
• 318  329
• 320 - 332
• 315 - 330
• 415  419
• 418  420
• 601 - 602  603
• 604  605
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• 802  804
• 701  707
• 702  705
We also had data for 4 villages, but they provide more diversied healthcare than
urban FHCs (including laboratory tests, inpatient activities for instance). Their
production function is dierent from the one of the FHCs of Ulan-Bator, so they
were excluded from the sample.
The biggest district is Bayan-Zurkh, the eastern district of Ulan-Bator, followed by
Songinokhairhan, the north-western district. They both represent around 300,000
inhabitants, and are constituted of a large proportion of ger and mixed areas (18
out of 28 for Bayan-Zurkh, 19 out of 29 for Songinokhairhan, see Figure 5.1). The
population increased in most districts. It remained stable in Nalaikh and Sukhbaatar
(and the villages) and decreased, mainly from 2011 to 2012 in Sukhbaatar (see Figure
5.7). Bayan-Gol, Sukhbaatar, Chingeltei and Han-Uul all range between 100000
and 200000. They are mixed between ger and building areas, except for Bayan-Gol,
where the housing is made of building in a large majority of sub-districts, as it is
located in the very centre of the city. A last group if districts exhibits a stable
population, around 5,000 people.
Figure 5.7: Evolution of the population of the districts from 2011 to 2014
The evolution of the activity and productivity of health establishments depends of
the demand and hence of the size of the population of the catchment area and its
demographic structure. Indeed, the youngest (under ve year old) and the older (65
year old and above) are supposed to be more likely to use health facilities because
of their health status. Dierent population sizes and demographic gure structures
may induce more or less health facility activity.
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District ger Building Mixed Total
Bayan-Gol 4 17 2 23
Bayan-Zurkh 12 10 6 28
Songinokhairhan 15 10 4 29
Sukhbaatar 2 8 4 14
Han-Uul 5 4 5 14
Chingeltei 13 3 2 18
Nalaikh 2 0 5 7
Baganuur 2 0 3 5
Total 55 52 31 138
Table 5.1: Number of subdistricts of the sample, by type, in 2014
Figure 5.8: Distribution of the catchment area per subdistrict, by district
The proportion of population below 5 is between 0.05 and 0.2 for most of the sub-
districts, and does not vary over the years (Figure 5.9). The proportion of elder
people is smaller, with a 75th percentile around 0.7 for every year. As a result,
the dependency (inactive population over active population) is more important. Its
median value is around 0.2 and the 75th percentile around 0.3 for every year.
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Figure 5.9: Evolution of dependency indicators from 2011 to 2014
5.3.2 Evolution of activity
5.3.2.1 Evolution of sta endowment
The sta of THCs includes doctors, nurses, and other (non medical sta). The
number of medical sta (i.e. doctors and nurses) varies between 4 and 22, with
an average value of 7 in 2012 and 9 in 2014 (see Table 5.11) and a median value
increasing from 7 to 8. But the increase is far from being homogenous across the
sample; the standard deviation sored over the study period. This idea is conrmed
by Figure ??, as most of the FHCs are above the red line, meaning that their sta
increased. Two FHC are atypical: FHCs 220 in 2012, due to its very large number
of doctors and nurses in 2012 (11 and 11), and 507 and 511 for their large number
of doctors in 2014 (15 and 10) compared to 2012.
Linking the sta endowment to the catchment area, the number of medical sta per
1000 inhabitants is mostly comprised between 0.5 and 1.5 for both of the two, with
a slight increasing trend (Figures ?? and ??).
5.3.2.2 Evolution of FHCs activity
The activity of the FHCs relies both on curative (almost 52%, in numbers of acts)
and preventive (47%) activities (Figure 5.12). Curative activity includes outpatient
visits and outreach home visits which represent around 60% of the curative activity
and 31% of the total activity. The sta of the FHC also has to call people of the
catchment area at home in order to remember them to proceed to some prevention
acts (immunization, diabetes analysis, etc.). This activity represents a very small
part of their activity (1%).
All the FHCs have the same pattern of activity and it remained very stable over
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a. Doctors b. Nurses
c. Medical sta
Figure 5.10: Evolution of the medical sta endowment between 2012 and 2014
(number of employees)
a. Whole sample b. Without 220 and 601
Figure 5.11: Medical sta per 1000 inhabitants between 2012 and 2014,
the studied period . There is a strong correlation between the components of FHCs'
activities (correlation coecients are high, and all signicant).
The average number of outpatient visits by FHC remains relatively stable over the
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Figure 5.12: Composition of FHCs activity, in number of cases
studied period, raising in average from 5420 (2012) to 5853 (2014). The dispersion
also increased, the standard deviation went from 2985 to 3201.
On the contrary, the average annual number of preventive visits decreased from 2012
to 2014 (13338 to 12242). This is raises some issues in terms of public health, as
preventive visits are supposed to be the core of FHCs missions, and the catchment
area of most FHCs remained stable or increased (see section 5.3.1.2). The same evo-
lution is observed for outreach home visits, whose average annual number decreased
from 8481 to 8181 (see Table 5.11). Those gure are conrmed by Figure 5.13a and
5.13b. The red lines represent the stability of the number of annual acts. Most
FHCs stand below this line, which their number of preventive visits and outreach
home visits decreased.
As the sta endowments remained exhibits a decreasing trend across the period, a
decreasing eciency is to be expected regarding descriptive statistics.
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a. Preventive visits b. Outreach home visits
c. Call home d. Outpatient visits
Figure 5.13: Evolution of FHCs activity between 2011 and 2014, number of cases
5.3.3 Main follow-up indicators
5.3.3.1 Evolution of contact indicators
The evolution of activity has to be linked to the one of the cathment area, to
check for the adequation of supply and demand in the primary healthcare sector.
Contact indicators were computed for the main three components of FHCs activity:
outpatient visits, preventive visits and outreach home visits.
The annual number of preventive visits per inhabitant ranges between 0.5 and 2, the
same order of magnitude as the annual number of annual outreach home visits per
inhabitant (Figures 5.14a and 5.14c). The number of outpatient visit per inhabitant
is smaller, below 1 for most FHCs (Figure 5.14b also).
For two of the three indicators, the trend is decreasing between 2011 and 2014
(Figure 5.14a and 5.14c). The majority of them saw the annual number of preventive
visits and outreach home visits per inhabitant decrease between 2011 and 2014. This
was expected, considered the conclusions in Sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.1.2. The number
of outpatient visit per oupatient (Figure ??) does not decrease to the same extent,
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it remains close to the red "stability" line for most FHCs.
Despite the increase of human resources (see Section 5.3.2.1), the contact indicators
decreased, an alarming fact regarding universal access to health care. Moreover,
those gures may be underestimated, because of unregistered households in the
catchment area.
Even with only registered households, it is crucial to understand why FHCs are less
frequented in 2014 than in 2011. From the literature and our discussion with local
actors, several answers are possible.
• nancial constraints tightened across the study period, and some households
can't aord anymore health care. This rst option is not convincing here, as
most care services delivered by FHCs are free of charge;
• the increase in the human resources may not be sucient to answer the increase
of the population. This scenario seems unlikely (Section 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.2.1);
• many households in the catchment area are not registered, so they have to pay
to access healthcare, imposing a nancial constraint on the demand side
• the medical sta workload has become very important because of administra-
tive work, and represent a serious constraint on the time health workers can
spend working with patients. This argument was put forward by many eld
partners we met. Administrative work means to ll health record for every
patients, writing reports of all kind for health monitoring for instance;
• nally, there is a strong deance facing the quality of healthcare delivered in
FHCs. Sick people prefer to go to secondary facility and pay for better services
than going to their FHC. This argument was presented as a crucial one by our
local partners.
According to the reason, the answer are very dierent in terms of health policy:
improving of sta skills and investment in their work, improving the bad reputation
of FHCs in patients' minds, improving FHC management so that administrative
work would not be a brake to "eective" healthcare. It is thus essential to further
investigate the activity ans eciency of Ulan-Bator FHCs.
5.3.3.2 Evolution of productivity indicators
A rst approach to eciency analyses is the analysis of productivity indicators. They
allow for comparison between dierent study areas, because they are expressed in
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a. Preventive visits b. Outpatient visits
c. Outreach home visits
Figure 5.14: Evolution of contacts indicators between 2012 and 2014 (annual cases
per inhabitant)
the same units to some extent. Their major weakness is that they can only link one
input to one output.
Productivity indicators are expressed in number of daily medical acts (preventive,
outpatient and outreach home visits) per medical sta. In 2012, medical sta prac-
tises in average 5.6 preventive visits, 2.3 outpatients visits, and 3.6 outreach home
visits a day (respectively 5.1, 2 and 3.2 in median (Figure 5.11). The trend is de-
creasing for most FHC of the sample, regarding the three indicators (see Figure
5.15).
FHC 323 exhibits an atypical number of preventive and outreach home visits per
sta in 2012 (17 and 12), due to its small number of sta (12) regarding its level of
activity. From 2013 its medical sta rises to 23.
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a. Preventive visits b. Outreach home visits
c. Outpatient visits
Figure 5.15: Evolution of productivity indicators, in annual cases per medical sta
between 2012 and 2014
5.4 The estimation of eciency scores
This section deals with the rst stage of the empirical analysis, the assessment of
eciency scores. It includes the denition of the production function, the adopted
methodology and the interpretation of the scores. A specicity of this study was the
way to take (or not) into account two main kinds of environment into the analysis
: building areas and ger areas.
5.4.1 The empirical model
5.4.1.1 The production function
FHC are at the rst level of the urban healthcare pyramid. Their activity is focused
on public health and prevention (see Section 5.2.2). Three outputs were introduced
in the analysis: the annual number of preventive visits, the annual number of out-
patient visits and the annual number of home visits. They represent almost all the
activity of FHCs.
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The considered inputs are both human and physical resources of the FHCs. Human
resources are the number of medical and non-medical sta. As they provide only
basic healthcare, there is not much equipment in the FHCs: neither beds nor labo-
ratory machines. As physical input, we considered the non-sta expenditures from
the nancing accounts les.
The production function therefore includes three outputs and three inputs.
Non-sta expenditures were only available from 2012 to 2014. To take them into
account, year 2011 had to be excluded from the eciency analysis, keeping only
2012, 2013 and 2014.
After the treatment of the satellites (see Section 5.3.1.2), the observations for which
one variable of the production function or more was not available were removed from
the sample. It then included 344 observations.
Finally, there were several observations with null values for the non-medical sta, or
for the non-sta expenditures. This is not ideal in an eciency analysis, particularly
when it concerns inputs in an output-oriented analysis. Indeed, FHCs with a null
value for an input will only be compared to other FHCs with a null value on this
precise input. The number of peers is thus considerably reduced. For this reason,
observation with at least one null value were also removed from the analysis.
The denitive sample was constituted of 311 observations, from 2012, 2013 and
2014.
5.4.1.2 The adopted methodology
The empirical model has to assess eciency of FHCs, and the role of their en-
vironnement on their performances. The methodology is chosen according to the
literature presented in Chapter ??: partial frontiers models to get robust eciency
scores, and fractional regression model to explain those scores by potential determi-
nants, managerial or external.
For all the variables introduced in the second stage, the separability condition is
assumed: those variables have an impact on the distance between a FHC and the
production frontier, not on the frontier itself.
For most of the potential determinants of eciency, this condition was accepted.
But following our discussions with local actors and the literature (Lhamsuren et al.,
2012), the major type of housing in a sub-district (i.e. ger areas or building ar-
eas) was crucial for the FHC performance. Indeed, in ger sub-districts access to
households is more dicult and requires more time, impacting the global activity.
It takes more time for the medical sta to reach the patients for the outreach vis-
its. The lack of infrastructure (sanitation for instance) in ger areas (mostly poor
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suburbian sub-districts) is also a factor of dierence, because comunicable diseases
are more likely to spread in those areas. The case-mix may thus be dierent. For
those reasons, it is possible that the type of housing does not only impact technical
eciency, but the production frontier itself.
Therefore, a possibility was to consider two dierent production functions and thus
to estimate two separate production frontiers: one for the ger sub-districts and
one for non-ger sub-districts. They both represent the maximal feasible production
given their environnement. The eciency scores, i.e. the distance to the production
frontier - the maximal output they could produce given their environment- thus
reect mainly the managerial performance of each FHC.
5.4.1.3 The environment: ger and non-ger subdistricts
As two frontiers have to be estimated, every FHC has to be attributed to one or the
other category. A great part of the sample is exclusively made of ger or building
sub-districts. But for a certain number of other, the available information was a
proportion of households or people living in ger, or even, for a few one, they were
just described as "mixed". Estimating three production frontiers was not possible,
so those sub-districts had to be assigned to the ger or the non-ger sub-sample.
The choice was made according to an assumption: to change the production func-
tion, the proportion of ger population has to be very high. Thus, the sub-districts
just known as mixed sub-districts were associated to the non-ger sample.
When available, the attribution to one or another frontier was made according to
the proportion of population living in ger.
As shown in Figure 5.16, there are two groups of FHCs where the proportion of ger
population is neither 0 nor 1: a group around 20% of ger population, and another
around 80%. The rst one was associated to the non-ger frontier, following the
assumption that this proportion of ger population was not sucient to redene the
production function itself. On the contrary, the FHCs where around 80% of the
population live in ger were associated to the ger frontier.
A last group of FHCs remained questionable, with no information at all about their
environment. It is the case for FHC 402, 403, 405, 406 and 502.
To choose, they were alternatively associated to both of the two frontiers, to compare
their scores in the two situations, and see if they distorted any production frontier.
They did not impact the rest of the scores. We decided to put FHCs 402 and 403
in the ger frontier, and 405, 406 and 502 in the non-ger frontier, according to the
frontier in which they had the higher score.
Finally, a ger frontier was dened with 99 observations, and a non-ger frontier with
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Figure 5.16: Distribution of the proportion of population living in ger, in frequency
212 observations (for the three years of the study). Table 5.12 gives the attribution
of each FHC to its frontier.
5.4.1.4 One or two production function(s) ?
To conrm or not the hypothesis that ger and non-ger areas FHCs operate according
to dierent production functions, several indicators are analyzed. If the access to
households is more dicult in ger areas, then there should be some dierences in
the contact and productivity indicators.
Indeed, several scenarios can be considered.
• If the access is more dicult in ger areas than in building areas, the produc-
tivity and contact indicators are expected to be weaker in ger areas for two
main reasons:
 a doctor will provide less outreach home visits in a day in ger areas:
negative eect on activity through outreach home visits, and on eciency
 fewer households will come to seek for health care because of accessibility
of the FHC. This will have a negative eect on activity through preventive
and outpatient visits, and on eciency.
• If the health infrastructure is not sucient, it can have an eect on the demand
for healthcare, especially related to comunicable diseases. The eect is then
positive on activity, and on eciency.
Those rst two scenarios have to be combined with the health authorities expec-
tations and decisions. If those latter are aware of the dierences between ger and
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non-ger areas and want to oset them, they may attribute more sta to ger areas.
In this situation, no dierence will be observed in the contact indicators, but the
number of medical sta per 1000 inhabitants is likely to be greater in ger areas.
• The socio-economic dierences between populations living in ger and in build-
ing areas also have to be considered:
 If people living in ger are poorer than people living in building, than they
should rely to a greater extent on free basic healthcare. They cannot
aord, for instance, to bypass the pyramidal system and go directly to
a secondary facility where they have to pay. The eect on FHC activity
and eciency is then positive.
 If people living in ger are very poor nomadic population, it is likely that
they are not registered. In this situation, either they go and seek for
healthcare at the FHC anyway, and the eect on the FHC eciency is
positive, or they do not have the information that they can have free
basic health care and do not go to the FHC. In this last situation the
consequence is negatice on the FHC activity eciency.
Table 5.2 gives average value for the ger and non-ger sub-districts, and the p-value
to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, obtained through a mean signicance
test. It allows to conrm, in a descriptive way, the assumptions proposed above.
None of the three contact indicators is signicantly dierent between ger and non-
ger areas. This can mean either that the access diculties are not that crucial and
do not aect global activity to a large extent, or that there are more sta in ger
areas, to oset the loss of time, so that no dierence can be seen in the contact
indicators.
There is not more medical sta per 1000 inhabitants, so this latter scenario does
not seem to be veried. This could be qualied claiming that the data do not have
reliable information on unregistered households, and that information concerning
catchment areas are underestimated. Unfortunately, it is impossible to test this
hypothesis.
The activity and productivity indicators are not signicantly dierent between ger
and non-ger areas. This suggests that the production functions are not dierent
between the two type of sub-districts, or that the dierent eect are mutually oset.
The only indicators for which a signicant dierence is observed are the sta vari-
ables, always greater in ger areas, even if the magnitude of the gap is not very large.
This could mean that health authorities attribute more sta to ger sub-districts to
oset their diculties. But it is not important enough to be seen in the number of
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Table 5.2: Average tests between ger and non-ger sub-districts
Ger sub-districts Non-ger sub-districts Prob
Home vis. per inhab. 0.88 0.844 0.397
Prev. vis. per inhab. 1.288 1.289 0.988
Outpatient vis. per med. sta 0.565 0.62 0.142
Sta per 1000 inhab. 0.907 0.853 0.157
Preventive vis. per med sta 4.51 4.489 0.941
Home vis. per med sta 3.073 2.948 0.528
Outpatient vis. per med sta 1.947 2.119 0.219
Catchment area 10408.24 10108.29 0.501
Preventive visits 13365.61 12579.96 0.2624
Home visits 9051.11 8308.679 0.147
Outpatient visits 5661.293 5912.05 0.4961
Total Sta 14.374 12.575 0
Doctors 4.475 3.882 0.007
Nurses 4.545 4.207 0.068
Non medical sta 4.364 3.368 0
Medical sta 9.02 8.179 0.029
Prop. of above 65 442.229 552.102 0.198
The last column is the p-value with the inequality of averages as alternative assumption.
sta per 1000 inhabitants, so it is not sure that if justies two distinct production
frontiers.
Moreover, as there is no assumption on the nature of return to scale in partial
frontier models, a dierence of size is not a problem, FHCs will simply be compared
to similar peers. There are also some technical considerations to take into account
while choosing between one and two frontiers.
On the one hand, estimating two dierent frontiers, it is absolutely sure that FHCs
will only be compared to similar peers.
On the other hand, this separate the sample in two subsamples, so it largely reduces
the number of observations per frontier, potentially harming the statistical power of
the scores. Moreover, it makes it impossible to compare the performances of FHCs,
as they are assessed relatively to dierent frontiers. The scores become indicators
of the dispersion of performances among the two subsamples. Lastly, in the second
stage of the analysis, estimating two production frontiers requires to run two dierent
regressions, one for the ger subsample, and one for the non-ger subsample. In terms
of interpretation and discussion, those last two ideas are quite problematic.
Finally the two alternative have been computed in the rst stage. The analysis of
the eciency scores suggests that there is no major dieerence between the two
options (i.e. the production frontier is not dierent for ger and non-ger FHCs), so
scores computed on the whole sample were used in the second stage.
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5.4.2 Measurement of eciency: the rst stage
5.4.2.1 The empirical model
The orientation and the number of frontiers As the FHC manager does not
decide the number of sta in his/her facility (it is decided by the Health Bureau),
an output orientation was chosen. For given resources, the objective of FHC is
to provide as much health care as possible. This is in line with approaches like
"Reaching Every District" (see Section 5.2.3).
FHCs provide only basic healthcare, so it is not likely that there were any technical
progress between 2012 and 2014. An only production frontier was estimated for
each of the two sub-samples.
As partial frontier models were used, it is not necessary to assume any nature about
the returns to scale.
The choice of the m parameter In partial frontier models, the value of the
m, seen as a "trimming parameter", is crucial. Simar and Wilson (2013) gives a
method to choose the optimal value : "The nal value of m can be chosen in terms
of the desired level of robustness", i.e., of proportion of DMUs above the production
frontier. The upper limit is the number of observations.
Here, all possible values from 10 to 90 for the ger frontier and from 100 to 200 for
the non-ger frontier were tested, with a range of 10. As expected, the proportion of
DMUs above the frontier (with a score higher than one) decreases as m increases,
and so does the average eciency in the sample (Figures ??b and ??c ).
For the ger frontier, from m = 70 the proportion of super-ecient DMUs is stable
around 0.05. This value was thus chosen. As for the non-ger frontier, the proportion
of super-ecient DMUs is really stable from m = 192. This value was thus chosen.
For each of the two frontiers, the precise value of m, starting from the chosen
threshold, does not change a lot either the mean eciency score, or the proportion
of scores higher than 1.
For the whole sample model, values between 100 and 250 have been tested, with a
range of 10 (see Figure 5.17a).
The choice of the alpha parameter Running the order-alpha analysis, the value
of the parameter has to be chosen. This value gives the percentage of DMUs that
will remain below the frontier: the higher the alpha, the closer the method is to the
Free Disposal Hull. Contrary to the order-m method, the order-alpha method leaves
a great part of the sample as super-ecient units, even for large values of alpha.
It is very sensitive to a slight change of the parameter when it is closing the unit
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a. Whole sample
b. Ger frontier c. Non-ger frontier
Figure 5.17: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs and mean eciency according to
the value of m
(see Table 5.3). To get less than 10% of super-ecient THCs, 4%, of the sample,
i.e. 6 observations approximately have to be left above the production frontier in
its estimation.
Table 5.3: Proportion of super-ecient DMUs according to the model and the value
of alpha, whole sample
Value of alpha 90 92 94 96 98
Model 1 0.392 0.341 0.257 0.170 0.071
Model 2 0.354 0.286 0.215 0.145 0.064
Model 3 0.447 0.408 0.341 0.222 0.122
Model 1,2 and 3 are detailed in section 5.4.2.3
Order-m scores are used in priority in the second stage, because they are more stable.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to check if the ranking of the FHCs is the same with the
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two methods, to see if the conclusions remain the same whatever the estimations.
5.4.2.2 Detection of outliers
A rst graphical analysis is run to detect some potential outlying FHC (Figure
5.20). They are presented here jointly for ger and non-ger frontier, but they were
also analyzed separetely. There does seem to be any super-eciency FHC in the
sample, the only outlying values are particularly inecient (220, 507) so they cannot
distord the production frontier.
The eciency scores were also analyzed, using the method of Simar (2003) already
used in the previous chapter. With a threshold xed at 1.05 several FHCs were
detected as potential outliers:
• for the ger frontier, FHC 301(2014) and 323(2014)
• for the non-ger frontier, FHC 104 (2014) and 318(2013).
The same analyses were conducted, successively removing each of those observations
of the samples. It appears that they did not aect the production frontiers, as the
scores of the other FHCs did not change at all. The Pearson correlation was higher
than 0.99 for each tested value of m. Thus, no outlying value had to be removed
from the sample. The eciency scores can be interpreted as such.
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a. Outpatient visits/medical sta b. Preventive visits/medical sta
c. Outreach home visits/medical sta
d. Outpatient visits/nonmedical sta
Figure 5.18: Outpatients visits
e. Preventive visits/nonmedical sta
Figure 5.19: Call home visits
f. Outreach home visits/nonmedical
sta
Figure 5.20: Detection of potential outliers
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5.4.2.3 Robustness of the model
Robustness of the production function Non-parametric models are data-
driven, hence their sensitivity to the denition of the production function (Jacobs
et al., 2006). Alternative models have to be tested, to check whether the eciency
scores are robust to the specication of the model.
In this study, there were no alternative for the outputs, as FHCs only provide basic
health, so there are few sorts of medical acts. The denition of inputs was more
exible, so it was possible to test various alternative empirical models.
• Model 1 (the principal one) includes medical sta, non-medical sta and non-
sta expenditures as inputs.
• Model 2 only non-sta expenditures and medical sta into consideration.
• Model 3 takes includes the non-sta expenditures and the global sta as inputs.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 give the Pearson correlation matrix and the Spearman rank
correlation matrix between the scores computed with the several models with one
frontier.
The Pearson correlation coecients are very high, the lowest is 0.798 between Model
2 in order-alpha and Model 1 in order-m for the ger frontier. The Spearman rank
correlations are also very high, suggesting that the specication of the model does
not aect to a great extent the ranking of FHCs performances.
Table 5.4: Pearson correlation matrix, whole sample
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.870 1
Model 3, order-m 0.909 0.932 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.830 0.971 0.899 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.963 0.882 0.905 0.882 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.853 0.836 0.847 0.850 0.888 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
All α parameters are equal to 98%. The values of m are 210 for M1, 201 for M2 and 180 for M3.
They were chosen with the same methodology as in paragraph 5.4.2.1.
Robustness to the number of frontiers Finally, a choice has to be made
between one or two production frontiers. Several criteria were used: are the two
series highly correlated ? How many observations have dierent score according to
the number of estimated frontiers ? Are they rather ger or non-ger observations ?
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Table 5.5: Spearman rank correlation matrix, whole sample
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.876 1
Model 3, order-m 0.915 0.936 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.840 0.979 0.907 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.969 0.888 0.914 0.879 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.881 0.848 0.863 0.855 0.911 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
To answer those questions, a graphical analysis is rst conducted. Figure 5.21 plots
the scores obtained with the two strategies. Most of FHCs are on the diagonal,
so their score does not change at all. When the scores are dierent between the
two methods, they are always higher with two distinct estimated frontiers. Four
observations have very dierent scores: 219, 221, 401 and 402, but for the rest of
the sample the gap is limited, both for ger and non-ger FHCs. This is conrmed
by Figure 5.22 which gives the distribution of the dierence between the two scores.
There are some negative values (65 over 311) but their absolute value is not large
(the minimal value is -0.027 over the whole sample).
The gap is more important for non-ger sub-districts than for ger ones, suggesting
that there is no major dierence in the production function due to environmental
diculties. For 56 FHCS,the dierence between the two scores is greater than 0.1,
and among them, only 16 are located in ger sub-districts. There is no reason to
think that the performances of FHCs located in ger areas are underrated because
they are compared to FHCs operating in non-ger areas.
Figure 5.21: Comparison of scores ob-
tained with one and two frontiers
Figure 5.22: Distribution of the dif-
ference between two-frontier and one-
frontier scores
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The analysis of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation matrices (Table 5.6 for
the whole sample, and 5.15 and 5.16 by frontier) leads to the same conclusion. The
correlation are always very high.
Finally, as eciency scores are close with one or two production frontiers, suggesting
that the production functions are not necessarily dierent, the scores obtained with
a unique frontier are kept for the second stage analysis.
In terms of analysis, this allows to compare ger and non-ger areas FHCs, and to
analyze all the FHCs in the regression in the second stage.
Table 5.6: Correlations between scores with one and two frontiers
Pearson correlation coecients
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.870 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.909 0.932 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.858 0.952 0.920 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.954 0.839 0.879 0.873 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.888 0.897 0.949 0.937 0.911 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
Spearman rank correlations
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.876 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.915 0.936 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.860 0.953 0.921 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.950 0.845 0.887 0.875 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.890 0.895 0.949 0.930 0.913 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
5.4.3 Eciency scores
5.4.3.1 Decreasing eciency over the study period
In average over the three years, FHCs exhibits a technical eciency of 0.70. They
could increase their activity by 30% with the same quantity of inputs. As expected
in section 5.3.2.2 due to a decreasing trend in activity, FHCs experienced a decrease
of their technical eciency between 2012 and 2014. The average (median) score
falls from 0.799 (0.864) to 0.643 (0.606) from 2012 to 2013, but remains stable from
2013 to 2014 (see Table 5.7). The same conclusion comes from Figure 5.23: the
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rst quartile in 2012 is higher than the median in 2014. The distribution of the
variable changed in one year. Only 3 FHCs in the sample experienced an increase
higher than 0.2 in their eciency scores, and the total number of THCs whose scores
improved is 27.
Table 5.7: Evolution of eciency scores between 2012 and 2014
Evolution of eciency, whole sample
year N Average Min Max p25 Median p75 Std dev
2012 113 0.799 0.197 1.011 0.629 0.864 1.000 0.220
2013 99 0.643 0.212 1.057 0.479 0.606 0.803 0.218
2014 99 0.641 0.274 1.083 0.483 0.632 0.791 0.212
Total 311 0.699 0.197 1.083 0.505 0.699 0.938 0.229
Evolution of eciency, inecient FHCs only
year N Average Min Max p25 Median p75 Std dev
2012 76 0.701 0.197 0.996 0.561 0.706 0.872 0.207
2013 91 0.611 0.212 0.996 0.474 0.571 0.774 0.197
2014 91 0.608 0.274 0.999 0.477 0.562 0.747 0.187
Total 258 0.636 0.197 0.999 0.483 0.625 0.791 0.200
Figure 5.23: Evolution of eciency scores
Testing the signicance of the average dierence, the 2012 average is signicantly
higher than 2013 and 2014 together. There is no signicant dierence between 2013
and 2014. This decrease is mainly due to a decrease in the number of cases for the
three types of provided medical acts (Section 5.3.2.2). There are only 53 ecient
observations in the sample, including 37 in 2012 (comparison between the two parts
of Table 5.7).
The variability in FHCs performances is very large. Among inecient ones, half of
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them exhibits a score lower than 0.57 in 2013 and 0.56 in 2012, which is very weak.
5.4.3.2 Dierences between FHCs located in ger or non-ger areas
There is a slight dierence in eciency scores between FHCs located in ger areas
(0.705 in average) and FHCs located in non-ger areas (0.758) (Figure 5.24 and Table
5.8). But this dierence is not statistically signicant. The evolution per year is
almost the same in ger and non-ger areas (see Figure 5.25).
Larger disparities can be observed across districts, even if the number of observa-
tions per district is very unequal. The districts of Han-Uul and Songinokhairhan
seem particularly ecient relatively to the other ones (0.769 and 0.794 of average
eciency), along with Bayan-Gol (0.735). On the contrary, Bayan-Zurkh exhibits a
particularly low average and median eciency (0.5658 and 0.517).
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics about eciency scores, by frontier
frontiere N Average Min Max p25 Median p75 Std dev
Ger sub-districts 99 0.668 0.197 1.083 0.508 0.632 0.879 0.229
Non-ger sub-districts 212 0.714 0.204 1.057 0.503 0.718 0.950 0.228
Total 311 0.699 0.197 1.083 0.505 0.699 0.938 0.229
Figure 5.24: Distribution of eciency
scores across environments
Figure 5.25: Evolution of eciency
scores, per environment
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Table 5.9: Eciency scores across districts
district N Average Min Max p25 Median p75 Std dev
Baganuur 9 0.542 0.379 0.845 0.389 0.496 0.614 0.177
Bayan-Gol 58 0.735 0.359 1.046 0.553 0.718 0.981 0.216
Bayan-zurkh 73 0.568 0.197 1 0.395 0.517 0.717 0.215
Chingeltei 13 0.709 0.204 1.001 0.507 0.671 1 0.262
Han-Uul 33 0.769 0.299 1.004 0.632 0.774 0.938 0.198
Nalaikh 12 0.682 0.327 1 0.502 0.688 0.898 0.225
Songinokhairhan 60 0.794 0.406 1.083 0.623 0.778 0.998 0.188
Sukhbaatar 53 0.718 0.292 1.001 0.500 0.747 0.969 0.242
Total 311 0.699 0.197 1.083 0.505 0.699 0.938 0.229
5.5 Estimating the determinants of FHCs eciency
This section describes the second stage of the analysis, the estimation of the deter-
minants and their interpretation, in the perspective of policy recommendations.
5.5.1 Potential determinants of FHCs eciency
Two main categories are introduced in the second stage of the analysis to explain
eciency scores: environmental (external) one and managerial (internal) ones.
5.5.1.1 External variables
Several environemental variables were introduced to capture the dierence in the
potential demand for each FHC: the logarithm of the catchment area, and the
proportion of population below 5 and above 65 years old. Both are expected
to be positively associated to eciency scores, as they spur demand for health care,
resources being equal.
As a global production frontier was estimated, and not two distinct ones between
FHCs operating in ger areas and FHCs operating in building areas, a dummy for
the ger sub-districts.
5.5.1.2 Managerial variables
Managerial variables are the interest variable, because they can give information
about relevant -or not- managerial practices in terms of activity and performances.
They are of two main types:
• variables related to the composition of the sta. The tested hypothesis is
that there might be a complementarity between the dierent sta in FHCs,
and an excess of certain type of sta relatively to the other may lower their
performance.
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• variables about the composition of the sta remuneration, between salary
and incentives. If incentives are allocated according to accurate criteria, they
may spur the motivation of the sta, and thus spur eciency.
Evolution of remuneration of the sta The proportion of incentives in the
sta total remuneration changed a lot over the period. In 2012, it represented the
same proportion for each FHC in the sample (around 25%, Figure 5.26). From
2013, every FHC applied its own remuneration formula between basic salary and
incentives. Incentives can represent up to 50% of managers' remuneration. For other
employees, the proportion of incentives is mostly below 30%. The situation did not
change between 2013 and 2014. Regarding the evolution of the global remuneration
of the sta, the change of the remuneration formula was globally at the advantage
of the employees: the median remuneration rose for each professional position in
the FHC (Figure 5.27). This increase is more important for managers, and can be
qualied for the other sta (the rst quartile of the other sta remuneration did not
increase much over the period).
Figure 5.26: Distribution of the propor-
tion of incentives in the sta remunera-
tion
Figure 5.27: Distribution of annual sta
remuneration, in thousands of Tugriks
5.5.2 Results
Results are presented in Table 5.10. The determinants of eciency were estimated
through a fractional regression model introduced by Ramalho et al. (2010) and
Ramalho et al. (2011) .
As there only 53 over 311 ecient observations, a one-part model was chosen, with
a Probit link function (other functions were tested in robustness checks). Dummy
variables were introduced for the dierent districts, in order to capture unobservable
characteristics. They highlight a signicant and positive impact of the size of the
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catchment area, as a potential demand for healthcare.
On the contrary, the composition of the population in terms of age does not have
any impact on eciency contrary to what was expected. This variables suers from
a great number of missing values, so it reduced the sample from 311 to 210. It was
thus chosen not to present it in the main result table, to keep the most observations
possible in the sample.
The proportion of medical sta (i.e. doctors and nurses) has a negative and signif-
icant impact. This can be explained by a complementarity in the composition of
the sta, particularly in front of the important administrative workload in FHCs.
In our discussions with local actors, the burden of administrative work was often
emphasized: reporting of several follow-up and monitoring indicators, constitution
of health booklets. Those activities do not enter the medical production function
as an output, thus they do not spur eciency. Though, they take time. They work
can be at least partially realized by non-medical sta, contrary to medical acts. In
FHCs where there is no of few non-medical sta, doctors and nurses have to do all
of it, therefore they see less patients, and are assessed as less ecient.
The proportion of incentives, whatever sta concerned has a global positive impact
on eciency. However, when we decompose this eect by type of sta, incentives
become non-signicant for doctors, and negative for managers and nurses. The
positive sign is driven by the proportion of incentives in the remuneration of the
other sta (administrative sta for example). This result can be explained by the
nature of the "incentive" variable. It is more a salary complement, unconditionnally
to the individual or collective performance of the sta. Thus it does not have any
role of spurring activity through nancial incentives.
5.5.3 Discussion
The results of the second stage highlights dierent phenomenon, and suggest several
possible levers for action to a universal access to healthcare in Ulan-Bator.
From the demand side, the catchment area is a major determinant of FHCs eciency.
In the context of Ulan-Bator, this can have several levels of interpretation. This
eect can represent the "classical" role of potential demand played by this catchment
area. Second, this catchment area represents the registered population. Then, the
positive sign means that the bigger the registered population of a subdistrict is, the
higher the eciency level is. It can suggest than the unregistered population does
not go to FHCs. It does not represent a potential demand for them. In this case, it
is crucial to understand why those populations do not seek for free healthcare: is it
a problem of information (they do not know that they don not have to pay) ? Or a
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problem of deance regarding the perceived quality of healthcare in FHCs ?
From the supply side, it seems hard to give a unique answer but some issues emerge
from the results of the second stage, and they are mainly linked to the sta compo-
sition and remuneration. FHCs are private entities, contracted by the city and the
Ministry of Health to provide primary healthcare, and give some regular data about
follow-up indicators. But according to our discussions with the Ulan-Bator Health
Department, there is no real credible threat if they do not fulll their missions,
mostly because public authorities do not have any information about their eorts.
This is a typical principal/agent situation, with a moral hazard at the benece of
the FHCs sta. Their sta is remunerated with a dotation from public authorities,
according to the number and position of employees. Those remunerations are known
to be low, which is a source of discontent, and they are not connected to any per-
formance or activity indicators. Public authorities can only assess the completeness
of the statistical data provided by the FHCs, but has no control on the eort of the
medical sta.
As a consequence, spurring activity, and then eciency in FHCs would require to
increase the level of remuneration of their sta, and to partly connect them with
their performance in terms of healthcare. The administrative workload also has to
be rethinked, as it seems to be a burden not only for non-medical sta, but also for
medical sta. This slows down the "eective" cring activity of FHCs.
5.6 Conclusion
This Chapter provides some information about the eciency of urban primary
healthcare facilities in Mongolia, the Family Health Centers. It relies on survey
data from 2011 to 2014, and adopts a two-stage procedure. Performance declined
in FHCs facilities during the study period, an expected result as human resources
increased, contrary to the number of provided health services. In average, FHCs
could increase by 30% their level of activity with the same level of resources. Con-
trary to what could have been expected, there is no major dierence of activity or
context between areas where people mostly live in ger, and the areas where they
live in buildings.
It is crucial that the Mongolian health system heads to this objectives, as it has to
face growing health needs with constant resources. Eciency scores are explained
both by the demand side (catchment areas), so it is necessary to improve information
about primary health care, and preception of the quality of healthcare in FHCs. On
the supply side, variables about the compositio and the remuneration of the sta are
signicant. A clear contract has to made between FHCs and the public authorities,
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in their exercise of the oversight function described in the general introduction, so
that the function of service delivery can be fulllled optimally.
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Table 5.12: Attribution of the subdistricts to the GER or non-GER frontier
Bayan-Gol Bayan-zurkh Songinokhairhan Sukhbaatar Han-Uul Chingeltei
101 Non-ger 201 Non-ger 301 Ger 401 Non-ger 501 Non-ger 601 Non-ger
102 Non-ger 202 Ger 302 Ger 402 Ger 502 Non-ger 604 Non-ger
103 Non-ger 203 Non-ger 303 Ger 403 Ger 503 Non-ger 606 Non-ger
104 Non-ger 204 Non-ger 304 Ger 404 Non-ger 504 Ger 607 Non-ger
105 Non-ger 205 Non-ger 305 Ger 405 Non-ger 505 Ger 608 Non-ger
106 Non-ger 206 Non-ger 306 Non-ger 406 Non-ger 506 Ger 610 Non-ger
107 Non-ger 207 Non-ger 307 Non-ger 407 Non-ger 507 Ger 611 Non-ger
108 Non-ger 208 Non-ger 308 Ger 408 Non-ger 508 Ger 612 Non-ger
109 Non-ger 209 Ger 309 Ger 409 Ger 509 Ger 613 Non-ger
110 Non-ger 210 Ger 310 Ger 410 Non-ger 510 Non-ger 614 Non-ger
111 Ger 212 Ger 311 Ger 412 Non-ger 511 Non-ger 615 Non-ger
112 Non-ger 213 Ger 312 Non-ger 413 Non-ger 512 Non-ger 616 Non-ger
113 Non-ger 214 Non-ger 313 Non-ger 414 Non-ger 617 Non-ger
114 Non-ger 215 Non-ger 314 Non-ger 415 Non-ger Nalaikh
115 Non-ger 216 Non-ger 315 Non-ger 416 Non-ger 701 Ger
116 Non-ger 217 Non-ger 317 Non-ger 417 Non-ger 702 Non-ger
117 Non-ger 218 Non-ger 318 Non-ger 418 Non-ger 703 Ger
118 Non-ger 219 Non-ger 319 Non-ger 704 Non-ger
119 Non-ger 220 Ger 320 Non-ger Baganuur
120 Non-ger 221 Ger 322 Ger 801 Non-ger
222 Ger 323 Ger 802 Ger
223 Ger 324 Ger 803 Non-ger
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Table 5.13: Correlation between alternative models and methods, ger frontier
Pearson correlation coecients
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.849 1
Model 3, order-m 0.8775 0.9716 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.9478 0.8498 0.8703 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.7973 0.9511 0.918 0.8822 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.8262 0.9311 0.9489 0.9038 0.9749 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
Spearman rank correlations
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.844 1
Model 3, order-m 0.874 0.971 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.804 0.965 0.930 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.963 0.844 0.869 0.855 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.836 0.940 0.961 0.969 0.885 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
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Table 5.14: Correlation between alternative models and methods, non-ger frontier
Pearson correlation coecients
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.887 1
Model 3, order-m 0.930 0.918 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.943 0.878 0.894 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.855 0.971 0.887 0.899 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.864 0.850 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
Spearman rank correlations
M 1, m M 2, m M 3, m M 1, α M 2, α M 3, α
Model 1, order-m 1
Model 2, order-m 0.894 1
Model 3, order-m 0.932 0.912 1
Model 1, order-alpha 0.955 0.895 0.906 1
Model 2, order-alpha 0.865 0.977 0.888 0.901 1
Model 3, order-alpha 0.884 0.869 0.873 0.913 0.879 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
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Table 5.15: Correlations between scores with one and two production functions, ger
frontier
Pearson correlation coecients
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.870 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.873 0.958 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.848 0.969 0.949 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.947 0.815 0.838 0.849 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.839 0.935 0.943 0.972 0.878 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
Spearman rank correlations
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.875 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.881 0.966 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.852 0.974 0.957 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.949 0.820 0.849 0.844 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.841 0.939 0.951 0.971 0.874 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
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Table 5.16: Correlations between scores with one and two production functions,
non-ger frontier
Pearson correlation coecients
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.872 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.926 0.921 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.863 0.945 0.904 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.959 0.858 0.902 0.887 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.918 0.885 0.955 0.918 0.930 1
All Pearson correlations are signicant at the 95% condence level.
Spearman rank correlations
M1, 1 fr M2, 1 fr M3, 1 fr M1, 2 fr M2, 2 fr M3, 2 fr
Model 1, 1 frontier 1
Model 2, 1 frontier 0.880 1
Model 3, 1 frontier 0.932 0.924 1
Model 1, 2 frontiers 0.864 0.946 0.902 1
Model 2, 2 frontiers 0.957 0.872 0.915 0.894 1
Model 3, 2 frontiers 0.915 0.886 0.955 0.912 0.932 1
All null hypothesis of independence between the variables are rejected
with a condence level of more than 99%.
Chapter 6
General conclusion
Through a methodological review and three empirical studies, this thesis provides
evidence on the issue of eciency of health systems, as a means of heading towards
Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development Goal of Good Health
and well-being.
Chapter 2 is a methodological review of the nonparametric measures of eciency.
The reference models, DEA and FDH, suer from several aws that have been dealt
with in the last decade. Nevertheless, the introduction of environmental issue still
raises some diculties that have been questioned in empirical Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Chapter 3 gives some empirical evidence about the macroeconomic eciency of
health systems in a sample of 120 low and middle income countries from 1997 to
2014. Countries are assumed to produce some maternal and juvenile survival with
private and public health expenditures. Health expenditures increased over the
study period (particularly private expenditures), and the mortality rates declined
in most countries of the sample. As it is impossible to compare countries per-
formance without considering the dierent contraints thay have to face, GDP per
capita is introduced in the model as a non-discretionary input, i.e. an input that
countries cannot control. GDP per capita is a proxy of economic developement
and capacity, it is positively correlated to the level of education, to infrasructure
for instance, factors that inuence the production of health in a country. Technical
eciency is found to increase from 1997 to 2014, meaning the variability in health
systems performances decreased. One of the result is that low income countries are
mostly assessed as ecient, which is surprising economically, considered the poor
performances of their health systems. This result is due to the way frontier models
estimate frontier, looking for peers with worst or same environment, and it is a
limitation od the implementation of frontier models in macroeconomic context.
Chapter 4 and 5 allow entering the "black box" of health system to provide some
information about sources of ineciencies. They both rely on survey data.
Chapter 4 sheds the light of the activity and eciency of a sample of 30 Township
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Health Centers in the prefecture of Weifang, Shandong province, China. In average,
production of health services could increase by 30% for the same resources.
The interest of the chapter also consists in the study period, which includes the
implementation of a major pharmaceutical reform. Before this reform, the medicine
provision chain was highly inecient, in the sense that it delivers some poor quality
and very expenses drugs to Chinese households. This was due to strategic behav-
iors from healthcare providers and drug suppliers. The 2009 reform thus aimed at
breaking those perverse incentives to increase the eciency of the system. The re-
sults of our study suggest that it did not reach this objective, because drug revenue
were replaced by subsides without any clear incentives mechanism. The asymme-
try information went from the relation between health providers and patients (the
patients were not sure that the drugs they were prescribed were necessary to their
healing, and that they paid a fair price for those drugs) to the relation between
health providers and nancing authorities (if subsidies are not linked to THCs per-
formance, there is no way to be sure that they maximize their eorts). The issue is
still unsolved in this matter.
This chapter also highlights a possible oversizing of THCs, given the catchment area.
Thinking in terms of optimal allocation of resources, deepening in benet package
of the insurance scheme (i.e. working of the deamand side of healthcare) appears to
be a greater priority than adding human and physical resources to the system.
Chapter 5 focuses on the activity and eciency of the Family Heath Centers of
Ulan-Bator, Mongolia. The activities of those primary healthcare are limited to
prevention and basic healthcare, that are provided for free to households. Given
that out-of-pocket payments represent more than 40% of total health expenditures,
it is crucial to spur activity of primary healthcare facilities. Yet, the assessment of
the eciency scores concludes the activity could increase, in average, by 30%, for
the same inputs. Brokes to FHC activity, and eciency seem to come from two
dierent sides. First, the remuneration amount and composition (between xed and
incentives) have to be improved. In our discussion, the administrative burden and
the low wages were a source of discontent, leading to demotivation to work and
ineciency.
Apart from the sta remuneration, the contract linking the FHC to health author-
ities (Ulan-Bator city and Ministry of Health) could also be reworked, in order to
include a actual threat in the case where health is not provided in a satisfying way.
Both of our two studies highlight the crucial stewardship role of health authorities,
to anticipate and avoid ineciencies due to agency relation. If health reforms are
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not thought in a global way, strategic behaviors will lower their positive eects.
The demand size is also a determinant of health facilities eciency in the two case
studies. Patients' ability to pay, perceptions and expectations about health facilities
are crucial components of healthcare facilities. In developing countries, a deance
is often observed towards primary healthcare facilities particularly. Patients prefer
to bypass the referral system and pay for higher user fees than going to THCs in
China, or FHCs in Ulan-Bator. In the perspective of responsiveness, the improve-
ment of quality of healthcare is essential, for two reasons: rst, for itself, and second,
because if the quality of healthcare is poor, people will reject those facilities. Those
who can aord it will go to other facilities, and the other will not seek for care at all.
The empirical works of this thesis also raise some questions in a methodological
point of view, about the introduction of environmental variables in eciency anal-
ysis. Chapter 2 presents the dierent available empirical strategies: one-, two- and
three-stage models and conditional models.
From a theoretical point of view, conditional models are to be preferred, as they do
not rely on the separability assumption, and they do not assume that the environ-
mental variable has a positive or negative eect on performance. Moreover, they
some eciency scores purges from the eect of the environment. Empirically, they
need a large data set, particularly to introduce several environmental variables to
the model, that can make their implementation dicult.
Then, several options are available to the researcher. The choice between them
depends upon several criteria. First, it depends upon the objective of the study.
If there are several potential determinants to eciency scores, and the researcher
aims at determining which one(s) is(are) signicantly associated to the scores, then
the second-stage procedures are a useful tool. Moreover, they do not assume that
environmental variable are positively or negatively related to eciency, which is
interesting in terms of exploratory study. It is the choice that has been made in
Chapter 4 and 5 to estimate the determinants of eciency scores.
If the researcher wants scores that are purged from the eect of environment, then
one-stage models are an option widely used in the empirical literature, especially
in macroeconomic studies. That is why it has been the choice made in Chapter
3. DMUs are compared to peers that are subjected to an environment at least as
defavorable as them, in the sample. As a consequence, observations experiencing the
worst environment (in Chapter 3, exhibiting very low values of GDP per capita) will
automatically assessed as ecent. This is a limit of this method, because it implies
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that subsaharian countries, with very poor health status and GDP per capita, are
assessed as ecient. Yet, there is much to improve in those countries in terms of
health system performance.
As a global conclusion, eciency has become a major path to UHC, and the attain-
ment of the third SDG, as a way to get "more health for the money". Eciency can
either be considered on a macroeconomic level, as the transformation of nancial
resources into health outcomes. Those performance assessment provides informa-
tion for the policy makers, but there results have to be considered with precaution,
because there multiple factors that aect the "health" production and no entirely
satisfying way to take them into account, in terms of data and statistical tools.
Eciency can also be considered at a lower level, assessing the production of health
outputs and not outcomes. In this case, it can provide some evidence to the microe-
conomic phenomenon that prevent the system to be globally ecient.
Those studies lead to other issues to be dealt with. Due to a lack of data, this thesis
does not tackle directly the question of the quality of care, though it is essential
to the assessment of a health system performance. Further studies should increase
indicators of quality (through mortality rate, readmissions for instance) and study
more deeply their relation with eciency. Assessment of the quality of care can also
be done relatively to patient expectations. This is another path for extensions of this
thesis: having a better knowledge of the demand side: what do people want ? Are
they satised ? People are not only patients but also coproducers of health through
their compliance to prescriptions, and global health bevahiors (Frenk, 2007). They
can lower, or spur a policy eectiveness, so a better knowledge of their beliefs and
expectations, put in relation with socio-economic characterictics give also give some
useful pieces of information to policy makers.

